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This dissertation investigates the adverbs ‘again’ and ‘almost’. These adverbs can “look inside” a 
predicate and modify just the result state. Sentence-final again modifying a complex predicate is 
ambiguous between a repetitive and a restitutive reading; almost modifying a complex predicate is 
ambiguous between a counterfactual and scalar reading. Chapter 2 examines you ‘again’ in Mandarin 
Chinese. Many researchers have argued that the repetitive vs. restitutive ambiguity is derived structurally, 
with a single ‘again’ attaching to different structural positions. This account is difficult to maintain in 
Mandarin, however. The adverb you ‘again’ can only occur pre-verbally, which suggests that it is 
adjoined at the vP level or higher, leading to a prediction that only the repetitive reading will be available. 
Mandarin nonetheless allows a restitutive reading. This would seem to rule out a syntactic analysis, but I 
argue that there is indeed a structural ambiguity in Mandarin. The evidence comes from scope interactions 
between ‘again’ and an indefinite object.  Interestingly, languages vary in whether their counterpart to 
English again permits a restitutive reading with goal-PP constructions. In Chapter 3 I address how 
English-speaking children acquire restitutive again with goal-PP constructions, given the cross-linguistic 
variation. Examining the parental input of four children, I show that parental uses of restitutive again with 
goal-PP constructions are infrequent and (usually) ambiguous. However, an experiment shows that many 
children nonetheless achieve a surprising degree of facility with these restitutive readings by a fairly 
young age. I propose that in this case children rely on more general evidence about the syntax of English 
goal-PP constructions, together with knowledge of a basic semantics for again, to deduce the restitutive 
reading.  Chapter 4 examines English almost, focusing on an intervention effect: an intervening manner 
adverb blocks its scalar reading. I develop an account of the intervention effect, which crucially relies on 
two assumptions: (a) a posited minimality constraint such that almost cannot skip potential targets; (b) the 
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Since the second half of the twentieth century, there has been an increasing interest in cases 
where an expression (e.g. quantifiers) is interpreted in a position that is different from the 
position it seems to occupy in the syntax. In this dissertation I investigate a particular subclass of 
such phenomena revolving around what are called “decomposition adverbs”, such as ‘again’ and 
‘almost’. Different from most other adverbs, these adverbs have a unique property of looking 
inside a complex predicate and modifying just the result state. For example, in a sentence with a 
lexical accomplishment verb open and sentence-final again (1), the sentence is ambiguous: First 
of all, it has a reading which presupposes that the agent has performed the action before (1a), 
called the “repetitive reading”. Under this reading, again is associated with the event represented 
by the whole sentence “John opened the door”. Another interpretation, called the “restitutive 
reading” presupposes only that the door has been open before (1b), with an example provided 
under (1b). Under the restitutive reading, again seems to be associated with the result state of the 
predicate open the door, which can be interpreted as ‘causing the door to become open. 
 
(1) John opened the door again. 
a. repetitive: John has opened the door before.  
b. restitutive: The door had been open before.  
[example: Bill was showing John how to open the door of the lab. He opened it first as a 




Like sentence-final again, preverbal almost modifying an accomplishment verb is also 
ambiguous: First, it has a “counterfactual” reading, in which the agent got close to start the 
action represented by the predicate but did not implement it at all (2a). Another interpretation, 
called the “scalar” reading, indicates that the agent initiated the action but the result state was not 
achieved (2b). In other words, John performed a “closing” action and as a result the door is 
almost closed. As these adverbs seem to be able to penetrate a complex predicate and merely 
modify the result state, they are often used to support lexical decompositional approaches for 
complex predicates (see McCawley 1971, a.o.), hence the term “decomposition” adverbs. 
 
(2) John almost closed the door. 
a. counterfactual: John was about to start closing the door but he did not start the action.  
[example: John planned to close the door but forgot to do it the last minute because of an 
emergency phone call.] 
b. scalar: John got close to fully closing the door (because it was too heavy). 
 
The unique property of these adverbs raises a series of questions: How can a decomposition 
adverb penetrate a complex predicate and modify just the result state? Do these adverbs behave 
the same cross-linguistically? How can children acquire the property of these adverbs in their 
target language? Understanding these issues will shed light on the nature of the mapping from 
syntactic structures to semantic interpretation and the acquisition of this mapping. In particular, 
they will help us understand the following broad questions that this dissertation attempts to 
address: How is interpretation derived when there is an apparent mismatch between surface 
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structure and compositional semantics? What is the nature of cross-linguistic variation at the 
syntax-semantics-pragmatics interfaces? How can children make the correct choices? 
In this dissertation, I focus on three specific questions that fall under the overarching 
questions above: the first one concerns the ambiguity of you ‘again’ in Mandarin Chinese, the 
second concerns children’s acquisition of again in English goal-PP constructions, and the third 
concerns the ambiguity of English almost. I discuss these questions in each of the following 
chapters. 
The main contribution of this dissertation lies in the following aspects: First of all, for the 
case of again, the predominant view that its ambiguity is structural rather than lexical has been 
successful for many languages. However, as we will see in Chapter 2, Mandarin you seems to be 
a counterexample, which no previous studies have investigated. In the dissertation I provide a 
solution, thus fix a loose end in the cross-linguistic picture of the ambiguous ‘again’.  
After investigating the underlying knowledge native speakers have about ‘again’, I further 
explore In Chapter 3 how native speakers end up having the knowledge of ‘again’, focusing on 
the acquisition of again in English goal-PP constructions. This construction has some features 
that make its acquisition process interesting: In the first place, the construction is subject to 
cross-linguistic variability. In addition, the direct input in the care-givers speech is scarce. Most 
importantly, ambiguity in the input is rampant, due to the fact that the more frequent 
interpretation of the construction entails the less frequent interpretation (across-languages). 
Studying the acquisition of this construction is furthermore of interest since it also concerns the 
acquisition of a prototypical semantic/pragmatic phenomenon: presupposition.  
For the case of almost, I provide in Section 4 a new piece of data on an intervention effect: 
when a manner adverb intervenes between almost and the predicate, the “scalar” reading 
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becomes unavailable. For example, John almost slowly closed the door cannot mean that John 
performed a slow action of closing, but did not close the door fully. An explanation of the 
intervention effect will shed light on the analysis of almost. I develop an account of the 
intervention effect, which bears on the semantics of almost and the source of its ambiguity. 
Following a scalar analyses of almost (Hitzeman 1992; Penka 2006; Amaral & Del Prete 2010; 
Eckardt 2007), I derive the intervention effect by examining the consequences when almost 








It is well-known that a sentence with an accomplishment predicate modified by again (1) is 
ambiguous between a repetitive reading and a restitutive reading. For the repetitive reading, the 
event of John opening the door has happened at a previous time (1a). For the restitutive reading, 
John did not open the door before, but simply restored the door to its original state (1b). Either 
the door had been open from the very beginning or someone else had opened it before.  
 
(1)  John opened the door again. 
a. Repetitive: John had opened the door before. 
b. Restitutive: The door had been open before. 
 
There are three possible ways to account for the ambiguity of (1): structural, lexical or 
pragmatic. The structural approach suggests that the ambiguity arises because (1) has different 
possible syntactic structures (see von Stechow, 1995, 1996; Rapp & Stechow, 1999; among 
others). In a head-initial language like English, when again occurs in sentence final position as in 
(1), it can potentially adjoin to different positions in the structure. The lexical approach instead 
argues that the ambiguity has nothing to do with the structure, but is a result of again having 
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different meanings (see Dowty, 1979; Fabricius-Hansen, 1983, 2001; Jäger & Blutner, 2000; 
among others). Since (1a) entails (1b), an alternative way to analyze the ambiguity is to treat the 
repetitive reading (1a) as a special case of the restitutive reading (1b). And the 
pragmatics/context decides which meaning is intended. I refer to this analysis as the naïve 
pragmatic approach. 
Most of the previous studies focus on English again and German wieder, which can occur 
in different positions of a sentence. In this chapter, I examine you ‘again’ in Mandarin Chinese. 
Like English, Chinese is also a head-initial language. Nevertheless, Chinese differs from English 
in that the position of you ‘again’ is relatively fixed: it can only occur preverbally (2a) but not 
postverbally (2b-c).  
 
(2) a. Zhangsan  you  da-kai   le   men. 
   Zhangsan  again  hit-open  Asp door. 
b. *Zhangsan  da-kai   le   men  you. 
    Zhangsan hit-open  Asp door  again. 
c. *Zhangsan da-kai  le   you men. 
    Zhangsan hit-open Asp again door. 
(a-c): Zhangsan open the door again. 
 
Like English again and German wieder, however, a bare sentence with you ‘again’, such as 
(2a), also exhibits an ambiguity between a repetitive and a restitutive reading, which raises the 
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following question: How do we account for the ambiguity? Is the ambiguity structural, lexical or 
pragmatic? 
In this chapter I argue that despite the preverbal position of you ‘again’, its ambiguity is 
structural rather than lexical or pragmatic. The crucial evidence comes from the scope interaction 
between you ‘again’ and an indefinite object.  
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, I review previous analyses of English 
again. In addition, I present two arguments in support of the structural analysis: word order and 
the scope interaction between again and an indefinite object. Chinese you also displays a 
repetitive/restitutive ambiguity. However, we will see in Section 3 that the ambiguity cannot be 
explained straightforwardly by a structural analysis of English again, given the rigid distribution 
of you. In Section 4, I examine the scope interaction between you ‘again’ and an indefinite object 
to tease apart different analyses. The unavailability of some logically possible reading supports 
the structural analysis and casts doubt on other approaches. To solve the dilemma how the 
ambiguity can be accounted for structurally, I propose in Section 5 three possible analyses: overt 
movement with LF reconstruction, overt movement with semantic reconstruction and pure 
semantic lowering without movement. In Section 6, I compare these analyses by examining how 
negation and adverb affect the scope of you and by investigating how the interpretation of again 
across languages bears on different analyses. Empirical data favors LF reconstruction and 
semantic reconstruction analysis, both of which assume the movement of you ‘again’. However, 
it remains an open question whether reconstruction occurs in syntax or semantics. Before 
concluding the chapter, in Section 7 I extend the analysis of you ‘again’ to chongxin ‘repeatedly’, 
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an adverb which has a similar meaning as you ‘again’. 
 
2. Analyses of English again 
In this section, I review previous studies on the ambiguity of English again and German wieder, 




2.1. The structural analysis 
The basic idea of the structural analysis is that again always denotes repetition. The differences 
between repetitive and restititive reading lie in what is repeated: the whole event or just its result 
state. Starting from von Stechow (1995, 1996), a number of studies argue for the structural 
analysis. Here I focus on the analysis of English again presented in Beck and Johnson (2004) 
and Beck (2005), which inherit the spirit from von Stechow (1995, 1996). For the convenience of 
discussion, slight modifications are made about some technical details but the crucial aspects 
remain the same.  
Let us start from the denotation of again proposed by von Stechow (1996), which is 




                                                             
1
 As far as I know, previous studies did not discuss the naïve pragmatic approach. However, Beck (2006) and Klein 




(3) Let P be a property of eventualities and let e be an eventuality. 
[[again]](P)(e) is defined only if e’ [ [[MAX]](P)(e’) = 1 & e’ < e]. 
Where defined, [[again]](P)(e) = 1 iff P(e) = 1. (von Stechow 1996: 95, ex 3-7) 
MAX is a symbol of type <<s,t>,<s,t>>. [[MAX]](P)(e) = 1 iff P(e) and there is no e’ such 
that e is a proper part of e’ and P(e’) = 1. (von Stechow 1996: 95, ex 3-8) 
 
As illustrated in (3), again introduces a presupposition that the proposition (a set of events) 
expressed by P was already true of another event e’. This other event e’ must have been entirely 
before the current event e, which is achieved by the MAX operator. 
Under the structural analysis, the presupposition of again is determined by again’s sister. 
Thus the different readings of again comes from where it adjoins to in syntax: When again 
modifies the whole event, the repetitive reading is derived. When again modifies the resultative 
state, the restitutive reading is derived.  
To see how the analysis works, we first discuss the analysis of sentences with complex 
predicates, such as (4). Intuitively, the complex predicate painted the wall white can be 
decomposed into an Agentive event (wall painting) and a resultative state (the wall becoming 
white). The LF of (4a) is presented in (4b), in which the object NP the wall raises to semantically 






(4) a. Sally painted the wall white. 
b. 
 
the wall  1     vP 
 
               DP          v’ 
 
              Sally      v        VP 
 
                          DP       V’ 
 
                              t1     V        AP 
 
                                    paint    PRO1 white 
 
Several assumptions underlie the LF in (4b): First of all, I follow Kratzer (1996) in the 
assumption that an external argument (Agent) is not a true argument of the verb, but is 
introduced by a functional head in the syntax (v in the case of (4b)). v denotes a relation between 
individuals and events, and v combines with VP by Event Identification.  
Second, since Agent is not a true argument of the verb, paint is of type <e, <s,t>>, which 
requires type e as its argument.
2
 However, in (4b) its complement is a proposition of type <s,t>. 
To solve the type mismatch, von Stechow (1995) proposes Principle R, a special interpretation 
principle that combines the verb with a proposition. 
 
(5) Principle (R): 
If α=[Vγ SCβ] and β’ is of type <s, t> and γ’ is of type <e, …<e, <s, t>>> (an n-place 
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[[α']] =λx1 . . . λxn λe. γe (x1) . . . (xn) & ∃e’ [BECOMEe’ (β’) & CAUSE(e’)(e)] 
 
Informal descriptions of BECOME and CAUSE are given below (Beck & Johnson, 2004; 
Beck, 2005, see Dowty 1979, von Stechow 1996 for the formal details). 
 
(6) [[BECOME]] (P)(e) = 1 iff e is the smallest event such that P is not true of the  prestate of 
e but P is true of the result state of e. 
(7) [[CAUSE]] (e’)(e) = 1 iff e’ occurred, e occurred and if e hadn’t occurred then e’ wouldn’t 
have occurred. 
With all these assumptions, the tree in (4b) is interpreted within an event semantics. (4a) has 
the denotation in (8). 
 
(8) [[ the wall 1 [Sally [v [t1 paint [PRO1 white]]]] ]]g  
=λe. [Sally is the Agent of e & e is an event of painting the wall & ∃e’ s.t. e’ is an event of 
the wall becomes white & CAUSE (e’)(e)] 
 
Now we can explain the ambiguity of again in (9a). Recall that again is of type <s,t><s,t> 
and the presupposition of again is determined by its sister. If again adjoins to vP or higher, as 
shown in (9b), we get the repetitive reading that Sally has painted the wall white before. If, on 







(9) a. Sally painted the wall white again. (repetitive/restitutive) 
b. [the wall 1 [   [vP Sally [v [VP t1 paint [AP PRO1 white]]]]   again ] ] 
c. [the wall 1 [vP Sally [v [VP t1 paint   [AP PRO1 white]   again ]]] ] 
 
Similar to a complex predicate like paint the wall white, an accomplishment predicate such 
as open modified by again also displays repetitive/restitutive ambiguity (1), even though the 
predicate does not provide us with a result state in an overt way. To make the result state 
accessible, the structural analysis resorts to lexical decomposition, assuming that a transitive verb 
open is decomposed into the adjectival root open, plus other material contributing a causal and a 
development component like CAUSE and BECOME. Crucially the decomposition is reflected in 
syntax. With this assumption, (10a) has the syntactic structure in (10b).
4,5
 Open is decomposed 
into the adjective open, plus a phonologically empty head, which contributes the the CAUSE and 
BECOME component. In overt syntax the adjective incorporates into the verbal head and 
appears as the transitive verb open. 
 
                                                             
3
 In principle, again can also adjoin to VP, yielding a reading that the action was performed before but perhaps by a 
different agent, i.e. someone other than Sally painted the wall white before (see von Stechow 1996, Rapp and von 
Stechow 1999 for some discussion). In fact, Nissenbaum (2006) argues that this adjunction site does exist. We will 
discuss Nissenbaum’s argument in the Section 2.4. 
4
 In (10b), I assume that the object the door moves to Spec of VP, so that it is consistent with (3b) in that the direct 
object also occupies Spec of VP. However, whether the object moves does not affect the interpretation of the 
sentence and the structural analysis of again. 
5
 Notice that in the structure in (4) the DP binds PRO in the resultative, whereas in (10) the DP starts in the 
resultative and moves out. The syntactic difference is reflected in cross-linguistic variation - some languages lack 
resultative constructions constructions as in (4), but they have lexical accomplishment verb as in (10). 
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(10) a. Sally opened the door. 
b.     vP 
 
               DP          v’ 
 
              Sally      v        VP 
 
                          DP  1     V’ 
 
                            the door  V        AP 
 
                                    Øv    open t1 
 
The underlying structure (10b) can be compositionally interpreted using the interpretation in 




(11) [[ØV]]=λpλe.∃e’[BECOMEe’(p) & CAUSE(e’)(e)] 
(12) [[ Sally [v [the door 1 [ Øv [open t1] ] ]] ]]
g
  
=λe.[Sally is the Agent of e & ∃e’ s.t. e’ is an event of the door becomes open & CAUSE 
(e’)(e)]. 
 
Similar as (9a), (13a) with again following open the door is also ambiguous between a 
repetitive and restitutive reading. The ambiguity derives from different positions again can 
adjoin to. If again adjoins to vP or higher (13b), we get the repetitive reading that Sally opened 
the door before. If again adjoins to AP (13c), the restitituve reading is derived. 
                                                             
6
 The denotation of the empty head ØV presented here is slightly different from the one presented in Beck and 
Johnson (2004) and Beck (2005), which assumes that the verb also takes an individual, the agent, as its argument. 
The modification is based on Kratzer (1996), who proposes that the agent is not a true argument of the verb, but is 
introduced by a functional head (v in our case). 
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(13) a. Sally opened the door again. (repetitive/restitutive) 
b. [   [vP Sally [v [VP the door 1 [ Øv [AP open t1] ] ]] ]   again] 
c. [vP Sally [v [VP the door 1 [ Øv [   [AP open t1]   again ] ] ]] ] 
 
2.2. The lexical analysis 
Contrary to the structural analysis, which argues that there is only one again, a lexical analysis 
claims that there is more than one again. Varying in details, different versions of lexical analyses 
share the common assumption that the ambiguity of again has nothing to do with the structure 
but simply because the lexical entry itself is ambiguous. The idea can be traced back to Dowty 
(1979), who assumes decomposition in semantics but not in syntax. The ambiguity of again is 
accounted for by postulating two agains: one again accounts for the repetitive reading whereas 
the other one accounts for the restitutive reading. For Dowty (1979), this ‘lexical ambiguity’ is 
not accidental homophony; instead, some sort of type-shifting is involved between two agains, 
as represented in (14). According to the type shifting rule, the restitutive again is interpreted as if 
the repetitive again takes narrower scope than CAUSE + BECOME. 
 
(14) ∀x∀P∀p NEC [againres (^[CAUSE(^[P(x)], ^[BECOME (p)])]  
 ↔ [CAUSE(^[P(x)], ^[BECOME (^[againrep(p)])])] 
Where NEC is the necessity operator    [Dowty 79: 267, modified by von Stechow, 1995] 
 
The idea has been implemented since then in various different forms. For example, Jäger 
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and Blutner (2000) propose that again is lexically ambiguous between a repetitive and a 
restitutive adverb. The former says that the property is instantiated by an event only if there was 
an event of the same type in the past (15a). The latter denotes that the property is instantiated by 
an event if the result state of the event occurred in the past (15b). RESULT takes a proposition 
and yields a proposition that is the result of the original. OBTAINS applies to a possible 
event/state and says that it occurs in the real world. 
 
(15) a. [[againrep]]=λpλe. p(e): ∃e’<e (OBTAINS (e’) & p(e’)) 
b. [[againres]]= λpλe. p(e): ∃s<e (OBTAINS (s) & RESULT(p)(s)) 
 
Fabricius-Hansen (2001) proposes a slightly different version of lexical analysis from 
Dowty (1979) and Jäger and Blutner (2000). In addition to expressing repetition (16a); again can 
also express reversal of the direction (counterdirectional again) (16b), which leads to the 
restitutive reading.  
 
(16) a. [[again1]](P<s,t>)(e) =1 iff P(e) & e’[e’<e & P(e’)] 
               =0 iff P (e) & e’[e’<e & P (e’)] 
        undefined otherwise. 
b. [[again2]](P<s, t>)(e) =1 iff P (e) & e’ [e’<e & PC (e’) & resPc (e’) =preP (e)] 
        =0 iff  P (e) & e’ [e’<e & PC (e’) & resPc (e’) =preP (e)] 
        undefined otherwise. 
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According to (16b), counterdirectional again takes a predicate of events P and an event e as 
its arguments. It has a presupposition that there is a preceding event e’, of which the 
counterdirectional predicate PC is true. The result state resPc of e’ is the starting point or prestate 
prep of the new event e.  
Here is how the restitutive reading of open the door again is derived under (16b). The 
counterdirectional predicate of “opening the door” is “closing the door”. The result state of a 
“closing” event is the door being closed, which can be the starting point of the event of “opening 
the door”. Given the availability of a counterdirectional predicate, we can derive the restitutive 
reading that the door is restored to its original opening state, because the availability of a 
counterdirectional event “closing the door” guarantees that the door was open before. However, 
it is a puzzle how this analysis can be carried over to predicates like ‘hammer the metal flat’ 
because it is not clear what its counterdirectional event is.
7
 In addition, under this analysis 
“ambiguity” means accidental homophony, which is suspicious in face of the cross-linguistic 
recurrence of the ambiguity.  
 
2.3. Arguments for the structural analysis I: Word order 
Von Stechow (1996) demonstrates that word order determines the ambiguity of again, which 
convincingly shows that the prerequisites for restitutive again are indeed syntactic but not lexical. 
In German when wieder ‘again’ follows a definite direct object, both restitutive and repetitive 
                                                             
7
 One can argue that in this case, the counter-directional event can be an event that yields ‘matal not flat’, for 
example, bend the metal, warp the metal, etc. One possible challenge for such an analysis would be to identify a 
unique counter-directional event (Jonathan Bobaljik, p.c.). 
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readings are available (17a). However, when wieder ‘again’ precedes the direct object, only the 
repetitive reading is available (16b). In English, if again is at sentence final position, both 
repetitive and restitutive readings are available (18a). On the other hand, if again precedes the 




(17) a.  dass Ali die Tür wieder öffnete.     (restitutive and repetitive) 
     that Ali the door again opened. 
b.  dass Ali wieder die Tür öffnete.     (repetitive only) 
     that Ali again the door opened. 
that Ali opened the door again. 
(18) a. John opened the door again.       (repetitive and restitutive) 
b. John again opened the door.       (repetitive only) 
 
The lack of resitutive reading in (17b) and (18b) is puzzling under a lexical analysis, 
                                                             
8
 Von Stechow (1996) points out there exists some counterexamples to the German generalization. Some verbs in 
German, for example, verlassen ‘leave’, allows the restitutive reading when combining with wieder ‘again’, even if 
wieder precedes the object (i). 
 
(i) Als  Anna wieder das Haus  verlieβ,    (repetitive and restitutive) 
when  Anna again the house  left 
When Anna left the house again. 
 
Von Stechow accounts for the counterexample by complicating the syntactic decomposition of verbs in 
question, which allows the object to surface in a lower position. Consequently, wieder ‘again’ can adjoin to the 
constituent denoting the result state and still precedes the object. Different from German, verbs like leave in English 
are not counterexamples of the English generalization, as shown in (ii) (Beck & Johnson, 2004). This is consistent 
with von Stechow’s account, because the verb surfaces as the functional head v in overt syntax. Since the 
interpretation of English again depends on the relative position of the verb and the adverb, preceding again only has 
the repetitive reading. 
 




because it is hard to explain how the restitutive reading disappeared. Similarly, a naïve pragmatic 
analysis which argues that the repetitive reading is just a special case of the restitutive reading 
cannot explain why the restitutive reading is unavailable either.
9
 On the contrary, the contrast 
between the two sentences in (17) and (18) follows directly from the structural analysis. Let us 
focus on the English examples in (18), whose syntactic structures are presented in (19).  
(19)                vP 
 
again (repetitive)  DP          v’     again (repetitive) 
 
              Sally      v        VP 
 
                           DP   1     V’ 
 
                            the door  V        AP 
 
                                  Øv      open t1   again (restitutive) 
When again occupies the sentence final position, it can either adjoins to AP or vP, which gives us 
the ambiguity. However, based on the assumption that open undergoes incorporation and moves 
to v in overt syntax, preverbal again can only adjoin to vP or higher positions. Thus only the 
repetitive reading is available.
10
 Therefore, the arguments in (17) and (18) are convincingly in 
favor of the structural analysis. 
 
                                                             
9
 In the literature there are more complicated pragmatic analysis (see Beck, 2006; Klein, 2001). 
10
 Noting that left adjunction of again leads to a wrong prediction for a predicate like paint the wall white: Since 
there is no incorporation of paint, there should be a position for restitutive again to the left of white. Therefore, paint 
the wall again white is expected to give rise to a restitutive reading. However, it does not seem so. Rather, white 
seems to be an afterthought of sorts (Thank Jonathan Bobaljik for pointing this out). This may has something to do 
with the fact that separating a verb from its complements with an adverb leads to ill-formedness. As shown in the 
examples below, this phenomenon is quite robust in English.  
 
(iii) a. *I hit again bill. 
 b. I consider usually him unintelligent. 
c. I want always to win.  
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2.4. Argument for the structural analysis II: Two kinds of restitutive readings 
So far we have been focusing on a two-way dichotomy of again: repetitive vs. restitutive. In this 
section, we discuss the restitutive reading of again, which concerns the repetition of a result state. 
Notice that both scenarios in (20a) and (20b) are compatible with the restitutive reading of (20). 
As a matter of fact, (20b) can be treated as a special case for (20a). 
 
(20) Sally painted the wall white again. 
a. The wall was white before. 
b. Someone other than Sally, say, Bill painted the wall white before. 
(21) a. Sally painted the wall white. 
b. [the wall 1 [vP Sally [v’ v [VP t1 [V’ paint [AP PRO1 white]]]]]] 
 
The counterpart of (20) without again, (21a), has an LF presented in (21b). Under the 
structural analysis, when again adjoins to vP or higher, the repetitive reading is obtained. When 
it adjoins to AP, the restitutive reading is derived. In principle, again can also adjoin to VP, 
yielding a reading that the action was performed before but perhaps by a different agent, which 
corresponds to the scenario in (20b). Investigating the interaction between again and existential 
quantifiers in the object position, Nissenbaum (2006) argues that this adjunction site does exist. 
In other words, there are two types of restitutive readings: low vs. high restitutive reading in 
Nissenbaum’s term. When again adjoins to AP, we have the low restitutive reading that the wall 
was white before and Sally restored the wall to its original state (20a). When again adjoins to VP, 
20 
 
the derived reading corresponds to a scenario in which the action was performed before but 
perhaps by a different agent (20b).  
Evidence in favor of two restitutive readings comes from the interaction between again and 
an indefinite object. Assuming the LF in (22b), Nissenbaum (2006) makes the following 
predictions about possible scope readings for (22a). First of all, for a low restitutive reading 
(with again adjoined to AP), the indefinite object can never be interpreted inside the scope of 
again, because it is base generated in Spec, VP. The prediction is borne out: In the scenario in 
(23), it is unspecified which tree will be painted blue. It could be the same tree or a different one. 
It is felicitous to continue the scenario with the sentence in (23a). The usage of pronoun in (23a) 
forces an interpretation in which the same tree was painted blue. As a contrast, (23b) does not 
serve as felicitous continuation of the scenario. This is expected under Nissenbaum’s account: 
The usage of an indefinite object in (23b) forces an interpretation in which a different tree was 
painted blue, which cannot be derived under the structure in (22b).  Although for the low 
restitutive reading, wide scope of again with respect to the indefinite object is not available, the 
indefinite object can be interpreted outside the scope of again. This is illustrated in (24), in 
which the sentence with again and the indefinite object is a felicitous continuation of the 
scenario. In (24) the tree I painted blue has to be previously blue simply because of the universal 
quantifier in the scenario. Contrary to the low restitutive reading, for a high restitutive reading, 
the indefinite object can be interpreted inside the scope of again. Again the prediction is borne 
out: (25) is a scenario in which I painted a different tree blue from someone else. And it is 
felicitous to continue the scenario with a sentence having again and an indefinite object. 
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(22) a. I painted one of my trees blue again. 
  b.              vP 
 
               DP          v’             again (repetitive) 
 
                I        v        VP 
 
                           DP        V’    again (high restitutive) 
 
                     one of my trees  V       AP 
again (low restitutive) 
                                  paint    PRO1 blue  
(23) Scenario A:  
One of my birch trees came up blue when it was a sapling; it later turned white like the rest. But I 
liked the idea of a blue birch tree so much that... 
a. I painted it blue again. 
b. #I painted one of my trees blue again. 
(24) Scenario B:  
All of my birch trees were blue when they were saplings; they later turned white like birch trees 
are supposed to be. But I liked the idea of a blue birch tree so much that... 
I painted one of my trees blue again. 
(25) Scenario C:  
One of my birch trees had been painted blue when I moved in. It later died and had to be cut 
down. But I liked the idea of a blue birch tree so much that... 





Nissenbaum (2006) did not report whether the other three possible readings exist: high 
restitutive reading with again taking narrow scope, repetitive reading with again taking narrow 
scope and repetitive reading with again taking wide scope. My informants report that these 
readings are all available. The scope interaction between again and an indefinite object in 
English is summarized below. 
Table 2-1. Scope interaction between again and an indefinite object in English 
Low restitutive reading ∃>again #again>∃ 
High restitutive reading ∃>again again>∃ 
Repetitive reading ∃>again again>∃ 
 
The pattern in Table 2-1 is hard to account for under a lexical analysis: Why is it the case 
that for the low restitutive reading an indefinite object cannot be interpreted inside the 
presupposition of again but for the high restitutive reading it can? How does the pattern in Table 
2-1 bear on the naïve pragmatic analysis for again, which assumes that the repetitive reading and 
high restitutive reading are simply special cases for the low restitutive reading and it is the 
context that determines which reading is intended? If we simply compare the three readings of 
again (i.e. the repetitive reading, the high restitutive reading, and the low restitutive reading) 
under the same scope reading between again and the indefinite object, we notice that when the 
indefinite object is interpreted within the presupposition of again, the repetitive reading and the 
high restitutive reading are available, but the low restitutive reading is not. This is not consistent 
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3. The puzzle: The ambiguity of you ‘again’ in Mandarin Chinese 
In this study, I examine one of the equivalents of English again in Chinese, you. Like English 
again and German wieder, you is ambiguous between a repetitive reading and a restitutive 
reading. For instance, (26) is compatible with all three scenarios in (a-c). 
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 The conclusion that the scope facts presented in Table 2-1 challenge the naïve pragmatic analysis is based on the 
assumption that both the high restitutive reading and the repetitive reading with again taking wide scope entail the 
low restitutive reading with again taking wide scope. However, under some theory of presupposition projection, 
both the high restitutive reading and the repetitive reading with again taking wide scope also entail the low 
restitutive reading with again taking narrow scope. So we can formulate an alternative naïve pragmatic analysis for 
a sentence with again and an indefinite object, i.e. the high restitutive reading and the repetitive readings (either with 
again taking wide scope or narrow scope) are special cases of the low restitutive reading with again taking narrow 
scope. The context determines which meaning is intended.  
Let me elaborate on this idea. It remains controversial what the presupposition of sentences with a 
presupposition trigger bound in the scope of a generalized quantifier is. Heim (1983) and Schlenker (2008a,b) argue 
that sentences of the form given in (iv) trigger a universal presupposition in (v)a: every individual satisfying the 
property R expressed in the restrictor should also satisfy the presupposition triggered from the nuclear scope. On the 
other hand, Beaver (1994, 2001) argues that sentences in the form of (iv) triggers an existential presupposition 
schematized in (v)b: some individual satisfying the property R satisfy the presupposition triggered from the nuclear 
scope. George (2008) argues that the presupposition varies depending on the quantifier: for some quantifiers the 
presupposition is universal and for others it is not.  
 
(iv) Quantified sentence: [Qx: R(x)] Sp(x) 
in which Q stands for a generalized quantifier, R stands for its restrictor and Sp for its nuclear scope, and the 
subscript p indicates that this nuclear scope triggers a presupposition p. 
(v) a. Universal presupposition (Heim, 1983; Schlenker, 2008a,b): [∀x: R(x)] p(x) 
b. Existential presupposition (Beaver, 1994, 2001): [∃x: R(x)] p(x) 
 
Let us see how different theories predict about the presupposition of the low restitutive reading with narrow 
scope of again, using the sentence I painted one of my trees blue again in Nissenbaum (2006) as an example. Heim 
(1983) and Schlenker (2008a,b) predict that it carries a presupposition that every tree was blue before. Beaver (1994, 
2001) predict that it is presupposed that some tree was blue before. What George (2008) predicts is that either some 
tree was blue before or none of the trees was blue before. As we can tell, under Beaver’s (1994, 2001) theory, the 
low restitutive reading with again taking narrow scope is entailed by high restitutive reading with again taking wide 
scope (which presupposes that some tree was painted blue before) and repetitive reading with again taking wide 
scope (which presupposes that I painted some tree blue before). And if we adopt this naive pragmatic analysis, the 
scope facts presented in Table 2-1 does not serve as its counterexample.  
However, even if we assume Beaver’s (1994, 2001) theory and give credits to the naïve pragmatic analysis here, 
the naïve pragmatic analysis still faces other problems. For instance, it fails to account for the German and English 
sentences with again/wieder and a definite object (cf. (17) and (18)). 
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(26) Zhangsan you da-kai  le   men. 
 Zhangsan again hit-open Asp door. 
Zhangsan opened the door again. 
a. Repetitive reading 
Context: Zhangsan had opened the door before. After a while, someone else closed the door. 
Feeling hot,… 
b. Low restitutive reading 
Context: Lisi built a wardrobe for Zhangsan. He set the door on its hinges and then closed it. 
Curious what was inside the wardrobe, …12 
c. High restitutive reading 
Context: Lisi first opened the door because it was very hot. Later he closed the door. Feeling 
hot,… 
 
Different from English, in which again may occur in different positions, you ‘again’ in 
Chinese has a restricted distribution: It can precede the verb (26) but not follow the verb (27). 
 
(27) a. * Zhangsan  da-kai   le   men  you. 
     Zhangsan hit-open  Asp door  again. 
b.* Zhangsan da-kai  le   you men. 
     Zhangsan hit-open Asp again door. 
                                                             
12
 The scenario is adapted from Beck (2005). 
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The ambiguity of Chinese you between repetitive vs. restitutive reading raises the following 
questions: How can we account for the availability of restitutive reading of you ‘again’ in 
Mandarin Chinese? Is the ambiguity syntactical, lexical or pragmatic?  
Let us start by examining whether the structural analysis for English again can be applied 
directly to Chinese. To answer this question, we need to know the syntactic structure of 
resultative verb compounds (RVCs) in Chinese, combined with which you ‘again’ yields 
ambiguity. RVCs have received much attention in the liteature (see Li, 1990, 1995, 1999; Shibata, 
Sudo & Yashima, 2004; Sybesma, 1999; Tang, 1997; Wang, 2010; Zhang, 2001; among others). 
For expository convenience, here I assume a head-movement-plus-control analysis of RVC 
(Tang, 1997; Zhang, 2001). Other analyses of RVC are also compatible with what I am 
illustrating here. Part of the syntactic derivation of a sentence with RVC such as (28) is shown in 
(29). The resultative predicate X si ‘dead’ in (28) undergoes head movement to a functional head 
F. And then, it has to be attached to verb da ‘hit’, forming a V-V compound.13 
 
(28) Lisi da-si   le   na-zhi  zhanglang. 
Lisi hit-dead Asp that-CL cockroach. 
Lisi killed that cockroach. 
 
 
                                                             
13
 Zhang (2001) proposes an alternative to syntactically drive resultative verb compounds. She does not assume that 




                  vP 
 
               subj          v’ 
               Lisi 
                        v        VP 
 
                           obji       V’    
                         cockroach 
                                    V       FP 
                                   hit 
                                         F       XP 
 
                                           pro/PROi     X 
                                                      dead 
 
 
Apart from the analysis of RVC (29), I am following several assumptions listed below: First, 
assuming V-to-v movement in Mandarin Chinese, the V-V compound da-si ‘hit-dead’ ends up in 
v. Second, I assume that the adverb you ‘again’ has the same semantics as what von Stechow 
(1995, 1996) proposed for English again and German wieder. It selects a proposition of type 
<s,t> as its sister. Next, following Ernst (2002) and Tang (2001), I assume that you ‘again’ 
adjoins in syntax instead of being licensed in the spec position of functional categories 
(Alexiadou, 1997; Cinque, 1999). Based on these assumptions, the preverbal you ‘again’ should 
adjoin to vP or even higher in (29). Thus only the repetitive reading is expected instead of the 
restitutive reading. The ambiguity of you poses a problem for the structural analysis. 
In addition to bare sentences, the Chinese ba construction with you preceding ba also 
displays a three-way ambiguity, as illustrated in (30). It is generally assumed in the literature that 
ba is an overt realization of a recursive small v (see Sybesma, 1999; Huang, Li & Li, 2009). 
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Zhangsan  you ba  men  da-kai    le.  
Zhangsan  again BA   door  hit-open Asp. 
Zhangsan opened the door again. (repetitive, high restitutive, low restitutive) 
 
If the structural analysis cannot apply to Chinese you directly, could the ambiguity be 
derived lexically or pragmatically? Under the naïve pragmatic analysis, the ambiguity is 
determined by context. Under the lexical analysis, you is a polysemous lexical entry. In fact, in 
addition to the English-type lexical analysis, which postulates repetitive again and restitutive 
again, there exists an alternative lexical analysis for Mandarin. A variety of interpretations seem 
to cluster in the single lexical entry you. For example, you also has an additive meaning (31)-(32) 
(glossed as ADD), which English again does not have. You can also be used to express some 
mood, for instance, strengthening negation in (33).  
 
(31) Zhangsan xi  le  yifu,  you zuo  le   fan. 
Zhangsan wash Asp clothes, ADD make Asp meal. 




(32) Zuotian Zhangsan caifang le  san-ge  xuesheng, 
 Yesterday Zhangsan interview Asp three-CL student, 
jintian ta you  caifang le  liang-ge  laoshi. 
  today  he  ADD   interview  Asp  two-CL teacher 
Yesterday Zhangsan interviewed three students, and today he interviewed two teachers. 
(33) Ta you bu hui  chi ren,   ni  pa  shenme? 
He YOU not would eat human,  you fear what 
He would not eat human beings. What are you worried about? 
 
The repetitive and the high restitutive reading can be easily accommodated under the 
additive reading. Whether the low restitutive reading can also be accommodated is not obvious. 
In fact, some researchers even propose that the repetitive meaning of you can be reduced to its 
additive meaning (Shao & Rao, 1985; Tovena & Donazzan, 2008).
14
 Admitting that repetition 
and addition are conceptually closely related, I will not commit myself to a uniform analysis of 
you. Rather I would like to examine a potential lexical account for repetitive/restitutitve 
ambiguity: Assuming that repetition and addition are separate meanings, and the former derives 
the repetitive reading, is it possible that the so-called “restitutive reading” is in fact subsumed 
under the additive interpretation of you? One approach to evaluate this analysis is to consider the 
semantics of additive you and see whether its denotation can capture the restitutive reading, 
                                                             
14
 Tovena and Donazzan (2008) propose that a number of iterative and aspectual adverbs in different languages, 
including Englsih again, French encore, and Mandarin zai, can received a unified semantic analysis and be 
characterized as additive particles.  
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which I will not go into here. Readers may refer to Appendix I for details. The gist of Appendix I 
is that additive you triggers a presupposition: The presupposed eventuality cannot follow the 
asserted eventuality and the sum of the two eventualities is more developed than the presupposed 
event. In addition, it is not obvious how the low restitutive reading can be also subsumed under 
the additive reading.  
The rigid word order does not help to distinguish different accounts for the ambiguity of 
you ‘again’ in Chinese. However, Nissenbaum’s (2006) test provides a tool to tease different 
analyses apart. In the next section, I examine the scope interaction between you ‘again’ and an 
indefinite object. 
 
4. Scope interaction between you ‘again’ and a quantifier 
Since you ‘again’ yields a three-way ambiguity, when it interacts with another scope-bearing 
element, such as an indefinite object, there are altogether six logical possibilities. Native 
speakers were presented with scenarios for each of these possibilities and were asked to judge 
whether bare sentences and ba-constructions with you were felicitous. The judgment is 
summarized in Table 2-2, which indicates that despite that the position of you ‘again’ is fixed and 
high in Chinese, Chinese behaves exactly like English with respect to the scope interaction 
between again and an indefinite object. All readings are available except the low restitutive 






Table 2-2. Scope between you ‘again’ and an indefinite object in Chinese 
Low restitutive reading ∃> you ‘again’ # you ‘again’>∃ 
High restitutive reading ∃> you ‘again’ you ‘again’>∃ 
Repetitive reading ∃> you ‘again’ you ‘again’>∃ 
For expository convenience, I focus on the following three readings: a) low restitutive 
reading with you taking narrower scope than the indefinite object; b) low restitutive reading with 
you taking wider scope than the indefinite object; c) high restitutive reading with you taking 
wider scope than the indefinite object. For the scenarios of the other readings, see Appendix II. 
First of all, when low restitutive reading is intended, the indefinite object can be interpreted 
outside the presupposition of you ‘again’, i.e. the object in the presupposition and assertion can 
be the same. This is illustrated in (34) and (35). The ba-construction has the same interpretation 
as its corresponding bare sentence.  
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(34) Context: Lisa had a bunch of red shells. Unfortunately after a while they all got very 
dusty and the redness faded. In need of two red shells to decorate her Christmas tree, … 
a.  ta  you  tu-hong  le   qizhong liang-ge  beike.15 
she  again  paint-red  Asp among  two-CL shell. 
She painted two of the shells red again. 
b. ta  you  ba  qizhong liang-ge  beike tu-hong  le. 
she  again  BA  among  two-CL shell  paint-red  Asp  . 
She painted two of the shells red again. 
(35) Context: John ordered ten pocket watches. Unfortunately, all of them had always been 
open due to a manufacturing error. Yesterday he got all his watches fixed and closed them for 
the first time. Today, … 
a. Ta you da-kai  le  qizhong yi-kuai  huaibiao. 
He again  hit-open Asp among  one-CL pocket-watch. 
He opened one of his pocket watches again. 
b. Ta  you ba  qizhong yi-kuai  huaibiao  da-kai  le. 
He again BA  among  one-CL pocket-watch  hit-open  Asp. 
He opened one of his pocket watches again. 
 
                                                             
15
 The test sentences in (34) and (35) involve a partitive marker qizhong ‘among’. As a matter of fact, native 
speakers were asked to judge sentences either with or without a partitive marker for all the scenarios. It turned out 
when you ‘again’ takes wider scope than the indefinite object, speakers tended to prefer sentences without partitive 
markers. On the other hand, they preferred sentences with partitive markers when you ‘again’ takes narrow scope. 
For expository convenience, when concentrating on scenarios in which you takes narrow scope, I only present the 
judgment of sentences with partitive markers; when focusing on scenarios in which you takes wide scope, I only 
present the judgment of sentences without partitive markers. 
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For the low restitutive reading, although the indefinite object can take wide scope with 
respect to you ‘again’, but not vise versa. In other words, when a low restitutive reading is 
intended, the object cannot be interpreted within the presupposition of you ‘again’. A number of 
my informants found the use of you ‘again’ odd in scenarios like (36) and (37), especially 




(36) Context: Zhangsan went to the beach and collected a lot of white shells and two red 
shells. When his wife cleaned the house, she accidentally broke the two red shells. Worried 
that Zhangsan would notice the mishap, …17 
a. #ta  you  tu-hong  le   liang-ge  beike. 
she  again  paint-red  Asp two-CL shell. 
She painted two shells red again. 
b. #ta  you  ba liang-ge  beike tu-hong  le. 
she  again  BA two-CL shell  paint-red  Asp. 
She painted two shells red again. 
 
                                                             
16
 Unfortunately the judgment for (36) and (37) is not clear-cut. Some of my informants did accept the test 
sentences for (36) and (37). This might be caused by the complexity of the task. Or these speakers are entertaining 
other interpretations of you, such as the additive interpretation. My analysis of the ambiguity of you will be based on 
the dialect of this subgroup who found a contrast between (34) vs. (36) and between (35) vs. (37). 
17
 The scenario is adapted from Dobler (2008). 
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(37) Context: John ordered many pocket watches. Unfortunately, two of them had always been 
open due to a manufacturing error. Yesterday he got them fixed and they closed for the first 
time. Today…18 
a. #Ta  you  da-kai  le  yi-kuai  huaibiao. 
He  again  hit-open  Asp one-CL pocket-watch. 
He opened a pocket watch again. 
b. #Ta  you  ba   yi-kuai  huaibiao  da-kai  le. 
He  again  BA  one-CL pocket-watch  hit-open  Asp. 
He opened a pocket watch again. 
 
The reason why you ‘again’ sounds infelicitous in (35) and (37) is not because it cannot take 
wide scope. As shown in (38) and (39), when a high restitutive reading is intended, the indefinite 
object can be interpreted within the presupposition of you ‘again’. 
 
(38) Context: John and Jane had some white shells. Since they needed two red shells to 
decorate their Christmas tree, John painted two shells red. Unfortunately, Jane accidentally 
broke the two red shells that John just painted. Therefore, … 
a. ta  you  tu-hong  le   liang-ge  beike. 
she  again  paint-red  Asp two-CL shell 
She painted two shells red again. 
                                                             
18
 The scenario is adapted from Bale (2007). 
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b. ta  you  ba  liang-ge  beike tu-hong  le. 
she  again  BA  two-CL shell  paint-red  Asp 
She painted two shells red again. 
(39) Context: Jane and John bought five pocket watches. Jane picked out one pocket watch, 
opened it and closed it. Later John needed to check the time. He wanted to open the watch 
that Jane opened just now, but he couldn’t find it. Therefore,… 
a. Ta  you  da-kai  le  yi-kuai  huaibiao. 
He  again  hit-open Asp one-CL pocket-watch. 
He opened a pocket watch again. 
b. Ta  you  ba   yi-kuai  huaibiao  da-kai  le. 
He  again  BA  one-CL pocket-watch  hit-open  Asp. 
He opened a pocket watch again. 
 
How do the scope facts summarized in Table 2-2 bear on different analyses of you? First, it 
raises a question for any lexical analysis, which argues that the ambiguity arises simply because 
you ‘again’ is polysemous: Why is the low restitutive reading not available when you ‘again’ 
takes wide scope? The scope facts also challenge the naïve pragmatic analysis, under which the 
repetitive reading and the high restitutive reading are supposed to entail the low restitutive 
reading. However, contrary to what the naive pragmatic analysis predicts, both the repetitive and 
the high restitutive readings are available when you ‘again’ takes wide scope, the low restitutive 
reading is not.
19
 On the other hand, the scope facts suggest that syntactic structure is playing a 
                                                             
19
 Again, the conclusion that the scope facts in Chinese challenge the naïve pragmatic analysis is based on the 
assumption that both the high restitutive reading and the repetitive reading with again taking wide scope entail the 
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role in the ambiguity of you. Let us take (38a) as an example, whose syntactic structure is 




                  vP 
 
               subj          v’ 
               he 
                        v        VP 
 
                            obji       V’    
                          two shells 
                                    V       FP 
                                   paint 
                                         F       XP 
 
                                           pro/PROi     X 
                                                       red 
 
 
The scope facts would fall in place if you ‘again’ can adjoin to some lower projections such as 
VP or XP. Let us first imagine what reading is possible if you ‘again’ can indeed adjoin to XP, 
giving rise to the low restitutive reading. As the indefinite object is base-generated in Spec, VP, it 
must take wider scope than you ‘again’, which explains why the indefinite object can never be 
interpreted within the presupposition of you ‘again’. On the other hand, if you ‘again’ can adjoin 
to VP, with the high restitutive reading, the indefinite object can be interpreted within the 
presupposition of you ‘again’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
low restitutive reading with again taking wide scope. As discussed in fn 8, there exists an alternative naïve 
pragmatic analysis for sentences with again and an indefinite object, which crucially relies on Beaver’s (1994, 2001) 
theory of presupposition projection. Given that it remains controversial what the presupposition of a trigger 





The scope interaction between you and an indefinite object suggests that the ambiguity of you 
‘again’ is structural instead of lexical or pragmatic. However, the structural analysis for English 
again cannot be applied directly to Chinese. How do we solve this dilemma? In this section I 
propose three possible analyses: overt movement plus LF reconstruction, overt movement plus 
semantic reconstruction and semantic lowering without movement. 
 
5.1. Overt movement plus LF reconstruction 
One solution to the puzzle is that you ‘again’ in Mandarin Chinese moves overtly and gets 
reconstructed at LF.  
Ernst (2004) argues that adverbs are licensed in their base positions whenever the relevant 
semantic rule gives them their proper interpretation and does not cause any semantic anomalies 
elsewhere in the sentence. If this is on the right track, in principle you can adjoin to some lower 
projections in (40), such as XP or VP, and gives rise to the low restitutive reading and the high 
restitutive reading, respectively. Below I demonstrate that this is indeed the case.  
First of all, you can modify a small clause that denotes a pure state. This is attested by 
Chinese de-resultative constructions, which is argued by many scholars to be structurally related 
to RVCs. Let us take (41) as an example, whose syntactic representation is given in (42). 
Following the analysis of Tang (1997), particle de is base-generated in the head position of the 
functional projection, and incorporates to V. Then V-de as a whole undergoes V-to-v movement. 
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Since you ‘again’ can occur between the object shoujuan ‘handkerchief’ and the secondary 
predicate shi ‘wet’ (43), it has to adjoin to XP in syntax to derive the correct linear order.20 
 
(41) ?Lisi ku de na-ge  shoujuan  shi  le. 
  Lisi cry de that-CL handkerchief wet Asp. 
  Lisi cried that handkerchief wet. 
(42)  
                  vP 
 
               subj          v’ 
               Lisi 
                        v        VP 
 
                           obji        V’    
                        handkerchief 
                                    V       FP 
                                   cry 
                                         F       XP 
                                        de 
                                           pro/PROi     X 
                                                       wet 
(43) ?Lisi ku de na-ge  shoujuan   you shi  le. 
  Lisi cry de that-CL handkerchief  again wet Asp. 
  Lisi cried that handkerchief wet. 
 
In addition to state-denoting XP, you can adjoin to VP in syntax. This is demonstrated by the 
                                                             
20
 In fact, it is not clear whether you adjoins to FP or XP. To answer this question, we need to figure out the 
denotation of particle de. The answer will not affect our analyses. For expository convenience, I assume that it 
adjoins to XP, which denotes the result states, and treat the functional head de as semantically vacuous. This is in 
line with analysis which analyze the functional head de as a complementizer (e.g. Wang, 2010). 
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Chinese ba-construction (44). Here I follow Kuo (2009), who argues that ba is the head of an 
Applicative phrase, which is illustrated in (45).
21
 Not only can you ‘again’ precede ba (cf. (30)), 
it can also occur between the ba-NP (the NP immediately following ba) and the predicate, as 
shown in (46).
22
 To derive the correct linear order for (46), you ‘again’ has to adjoin to VP in the 
structure.  
 
(44) Wo  ba  Sara da-shang  le. 
I   BA Sara hit-hurt Asp.  
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 Other analyses of ba-constructions (for example, treating ba as an overt realization of a recursive v) are also 
compatible with my point here.  
22
 In fact, the pattern is more complicated than what is presented in (46). It seems that you ‘again’ can follow a 
ba-NP only if the predicate in the ba-sentence is complex. When the predicate is mono-syllabic, it is less natural to 
have you immediately preceding the predicate (vi). In this case, native speakers prefer to put you ‘again’ before ba 
(vii). Meanwhile adding GEI, a marker that marks affectedness, ameliorates the sentence in (vi), which is illustrated 
in (viii). I leave open the question why you is sensitive to this requirement.  
 
(vi)   ?Wo  ba  Sara you  da le. 
I   BA Sara again hit Asp.  
  I hit Sara again. 
(vii)   Wo  you  ba  Sara da le. 
I   again BA Sara hit Asp.  
   I hit Sara again.  
(viii) Wo  ba  Sara you  gei   da le. 
I   BA Sara again GEI  hit Asp.  
  I hit Sara again. 
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(45) Kuo’s (2009) analysis of Chinese ba-construction23 
          vP 
 
NP1      v’ 
 
               v       ApplP 
 
                    NP2     Appl’ 
 
                         Appl     VP 
 
                              Spec      V’ 
 
                                    V       XP 
 
I   BAk  Sarai  tk    ti   hit-     PROi hurt 
(46) Wo ba  Sara you  da-shang le. 
I  BA  Sara again hit-hurt Asp  
  I hit Sara again. 
 
I also assume that you ‘again’ cannot right-adjoin in syntax. This is in line with what Lin’s 
(2005) “left proliferation” of phrase structures in Chinese. Lin (2005) maintains that there is no 
right adjunction in Mandarin syntax. Whether this generalization holds for all adverbials is a 
separate issue which I will not going into in this chapter. Yet at least the adverb you ‘again’ 
cannot right-adjoin, because it never occurs in sentence-final position. 
As we have observed, Chinese adverbs like you have a restricted distribution in a bare 
sentence. Without going into why this is the case, I postulate that there is a PF-requirement in 
                                                             
23




Chinese, which requires adverbs like you to be preverbal.
24
  
With these assumptions in mind, we can now explain how the ambiguity of you ‘again’ is 
derived. In a bare sentence such as (47a), whose LF is presented in (47b), there are multiple 
positions that you can adjoin to: If you ‘again’ left-adjoins to XP (marked by ③), it corresponds 
to the low restitutive reading; if it left-adjoins to VP (marked by ②), the high restitutive reading 
is derived; if it left-adjoins to vP or higher (marked by ①), we obtain the repetitive reading.25 
However, in overt syntax you ‘again’ has to move as a last resort to satisfy some PF-requirement 
in Chinese. When it gets interpreted, it can be reconstructed at LF. 
 
(47) a. Zhangsan you da-kai  le   men. 
Zhangsan again hit-open Asp door.  
Zhangsan opened the door again. 
b.  [IP…①[vP Zhangsan v ②[VP the-door 1 hit [FP F ③[XP PRO1 open]]]] 
you ‘again’ adjoins to… 
 
                                                             
24
 It has been widely observed that there exists a restriction in Mandarin that a transitive verb with an object cannot 
be modified by a post-verbal manner expression (ix). The verb has to be doubled (ix)a. The PF requirement 
proposed here may be part of a broader (but unexplained) generalization about modifiers in Chinese resisting 
VP-internal surface positions, even when they are interpreted there (Jonathan Bobaljik, pc).  
 
(ix) a.  Wo  pa   shan   *(pa)  de kuai. 
I   climb  mountain climb  DE fast. 
I climbed the mountain fast. 
b. *Wo  pa  de kuai  shan. 
   I  climb DE fast  mountain. 
 
25
 Similar to how I treat the functional head de in the de-resultative construction, I assume here that the function 
head F is a complementizer and is semantically vacuous, following Wang (2010). Thus you ‘again’ adjoins to XP 
instead of FP. 
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5.2. Overt movement plus semantic reconstruction 
The analysis sketched above assumes that reconstruction occurs at LF. It is also possible that 
moved you ‘again’ lowers in semantics, which is along the line of semantic reconstruction (Cresti, 
1995; Lechner, 1998; Rullmann, 1995; Sharvit, 1999; among others). In brief, the semantic 
reconstruction approach assumes that traces (or non-privileged copies) can be interpreted in 
semantics as higher types, giving rise to the effect of scope reconstruction without actually 
lowering at LF/in syntax. Let us take (48) as an example. The overtly moved wh-phrase can 
strand a higher type trace (represented as T) of Generalized Quantifier. Since T is in the scope of 
the intensional operator, semantic reconstruction yields the de dicto reading, with the wh-phrase 
taking narrow scope. Notice that semantic reconstruction entails movement, because it crucially 
relies on higher type traces.  
 
(48) How many books does Chris want [CP T<<e,t>t> to buy t<e>]?  
(intended: the de dicto reading) 
 
We can follow the same logic to resolve the ambiguity of you ‘again’: you ‘again’ moves 
overtly to satisfy some PF requirement specific in Chinese. Instead of lowering at LF, it 
undergoes semantic reconstruction, yielding the desired ambiguity. Previous works on semantic 
reconstruction focus on raised quantifiers or wh-phrases, which strands a higher type trace T of 
type <<e,t>,t>, i.e. the type of a Generalized Quantifier. How do we interpret the higher type 
trace T that is stranded by you ‘again’? To answer this question, let us look at the low restitutive 
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reading of Zhangsan you da-kai le men ‘Zhangsan opened the door again’, whose corresponding 
LF is presented in (49). In (49), you ‘again’ moves to vP-adjoined position or higher, leaving 
behind a trace T2. Given that the verb hit can take a result-state-denoting clause (of type <s,t>) 
via von Stechow’s (1995) Principle R and the small clause XP is of type <s,t>, the trace T2 
should be of type <s,t><s,t>, which is the same as the type of again.  
 
(49) [vP again 2 [vP Zhangsan v [VP the-door 1 hit [FP F [XP T2 [XP<s,t> PRO1 open]]]]]] 
 
5.3. Lowering in semantics without movement 
Both analyses sketched above (LF reconstruction and semantic reconstruction) assume that you 
‘again’ moves overtly. The difference between them lies in where reconstruction occurs: in 
syntax or in semantics. A third possibility that I would like to lay out here does not assume the 
overt movement of you ‘again’. It is base-generated in a high position, and there exists a brute 
force rule that allows you ‘again’ to lower in semantics. Ernst (2002) proposed a rule of this kind, 
Core State Accessibility (50), which permits preverbal adverbs to be interpreted as if they were 
adjoined to a lower position. According to Ernst (2002), (50) is subject to some ceiling effect. It 
can only apply in a certain domain (what Ernst calls the Low range). Above a certain point, more 
rigid mapping from syntax to semantics must be observed. Careful readers may notice already 
that this rule gives too much leeway, since it predicts the availability of restitutive reading for 
preverbal again in English. We will come back to this point in Section 6. At the moment, let us 
assume that at least such a rule is available in Chinese to derive the ambiguity of you.  
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(50) Core State Accessibility (Ernst, 2002: 268) 
ADV[E’’ CAUSE (e’’, [E’ BECOME (e’) & Th (e’, [E F (e)…])])] 
 [E’’’ CAUSE (e’’’, [E’’ BECOME (e’’) & Th (e’’, [E’ ADV [E F (e)…]])])] 
 
6. Comparing different analyses 
In the last section, I propose three possible analyses: overt movement with LF reconstruction, 
overt movement with semantic reconstruction and pure semantic lowering without movement. 
The first two analyses assume overt movement of you ‘again’, but not the third analysis. Which 
analysis is on the right track? In this section, I compare these three analyses by examining two 
issues: The first issue concerns the interpretation of you ‘again’ in sentences with negation or 
adverbs. As we will see, when you ‘again’ precedes negation or adverbs, only surface scope is 
available. I argue that these facts are consistent with analyses which appeal to the movement of 
you. The second issue concerns how the interpretations of again across languages bear on the 
analyses of you in Chinese.  
 
6.1. Interpretation of you ‘again’ in sentences with negation or adverbs 
I will start this section by presenting the data about negation and adverbs. To begin with, English 
and Chinese behave differently with respect to the scope interaction between again and negation. 
In Chinese, only surface scope reading is available when you precedes negation mei, i.e., the 
presupposition is negative (51a) rather than positive (51b). In contrast, the English 
correspondence is ambiguous, as it can trigger two different presuppositions, as illustrated in 
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(52a) and (52b).  
 
(51) a. Zhangsan  shang-ge yue mei dasao fangjian, 
     Zhangsan  last-CL month NEG clean room 
Zhe-ge  yue ta you mei dasao fangjian. 
This-CL month he again  Neg  clean room. 
Zhangsan didn’t clean the room last month. Again, he didn’t clean the room this 
month. 
b.  Zhangsan  shang-ge yue dasao le fangjian, 
Zhangsan   last-CL month clean  Asp room, 
#danshi zhe-ge  yue ta you  mei dasao fangjian. 
 but   this-CL month he again   Neg  clean room. 
(52) a. John didn’t clean the room last month, and this month he didn’t clean the room          
again.  
b. John cleaned the room last month, but he didn’t clean the room again this month. 
 
Furthermore, both high and low restitutive readings are not available when you ‘again’ 
immediately precedes negation. This is demonstrated in (53a). In fact, to express the restitutive 
reading, a different lexical item zai, which is generally assumed to denote repetition in irrealis 
context, is used and it has to follow negation (53b). The English sentence with postverbal again 
is compatible with the scenario, as illustrated in (53c).  
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(53) Scenario A (low restitutive reading): The door was open at the beginning. Then somehow 
it got closed by someone other than John. John wants to open the door but he was too tired, 
so... 
Scenario B (high restitutive reading): Bill first opened the door. Then somehow it got closed 
by the wind. John wants to open the door but he was too tired, so… 
a. #ta  you  mei ba men da-kai. 
 He you  NEG BA door hit-open. 
b.  ta  mei zai  ba men da-kai. 
 He NEG again BA door hit-open. 
c.  He didn't open the door again. 
 
Another set of data concerns the scope between you and other adverbs. In general, when you 
‘again’ precedes another adverb, surface scope reading is available, as shown in (54), (56) and 
(58). The inverse scope is less preferred, as illustrated in (55), (57) and (59).
26,27
 Take the adverb 
guyi ‘purposefully’ as an example, when both the action and the manner are repeated, the 
                                                             
26
 In fact, the judgment on adverbs is less clear-cut than the judgment on negation. Some of my informants do not 
completely reject (55a), (57a) and (59a). It is likely that the informants are entertaining the additive interpretation of 
you in these cases. I argue in the appendix that additive you is felicitous when the sum of the presupposed and 
asserted events brings a more developed event. By 'more developed' I mean it leads to or correlates with a higher 
degree measuring an eventuality on another scale. In fact, the continuation in (57a) is completely felicitous if we are 
emphasizing that the road is dangerous. This is consistent with my analysis of additive you, as adding the asserted 
event to the common ground lead to a higher degree of insecurity. For other examples, we can come up with some 
scenarios to accommodate the additive interpretation, for instance, emphasizing that an employee violated the rules 
frequently in (55a) and measuring the time of the door being open in (59a). 
Why is the additive interpretation not available for negation, which allows some native speakers to accept the 
inverse scope reading? This is because negation brings a presupposition failure for additive you. Take (51b) as an 
example, the presupposed event is that he cleaned the room, and the asserted event is he didn’t clean the room. 
Addition of these two events can by no means lead to a more developed event on any measuring scale.  
27
 Preverbal again in English shows the same pattern such that only surface scope reading is available, as will be 
expected under the structural analysis. 
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continuation is felicitous (54). Comparatively, the continuation with pre-adverbial you ‘again’ in 
(55a) sounds odd, when the action ‘violate the rules’ is repeated but in an opposite manner. 




(54) Scenario: Last time he violated the rules on purpose. This time… 
Ta you guyi   weifan le  guize. 
He again purposefully violate Asp rules. 
He again purposefully violated the rules.      (again>purposefully) 
(55) Scenario: Last time he carelessly violated the rules. This time… 
a. #Ta you  guyi   weifan  le  guize. 
He  again  purposefully violate  Asp rules. 
He again purposefully violated the rules.       (*purposefully>again) 
 b.  Ta  guyi   you weifan guize. 
He purposefully again violate rules. 
Purposefully, he violated the rules again.  
(56) Scenario: Yesterday he almost got hit. Today… 
Ta you   chadian bei  zhuang le.  
  he again  almost  BEI hit  Asp. 
  It is again the case that he almost got hit.   (again >almost) 
(57) Scenario: Yesterday he got hit. Today… 
a.  #Ta you  chadian bei  zhuang le. 
   He again almost  BEI hit  Asp. 
  It is again the case that he almost got hit.   (*almost> again) 
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b.  Ta chadian you bei  zhuang  le.  
He almost  again BEI hit   Asp. 
It almost happened that he got hit again.   
(58) Scenario: Five minutes ago, he opened the door quickly. Now… 
 Ta  you   xunsu   da-kai  le  men. 
 he  again  quickly hit-open Asp door. 
 Again, he quickly opened the door.   (again >quickly) 
(59) Scenario: Five minutes ago, he opened the door slowly. Now… 
a.  #Ta you  xunsu  da-kai  le  men. 
  he again quickly hit-open Asp door. 
  Again, he quickly opened the door.   (*quickly >again) 
b. Ta xunsu  you   da-kai  le  men. 
 he quickly again hit-open Asp door. 
 Quickly, he opened the door again.    
 
Another generalization is that low restitutive reading is less desirable when you ‘again’ is 
followed by another adverb.
28
 Here I will use chadian ‘almost’ as an example to illustrate this 
point (60). 
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 Here I leave aside the question whether the high restitutive reading is available when you precedes another adverb, 
because high restitutive reading can be easily accommodated under the additive usage of you. This complication 
makes high restitutive reading a less desirable test. 
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(60) Scenario: A month ago, John bought a red shell. It became dusty and the color faded in a 
month. John wanted to paint it red. He almost did it today but ran out of time in the end. 
a. #Ta you chadian tuhong   le   nage  beike. 
 He again almost  paint-red  Asp that shell. 
 He again almost painted the shell red. 
b. Ta chadian you tuhong  le  nage  beike. 
He almost  again paint-red Asp that shell. 
He almost painted the shell red again. 
 
The data on negation and adverbs raise a couple of questions: Why is the inverse scope 
reading blocked when you ‘again’ precedes an adverb or negation? How does the answer to this 
question bear on the distinction between syntactic vs. semantic lowering?  
There exists a tradition to treat the negative particle mei ‘not’ as a type of adverb (see Chao, 
1968; Li & Thompson 1981; Ernst, 1995). Assuming Tang’s (1990, 2001) theory of licensing 
adverbials, negative particles may be licensed in an adjoined position on a par with other types of 
adverb in Mandarin (see Ting, 2006 for some inconclusive discussion). If this is on the right 
track, analyses which assume the overt movement of you—overt movement plus LF 
reconstruction and overt movement plus semantic reconstruction (see Section 5.1 and 5.2 
respectively) can account for the generalization: The fact that adverbs and negation block the 
inverse scope reading of you follows directly from Relativized Minimality (Rizzi, 1990), a 
well-established syntactic constraint that bans movement of an adjunct like you across another 
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adjunct. On the other hand, there is no obvious account as for how the semantic lowering 
analysis of you ‘again’ (the analysis sketched in Section 5.3) can account for the blocking effect. 
However, it is not obvious how the negation and adverb facts can tease apart syntactic 
reconstruction vs. semantic reconstruction, as both of them entail movement. 
 
6.2. English again and German wieder vs. Chinese you 
Any analysis which can explain why Chinese preverbal you ‘again’ is ambiguous must also 
disallow the availability of the restitutive reading of again in English and German, as the latter 
constitutes crucial evidence in favor of the structural analysis. An analysis with either LF or 
semantic reconstruction can straightforwardly achieve this goal for the following reason: 
Different from Chinese, English allows right-adjunction. There is no PF requirement for 
adverbials to occur preverbally, hence no Chinese-type movement as a last-resort. Thus English 
again and German wieder are simply interpreted in their base-generated position.  
How does the pure semantic lowering analysis, which does not assume movement, disallow 
again to be ambiguous in English and German? Assuming that Core State Accessibility applies 
cross-linguistically, Ernst (2002) suggests that restitutive again is a homonym of repetitive again 
instead of an instance of a unified entry with different possible scopes. The reason is as follow: If 
again had a unitary meaning, we would expect preverbal again in English and German to have a 
restitutive reading, because the Core State Accessibility rule allows vP-adjoined adverbs to have 
narrow scope as if they were adjoined to VP or lower. To avoid this, we must assume that 
restitutive again is specially marked, such that it requires narrow scope. Not only is this a 
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stipulation, but it is not in line with the spirit of the structural analysis—having only one again 
and attributing the ambiguity to the structure. Perhaps we need to postulate that the lowering rule 
has to apply in Chinese but cannot apply in other languages like English and German. But why is 
the Core State Accessibility rule specific to Chinese?  
A tentative solution is to appeal to some Economy condition. Since Chinese you ‘again’ can 
never occur at sentence final position, the only way that you ‘again’ can modify a result state is 
to appeal to Core State Accessibility. Different from Chinese, in English again can occur 
post-verbally, thus it can adjoin freely to different positions, allowing the restitutive reading to be 
derived without Core State Accessibility. When again occurs pre-verbally, Economy rules out 
the application of Core State Accessibility, which consequently excludes the restitutive reading.  
In fact, this Economy condition for Chinese vs. English differences seems very much 
connected to the Scope Transparency model (henceforce ScoT) (see Bobaljik & Wurmbrand, 
2012 and reference therein), which aims to explain an observed correlation between word order 
and scope. It has been widely observed that languages with flexible word order are often scope 
rigid; whereas languages with restricted word order usually have a high tolerance of scope 
ambiguity. For instance, an English sentence with quantified DPs is ambiguous between the 
surface scope and inverse scope reading (61a), but only the surface scope reading is allowed in 
its Japanese counterpart (61b). The inverse scope reading can be expressed through a Japanese 
sentence with the object scrambled across the subject (61c). So it seems that the availability of 
scrambling in Japanese blocks the inverse scope reading, because there exists another structure 
that can reflect the scope more transparently. However, since English does not allow scrambling, 
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the only way to express the inverse scope is to appeal to Quantifier Raising. Bobaljik and 
Wurmbrand (2012) propose that UG includes a soft economy condition ScoT that favors 
isomorphism between LF and PF representations, as stated in (62). 
 
(61) a. Someone read every book.        ∃»∀;∀»∃ 
b.  dareka-ga   subete-no  hon-o    yonda        [Kuroda 1970] 
someone-NOM  all-GEN  book-ACC  read 
Someone read all the books.       ∃»∀; *∀»∃ 
c.  subete-no hon-o   dareka-ga   yonda 
all-GEN book-ACC  someone-NOM  read 
Someone read all the books.       ∀»∃ 
(62) Scope Transparency (ScoT): If the order of two elements at LF is A»B, the order at PF is 
A»B. 
 
Although both Economy conditions hint at how interpretation determines the flexibility of 
word order, the Economy condition we appeal to as an explanation for the English/Chinese 
difference is not identical to ScoT. ScoT evaluates which PF wins when different PFs compete to 
represent a given LF. Our Economy condition, on the other hand, concerns about various PFs 
competing to represent a given semantics instead of LF. Notice that under the Core State 
Accessibility rule, the position where you ‘again’ gets interpreted in semantics does not 
necessarily correspond to its position at LF. For instance, under the restitutive reading, you 
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‘again’ is interpreted low (below v), but it occupies a higher position at LF (above v). Given this 
mismatch, we need an Economy condition of similar spirit as ScoT yet regulates the connection 
between semantic representation and word order. A lot more details need to be fleshed out for 
this Economy condition to work out.  
To summarize, in this section I compare the three analyses of you ‘again’ proposed in 
Section 5. The facts that negation and adverbs block the inverse scope reading of you ‘again’ is 
in favor of a reconstruction analysis (either semantic or syntactic) which assumes overt 
movement of you. Under such an analysis, the facts follow automatically from some 
well-established syntactic constraint. Comparatively, a pure semantic lowering analysis seems 
untenable to account for these facts. Meanwhile, cross-linguistic behavior of again gives the 
movement analyses slightly more advantage than the pure semantic lowering analysis, even 
though both assume some Chinese-specific operation. As we have seen, the unavailability of the 
Chinese-type movement in English and German straightforwardly explains why preverbal again 
and pre-object wieder lack ambiguity. Comparatively, more details need to be fleshed out for the 
semantic lowering analysis to explain why the Core State Accessibility rule does not apply in 
English or German.  
Unfortunately, so far I have not been able to conclude whether reconstruction of you occurs 
in syntax or semantics. More evidence is needed to tease them apart. I leave this question for 





7. Further result and extension: chongxin ‘repeatedly’ 
So far I have demonstrated that the ambiguity of you is structural and I have proposed three 
possible analyses for its ambiguity and demonstrated that the movement analyses plus 
semantic/syntactic reconstruction is on the right track. Before concluding, I would like to show 
that the movement analyses is not restricted to you ‘again’, but can be extended to chongxin 
‘repeatedly’, an adverb which shares a similar meaning as you. Like you ‘again’, chongxin 
‘repeatedly’ can only occur preverbally (63). Different from you ‘again’, however, chongxin 
‘repeatedly’ does not have low restitutitive reading (63).  
 
(63) Zhangsan (chongxin) tu-hong le  (*chongxin) na-ge  beike (*chongxin). 
Zhangsan repeatedly paint-red  Asp  repeatedly that-CL shell repeatedly. 
Zhangsan painted the shell red again.          (repetitive, high rest, *low rest) 
 
We can account for the lack of low restitutive reading in the following way. Different from 
you ‘again’, chongxin ‘repeatedly’ cannot modify a small clause denoting pure state. Again, we 
use the resultative de-construction as a diagnosis. The contrast between (64) and (65) shows that 
this is the case.  
 
(64) *ta tu   de na-ge   beike chongxin hong le. 




(65) ?ta tu   de na-ge   beike you hong le. 
He paint de that-CL shell again red  Asp. 
He painted that shell red again. 
 
The difference between you ‘again’ and chongxin ‘repeatedly’ is in line with Rapp and von 
Stechow’s (1999) Visibility Parameter, which aims to capture the variation between different 
adverbs with respect to their lexico-syntactic property. Given this distinction, the fact that 
chongxin ‘repeatedly’ only displays a two-way ambiguity and the low restitutive reading is 
missing follows automatically. Under the movement analysis (with either LF reconstruction or 
semantic reconstruction), chongxin cannot be base-generated in an XP-adjoined position, thus 
the low restitutive reading is unavailable. But it can be base-generated at the VP-level, undergo 
overt movement and get reconstructed (either at LF or in semantics). This yields the high 
restitutive reading. Or it can adjoin to vP or even higher, deriving the repetitive reading. 
 
8. Chapter conclusion 
In this study, I examined how the repetitive/restitutive ambiguity of you ‘again’ in Mandarin 
Chinese is derived. Is the ambiguity structural, lexical or pragmatic? On the surface, Chinese 
poses a problem for the structural analysis because the adverb you can only be preverbal. 
However, the scope interaction between you ‘again’ and an indefinite object suggests that the 
ambiguity of you ‘again’ must be structural rather than lexical or pragmatic. The puzzle can be 








Theories on child language acquisition seek to understand how a child acquires her target 
languages given the cross-linguistic variation. A satisfactory answer to this question must also 
address the question what kind of input a child can make use of, especially under the “poverty of 
the stimulus” concern that sometimes the child’s experience of the language is limited not only in 
terms of quantity but also in terms of quality, since it is consistent with more than one possible 
grammar.  
This chapter focuses on the acquisition of goal-PP constructions modified by ‘again’, which 
gives rise to more than one possible interpretation. This construction that has some features that 
makes its acquisition process interesting: In the first place, the construction is subject to cross-
linguistic variability. In addition, the direct input in the care-givers’ speech is scarce. Most 
importantly, ambiguity in the input is rampant, due to the fact that the interpretation that is used 
more frequently entails the one that is used less frequently. Studying the acquisition of this 
construction is furthermore of interest since it also concerns the acquisition of a prototypical 
semantic/pragmatic phenomenon: presupposition.  
Presupposition refers to some background information that participants of the conversation 
take for granted for an utterance to be felicitous in discourse, in contrast to what the speaker 
asserted by the utterance. There are a large number of expressions that trigger presupposition, 
such as the definite article the, some change of state verbs (stop, start, continue), additive 
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particles (also, too), pseudo-clefts (it is X who…), etc. This chapter concerns the adverb again, 
which is argued to trigger a presupposition that a salient event of the same property has occurred 
before. For instance, by uttering the statement ‘John was late again’, the speaker takes it to be 
shared knowledge that John had been late before.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, a sentence with an accomplishment predicate 
modified by again is ambiguous between a repetitive reading and a restitutive reading (e.g. Beck 
& Johnson 2004; von Stechow 1996). The former presupposes that the agent has performed the 
action before; the latter presupposes only that the result has held before. Consider the following 
example in which again modifies a goal-PP construction, by which I refer to constructions 





(1) John walked to the village again. 
a. Repetitive: John had walked to the village before.  
b. Restitutive: John had been at the village before.  
 
Example (1) is ambiguous between a repetitive and a restitutive reading. The former 
presupposes that John had walked to the village before (cf. (1a)) and the latter simply 
presupposes that John had been at the village before, without necessarily having walked there (cf.  
(1b)). For instance, a context in which John was born in the village, left, and returned to the 
village, would render (1) true.
2
  
                                                          
1
 Note that this pattern observed in English is also found in Mandarin. 
2
 Speakers report that the restitutive reading is more salient if (1) contains the adverb back. It has been observed that 
many of the most natural examples of restitutive again in English involve adverbs like back and up, which (for  
unexplained reasons) renders the result state of a goal-PP sentence more visible than in sentences without these 
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Interestingly, languages vary in the availability of (1b) (Beck 2005; Beck & Snyder 2001). 
For instance, the French and Spanish counterparts of walk to the summit/village again given in (2) 
and (3) allow only the repetitive reading (see Beck & Snyder 2001 and Beck 2005 for details). 
  
(2) Jean a marché de nouveau au sommet. 
Jean has walked  again  to-the summit 
(3) Suresh anduvo hasta la aldea otra vez. 
Suresh walked  until the village again 
 
This cross-linguistic variation raises serious and interesting developmental questions, which, 
as far as I am aware, have not been addressed in previous studies: How do children decide 
whether the restitutive reading is available in their target language? What kind of evidence can 
they rely on?  
In the current study I will address these questions by investigating English-learning 
children’s acquisition of again modifying goal-PP constructions. Examining parental input in 
these cases, I will show that parental uses of the restitutive reading of again in English goal-PP 
constructions are infrequent and subject to considerable ambiguity. I will also present results 
from an experiment which indicate that many children nonetheless achieve a surprising degree of 
facility with these restitutive readings by age 4 and 5. To resolve this conundrum, I will propose 
that in this case children rely on more general evidence about the syntax of English, together 
with knowledge of the basic meaning of again, to derive the restitutive reading of again in goal-
PP constructions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
adverbs (see Beck 2005 footnote 8). However, this is not a necessary condition for the restitutive reading to be 
available for goal-PP sentences (as can be seen in Appendix III, none of the stimuli for my experimental study 
contains back or up). 
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This study will supplement previous studies on when and how children can evaluate 
presupposition and how experimental manipulation can enhance children’s sensitivity to it. 
Results of some previous studies demonstrate that preschool children often ignore the additive 
particle ‘too’ in some comprehension tasks (e.g. Bergsma 2006), thus leading the authors to 
conclude that young children have difficulty with the presupposition.  However, more recent 
studies (e.g. Höhle et al. 2009; Berger & Höhle 2012; Berger & Pouscoulous 2013) show that the 
reported difficulty is likely to be task-related, and that 3- to 4-year-olds (and even younger 
children) are able to take into account the presuppositions triggered by particles like German 
auch ‘too’. The results of the study reported here indicate that children have considerable success 
interpreting again, thus lending further support to this view.  
In this chapter, I will begin with some background on goal-PP constructions and the 
restitutive reading of ‘again’ (Section 2). Section 3 will review previous studies on the 
acquisition of restitutive ‘again’. In Section 4, I will present the results of the corpus study on 
child-directed speech, which shows that children do not receive input that unambiguously cues 
the restitutive reading of again modifying goal-PPs. However, my experiment will show that 
children are nonetheless good at comprehending this meaning (Section 5). In Section 6 I will 
account for this seeming paradox by appealing to a syntactic aspect of English. To be more 
specific, I will explain how a child could, in principle, acquire restitutive again with goal-PPs by 
making use of more general evidence about the syntax of English goal-PPs, and their knowledge 






2. Background: some notes on goal-PP constructions and restitutive ‘again’  
By goal-PP constructions, I refer to constructions involving a manner of motion verb combined 
with a PP indicating a location or path. (4)-(7) are examples of such constructions from English 
and Spanish. Notice that “walk to the village” is grammatical in both English (4) and Spanish (6), 
and the two examples yield the same truth conditions. On the other hand, although “float under 
the bridge” in English (5) can express a meaning in which the bottle was not originally under the 
bridge but came to be there (called the goal-PP reading), the Spanish counterpart (7) does not 
permit such a reading. It can only express a locative meaning, in the sense that the floating of the 
bottle occurred (entirely) under the bridge, a reading we are less concerned about in this study. In 
fact, goal-PP constructions vary to a large degree cross-linguistically. Both the PP and the 
motion verb can affect whether a goal-PP construction is available; this will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 6.  
 
(4) John walked to the village. 
(5) The bottle floated under the bridge. 3           
a. Locative reading: The location of the bottle is always under the bridge. 
b. Goal-PP reading: The bottle was not under the bridge originally but came to be there by 
floating. 
Spanish 
(6)  Juan caminó hasta la aldea.  
        John walked  until the  village 
        John walked to the village. 
                                                          
3
 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, speakers also allow an atelic reading for (5) in which the bottle passed 
under the bridge but did not end up there (it floated under the bridge and kept going). This reading is not relevant to 
the current study. 
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(7)  La botella flotó bajo el puente.          
        the bottle floated under the  bridge 
        The bottle floated under the bridge.       (locative reading, *goal-PP reading) 
 
Crucially, in languages like Spanish and French, although some manner-of-motion verbs can 
be combined with a PP and give rise to a goal-PP interpretation similar to that of an English 
goal-PP construction, the combination of goal-PPs and ‘again’ in these languages does not yield 
a restitutive reading, as we have seen in (2) and (3). This leads to the following question this 
study investigates, with a focus on English-speaking children: how do children decide whether 
their target language permits the restitutive reading? 
Before proceeding, I would like to point out that the repetitive versus restitutive ambiguity is 
not unique to goal-PPs, but is also possible with other complex predicates, such as lexical 
accomplishment verbs (8), adjectival resultatives (9), etc. I will discuss in Section 6 why this 
study focuses on the case of ‘again’ modifying goal-PPs. On the other hand, some earlier studies 
have examined children’s acquisition of restitutive ‘again’ in general, without focusing on 
‘again’ modifying a particular construction. I review these studies in the next section.  
 
(8) John opened the door again. 
a. Repetitive: John had opened the door before. 
b. Restitutive: The door had been open before. 
(9) Sally painted the wall white again.  
a.  Repetitive: Sally had painted the wall white before. 




3. Previous acquisition studies of restitutive ‘again’ 
There are a few studies which have explored children’s knowledge of restitutive ‘again’ with 
complex predicates of various kinds (such as lexical accomplishments and verb particle 
constructions). Overall, these studies report that German- and English-learning children at ages 
three and four have mastered the meaning of ‘again’.    
Bamberg (1994) showed that German children as young as three years old seem to be able to 
use wieder ‘again’ to indicate both restitution of a state and reoccurrence of an action in their 
narration of the Frog Story, which was Mercer Mayer’s (1969) wordless picture book, Frog, 
where are you?. The book is about the disappearance of a boy’s frog and the boy’s search for it. 
Bamberg (1994) reports a few possible examples of children’s restitutive wieder ‘again’: wieder 
da rauf wollen ‘wanting to move back up again’ (onto the tree trunk in the last picture), and 
wieder nach Hause gehen ‘going back home again’.  
Clark, Carpenter and Deutsch (1995) examined how German- and English-speaking children 
(age range 2;8-5;0) understand the notion of reversal through a production task. In the 
experiment, adults carried out different actions (e.g. wrap, crush, stick) under the direction of a 
puppet, Fozzie Bear. Children, who played the role of Oscar the Grouch and thus always 
objected to the adults’ actions, had to command the adults to restore the objects to their original 
states. The results of this study indicated that German-speaking children added wieder ‘again’ to 
their requests for reversal 46% of the time. Even the youngest group of children (mean age 3;7) 
used wieder in their command about 40% of the time. The same pattern holds for English-
speaking children.  
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Using these production studies as a starting point, Wittek (1998, 2002) conducted a new 
study, demonstrating that 5-year-olds can even use again as a cue to learn novel verbs entailing a 
change of state. The finding further supports earlier findings that German-speaking children have 
the knowledge of restitutive ‘again’ from an early age. However, Witteck (1998, 2002) 
acknowledged that it would be ideal to conduct a comprehension study in the first place to assess 
how well children have grasped restitutive ‘again’. This examination will be achieved in the 
current study.  
 
4. Relying on direct evidence? A corpus study  
Let us return to our acquisition questions of the current study: Given the cross-linguistic 
variation, how do learners acquire restitutive again with goal-PPs in English? What kind of 
learning strategy can they rely on to figure out whether restitutive again is available in goal-PP 
constructions?  
One possible answer is that children rely entirely on parental uses, i.e. are exposed to goal-PP 
sentences with again that describe situations where only the restitutive reading is true.
4
 This 
possibility raises some empirical questions: Are such parental uses actually available to children? 
And if so, how often? 
To address these questions, I examined the parental input to four English-learning children 
for whom high-quality longitudinal corpora are available in the CHILDES database (Demuth, 
Culbertson & Alter 2006; MacWhinney 2000; Weist, Pawlak, & Hoffman 2009; Weist & 
Zevenbergen 2008). Table 3-1 summarizes the corpora analyzed.  
                                                          
4
 A specific version of this input-based proposal is that children are guided by the Semantic Subset Principle (Crain, 
Ni & Conway, 1994), which is discussed in detail in (Xu 2015).  
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Table 3-1. English corpora analyzed 
Child Corpus 
# of child 
utterances 
Age span # of transcripts 
Naima Providence 43,542 0;11,28–3;10,10 83 
Lily Providence 39,852 1;01,02-4;00,02 80 
Violet Providence 17,274 1;02,00-3;11,24 54 
Mat Weist 10,157 2;03,10-5;00,05 56 
(Total # of child utterances: 110,825) 
 
All the adult speech was searched for utterances containing a potential goal preposition (one 
of the following: to, into, onto, under, down, up, in, across, around) together with again. I 
applied the following criteria to code restitutive and repetitive again: (i) If in the preceding 
context, the agent has performed the action represented by the predicate, the utterance is coded 
as repetitive. (ii) If there is no mention in the preceding context of the same event being carried 
out by the same agent, it is coded as potentially restitutive. (iii) Among the utterances that were 
coded as potentially restitutive in (ii), if the combination of the predicate with (purely) restitutive 
again would have been pragmatically odd (for example, under the restitutive reading of go to the 
library again, the subject has been to the library but has never gone to the library before, 
therefore s/he must have been born in the library), it was re-coded as repetitive.
 5
 
                                                          
5
 An example with go to school, as shown in (i), was set aside in the analysis, because the mother (M) seemed to 
intend a figurative meaning of go to school, i.e. to receive education, instead of a real ‘goal-PP’ reading.   
(i) Child(C)’s name: Lily; file number: 70; line 294 
M: you know Justine goes to school too.  
C: ooh.  
M: just like Lily and just like mommy.  
C: just like daddy.  
M: well daddy's already done with school he doesn't go anymore.  
M: it's true it is true.  
M: daddy is all done with school.  
C: yeah.  
C: he goes to school more after he's done.  
M: really should he go back to school again?  
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The results are summarized in Table 3-2. Among the goal-PP utterances found in the parental 
input, there is some potentially restitutive usage of again. However, I find that examples of again 
modifying a goal-PP where the restitutive reading is unambiguously intended do not exist (0 out 
of 175,201 utterances across our samples of child-directed speech).  
 















Naima 61794 5 2 0.032 0 
Lily 67238 7 7 0.104 0 
Violet 25999 3 1 0.040 0 
Mat 20170 3 2 0.099 0 
(Total # of adult utterances: 175, 201) 
 
If children simply rely on direct evidence in child-directed speech to acquire the restitutive 
reading of again with goal-PPs, whether these input can guide them depends on what they should 
do with the ambiguous cases that potentially speak to the availability of the restitutive reading. If 
children are simply relying on clear unambiguous uses of restitutive again, it seems implausible 
that a child will receive sufficient direct evidence of the restitutive again before age four and five, 
given the absence of clear examples that were attested in our samples of child-directed speech. If 
so, most English children will still be non-adult-like at ages four and five. On the other hand, it is 
possible that the ambiguous examples are at least partially informative, either because they 
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provide probabilistic evidence for the availability of the restitutive reading or because some of 
them are in fact unambiguous for children. If this is the case, we can ask a further question: Do 
the ambiguous cases provide “enough” evidence for learners to determine the availability of the 
restitutive reading? As far as I am aware of, it is not well-established how much input counts as 
“enough” for learners. However, there is some number that we can compare to. Yang (2004) 
argues that there exists a negative correlation between the timing of parameter setting and the 
frequency of relevant input a learner receives, all else equal. In other words, parameter settings 
are determined late by learners if the requisite evidence is low in frequency. Among the 
examples provided by Yang (2004), the parameter of scope marking of long-distance wh-
questions is considered to be set late by English children (not until they are four years old or after) 
and the frequency of the requisite evidence in the input (long-distance wh-questions) is only 
0.2% (i.e. 2 per 1000 utterances). Comparatively, among the four children whose child-directed 
speech we examined, Lily has the highest frequency of potentially restitutive again: 0.1 per 1000 
utterances. However, even this number is still far lower than 2 per 1000 utterances. Based on this 
estimation, it seems implausible that four- and five-year-old children have enough direct 
evidence to allow them to learn the restitutive reading, if they simply rely on these ambiguous 
examples.   
On the other hand, is it possible that children infer the availability of restitutive again with 
goal-PPs that from other utterance-types, which are much more frequent in their input? If this is 
the case, children around age 4 and age 5 might already know that this reading is possible in 
English. In the next section, we examine whether English-learning children can understand this 






The participants in this experiment included 31 English-learning children between the ages of 
3;10 and 5;07 (mean age 4;09) and 12 adult native speakers of English.
6
 An additional 8 children 
were tested but they were excluded from data analysis for the following reasons: failure to 
understand, comply with or complete the task; failure to pay attention; or failure to understand 
goal-PP sentences without again (during the pretest, which is to be discussed later in Section 5.2). 
 
5.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were tested on their interpretation of repetitive again and restitutive again modifying 
goal-PP sentences. I used a slightly modified version of the Truth Value Judgment Task (TVJT, 
Crain & McKee 1985; Crain & Thornton 1998). The format was similar to the traditional TVJT: 
The experimenter told stories through cartoon pictures presented in PowerPoint on a laptop 
computer. At the end of each story, a puppet on the computer screen, Parrot, said the test 
sentence, and the participant was asked whether the puppet “got it right.” If Parrot got it right, he 
was rewarded with a smiley stamp. If he got it wrong, he was given a dinosaur stamp. If a child 
participant rejected the test sentence, s/he was asked a follow-up question like, “How do you 
know”? On the other hand, adults were not asked to justify their answers after each trial, but 
were given an informal interview after all the test sentences were presented. This was to avoid a 
potential problem of the adult participants overanalyzing the test sentence.    
Crucially, I introduced a modified version of the TVJT. Remember that again triggers a 
presupposition that a salient event with the same property as the asserted event has occurred 
                                                          
6
 Bilingual children may have been tested in the study, since the information about what language(s) children spoke 
at home was not collected. A possible improvement in future studies is to exclude bilingual children. Meanwhile it 
would also be interesting to examine how bilingual children interpret again. 
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before. In fact, the meaning contribution of again to its host sentence is strictly presuppositional, 
i.e. taking out the adverb does not change the asserted content of a sentence. For example, John 
danced again presupposes that John had danced before, and has the same asserted content as 
John danced. What the participants evaluate in our experiment is whether the test sentences’ 
presuppositions have been met, rather than whether the test sentence is true. Thus, the traditional 
TVJT would not have been appropriate, for the following reasons: First, the participants may 
give answers based on the assertion, and thus downgrade the relevance of the presupposition. 
Second, since a presupposition failure often gives rise to a “squeamish” feeling rather than a 
plain sense of falseness, participants may be unable to decide whether the puppet’s sentence with 
again is correct. For these reasons I introduced a modified version of the TVJT, in which I 
included a “contrastive” character in the stories for the again-conditions. In other words, the 
stories for both interpretations of again (repetitive and restitutive) involved two characters, 
where exactly one of the two satisfied the presupposition of again. The presence of a contrasting 
character, who did not meet the presupposition of again, highlighted the relevance of the 
presupposition.  
To illustrate this point, consider a sample story (10) for restitutive again. In the story, the 
lizard meets the presupposition of restitutive again (i.e. the lizard was under the rock before) by 
being born under the rock. The other character, the snail, was born near a river and thus did not 
meet the presupposition.
7
 Two possible test sentences are included in the sample: a match (M) 
sentence and a mismatch (MM) sentence. In the experiment, the participant heard only one test 
                                                          
7
 For restitutive again with goal-PP sentences, such as John walked to the village again (1), the sentence 
presupposes that John was at the village before (without necessarily having walked there). This reading was often 
illustrated in the literature (e.g. Beck 2005) through a context where the agent, John, was born at the destination (the 
village) from the beginning. Such contexts were also widely used in our experiment for the examination of 
children’s interpretation of restitutive again, as shown in (10). In principle, restitutive again should also be felicitous 
in a context where John went to the village before, but through a different manner of motion than walking; for 
example, perhaps last time John drove to the village, but this time he walked there. In our experiment, I included one 
such story (see (11) in Appendix III), which involves different manners of motion (flying versus swimming).  
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sentence per story (either (10a) or (10b) for (10)). A sample story to test children’s repetitive 




(10) Restitutive story: 
Experimenter: This is a story about a baby lizard and a baby snail. Look, they are hatching 
from their eggs! The lizard is hatching under the rock, and the snail is hatching by the river. 
The lizard decides to stay under the rock for a while, enjoying the cool shade and the breezy 
air. Then he starts to feel thirsty. So he crawls away from the rock to the river and gets some 
water. But then he starts to feel hot. “Should I go back? It’s pretty out here, but I really like 
the cool shade under the rock,” says the lizard. So he crawls back, and takes a break under 
the rock. The snail hatched by the river, but she thinks the riverside is too hot. She wishes she 
had been born under the rock! She crawls toward the rock. It’s a bit far. She gets tired 
halfway, because she's too small and not strong enough. “Should I keep going?” asks the 
snail. “Yes, I’ll keep going. I need the shade.” She finally gets there and decides to stay 
under the rock.  
a. Puppet: I know what the lizard did in the end. The lizard crawled under the rock again. (M) 
b. Puppet: I know what the snail did in the end. The snail crawled under the rock again. (MM 
due to presupposition failure)
9
 
                                                          
8
 An anonymous reviewer expresses the following concern about testing participants’ interpretation of the repetitive 
reading: Since the repetitive reading entails the restitutive reading, how can we tell that participants are in fact 
interpreting test sentences like (11a) as repetitive? I believe this is the case for two reasons. First, on the plausible 
assumption that frequent use of an interpretation makes it easier to access, and on the further assumption that 
repetitive readings of again are more frequent than restitutive readings (as seems likely, given that restitutive 
readings are available in a much more restricted set of environments), we might expect the repetitive reading to be 
preferred when both are possible. Second, as will be discussed, only the repetitive reading is available when again is 
stressed (Fabricius-Hansen 1983; von Stechow 1996, Beck 2006). In the experiment, again was not stressed in the 
stimuli for restitutive stories, yet it was stressed in stimuli for repetitive stories. If (child) participants are following 
the adult grammar, they should entertain the repetitive interpretation under a repetitive context.  
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(11) Repetitive story: 
Experimenter: This is a story about a baby dinosaur and a baby crocodile. They're near a 
river, where they've just hatched from their eggs. They stay and play by the river for a while... 
Then they notice that there's a tree not far away. The dinosaur wants to play under the tree, 
and he asks the crocodile to join him. “No,” says the crocodile. “I’m too sleepy to crawl right 
now.” So the dinosaur crawls to the tree by himself, and plays there for a while. Later when 
he crawls back to the river, he starts missing the tree, and he wonders if he should go there 
for a second time. “It's a little bit far, but I think I’ll crawl there anyway. It’s a lot of fun to 
play under the tree!” He decides to ask the crocodile to come with him. The crocodile is still 
sleepy, but he feels bad saying no for a second time. So, the crocodile and the dinosaur both 
crawl under the tree, and they both have a great time there! 
a. Puppet: I know what the dinosaur did in the end. The dinosaur crawled under the tree again. 
(M) 
b. Puppet: I know what the crocodile did in the end. The crocodile crawled under the tree again. 
(MM due to presupposition failure) 
 
Fabricius-Hansen (1983), von Stechow (1996), Beck (2006), and others report that focus 
helps disambiguate: only the repetitive reading is available when again is stressed. In the 
experiment, again was not stressed in the stimuli for restitutive stories (e.g. (10a) and (10b)) to 
make the test sentences most natural under the intended reading. Yet it was stressed in stimuli for 
repetitive stories (e.g. (11a) and (11b)) to draw the participants’ attention to the crucial adverb. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9
 Ideally one would place focal stress on lizard / snail in the lead-in, and thereby turn the snail/lizard into a 
"contrastive topic"; this could highlight the issue of whether it's the snail or the lizard who better meets the 
description. This was not done in the present experiment, but it would be a possible improvement in future studies. 
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Each adult participant received four stories for repetitive again (e.g. (11)) and four stories for 
restitutive again (e.g. (10)). Each child participant received these eight stories plus two more 
stories for restitutive again, for reasons to be discussed later. In addition to stories for repetitive 
and restitutive again, adult and child participants also received a pre-test that included four goal-
PP trials without again. The purpose of the pre-test was twofold: to prepare the participants for 
the test stage and to make sure that the subjects could understand goal-PP sentences in the first 
place. Only children who got at least three out of four trials correct were included in the analysis.  
Six combinations of motion verb and preposition (walk to, crawl under, fly into, swim to, 
jump into and run into) were used in the experiment. Four of them (walk to, crawl under, fly into, 
swim to) were used in all three types of stories (goal-PP stories, repetitive stories, and restitutive 
stories), and two (jump to and run into) were only used for restitutive stories, as summarized in 




Table 3-3. Test sentences under different story types 
Story types Puppet’s statements 
Goal-PP stories Daisy walked to the store. 
The turtle crawled under the bridge. 
The bee flew into his hive. 
Ariel swam to the land. 
Repetitive stories Aladdin/Abu walked to the castle again. 
The dinosaur/The crocodile crawled under the tree again. 
The sparrow/The woodpecker flew into the lighthouse again. 
Elmo/Cookie Monster swam to the boat again. 
Restitutive stories The puppy/The bunny walked to the doghouse again. 
The lizard/the snail crawled under the rock again. 
The robin/The crow flew into the birdcage again. 
Woody/The fisherman swam to the island again. 
The bear ran into the forest again.  (for children only) 
The pony jumped into the farm again.  (for children only) 
 
Four different versions were created to control the order of presentation of the again stories. 
Two versions were created first with everything identical except the subject of the puppet’s 
utterance. Take (10) as an illustration: in one version the test sentence is (10a), while in the other 
version the test sentence is (10b). The third and fourth versions were created by reversing the 
presentation order of again-trials to cancel out any item-specific effects of either fatigue or 
practice. Children and adults were divided roughly equally among the four versions. All four 
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versions started with the presentation of a story containing a test sentence with a stressed 
repetitive again, in an attempt to call the participants’ attention to the word again. In subsequent 
trials no more than two trials in the same condition were presented in a row. For participants who 
gave the same judgment to three consecutive trials, a filler item with the opposite expected 
answer was inserted, in order to confirm that the participant understood the task and was not 
simply responding Yes (or No) to all items.  
Ideally we would have liked to have the test trials in two conditions: repetitive and restitutive, 
with each condition having match and mismatch items. However, in the context of goal-PPs, 
truth of the presupposition of repetitive again entails truth of the presupposition of restitutive 
again. In other words, contexts compatible with repetitive again are a proper subset of those 






Due to the entailment relation, the test trials with again fell under three conditions, as 
summarized in Table 3-4. The first condition included true repetitive items like (11a). By “true” I 
                                                          
10
 However, by stressing again in the repetitive items, the restitutive reading may have been blocked there, at least 
for children who were following the adult grammar. In this experiment again is stressed in the test items for 
repetitive stories, which stacks the cards against us. This is because participants are likely to be primed for repetitive 
readings and may have more difficulty accessing the restitutive reading. As we will see later, however, children in 






mean ‘both true and felicitous’, and the consequence of an unsatisfied presupposition is simply a 
percept of infelicity. These trials were also true under the restitutive reading, because of the 
entailment relation. Each participant received two trials in this condition. The second condition 
included true restitutive sentences which failed to meet the presupposition of repetitive again, as 
exemplified by (10a). Each adult participant was asked to judge two items in this condition, and 
each child participant was asked to judge these two and two more, for reasons to be discussed 
later in this paragraph. The third condition, called ‘mismatch items’, failed to meet the 
presupposition of repetitive or restitutive again, as shown in (10b) and (11b). Each participant 
received four items of this category. Logically, there exists a fourth condition: sentences that are 
true under repetitive again yet fail to meet the presupposition of restitutive again. However, such 
sentences do not exist, because in the context of goal-PPs, truth of the presupposition of 
repetitive again entails truth of the presupposition of restitutive again. Among the three 
conditions, the true restitutive condition was the only condition that was informative about 
children’s knowledge of restitutive again. Ideally, we would have liked mismatch restitutive 
items to be informative as well. However, because the repetitive reading asymmetrically entails 
the restitutive reading, the mismatch items that failed to meet the presupposition of restitutive 
again (cf. (10b)) also failed to meet that of repetitive again. This explains why items like (10b) 
and (11b) were grouped together. If children only had knowledge of the repetitive reading, they 
would reject these items anyway. Consequently, we included two more true restitutive trials for 
the child participants than adults, with the hope of better tapping into their knowledge of 
restitutive again. The true repetitive items served as a control. The mismatch items were 
included to make sure that children were not simply ignoring the adverb in their interpretation. If 
they were doing so, they would accept the mismatch items.  
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Presupposition failure N=4 (11b), (10b) 
N/A True Presupposition failure   
 
 
5.3. Plan for data analysis 
If children in the age range of 3;10 to 5;07 know that restitutive again with goal-PPs is possible 
in English, they will accept the puppet’s statement as “right” substantially more often when it is 
a true restitutive item than they will when it is a mismatch item. On the other hand, if children in 
this age range do not understand restitutive reading, few if any of them will make any distinction 
between the true restitutive and mismatch items. Hence, we do not expect a significant difference. 
The plan is to compare the acceptance frequencies for true restitutive vs. mismatch items, by 
applying a non-distributional test of within-subject difference, the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.  
Additional analyses were performed on the children’s accuracy through mixed logit models, 
to check for possible effects of sentence type (true repetitive vs. true restitutive vs. mismatch), 
and of individual verb-preposition combinations. Such models are well-suited for modeling data 
like the binary felicity judgments that the participants made in this study. They also provide 
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information about effect size for each factor in the magnitude of the coefficients β, which 
eliminates the need for additional post-hoc tests. 
 
5.4. Results 
Each participant’s responses for each condition (goal-PPs, true repetitive, true restitutive and 
mismatch) were analyzed. I first present the accuracy of all adult and child participants, assessing 
whether they were sensitive to the distinction between match and mismatch again for both 
repetitive and resitutitve again (in Section 5.4.1). Then I examine the performance of each 
individual child particpant (in Section 5.4.2). The results indicate that a number of children 
ignored again, the critial element in the test sentence. Focusing on children who did not ignore 
again, I present their overall accuracy and assess whether these children were sensitive to the 
distinction between match and mismatch again for both repetitive and resitutitve again. In the 
end, I present results based on an alternative way of classifying the data, and address the 
questions of whether signal detection is modulated by story types (repetitive vs. restitutive) and 
whether individual verb-preposition combinations play a role in participants’ interpretation 
(Section 5.4.3).  
 
5.4.1. Overall performance 
The adults’ and children’s accuracy on each type of test sentence is presented in Figure 1.11 The 
results indicate that children’s accuracy on true repetitive items (82.3%) and on true restitutive 
                                                          
11
 Figure 1 indicates a drop in adults’ accuracy on true restitutive items compared with true repetitive items. Three 
out of twelve adults each rejected one true restitutive item, which suggests that they sometimes had a strong 
preference for the repetitive interpretation. This led to an accuracy of 87.5%. I speculate that the drop may stem 
from a processing bias, given that the repetitive reading is more accessible than the restitutive reading. On the other 
hand, given that there were only two items in each condition, it is hard to make any conclusion based on the results 
here. Adding more items per condition could be another improvement of the experiment. 
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items (83.9%) are similar. Yet their accuracy on mismatch items (i.e. where there was a 
presupposition failure) is much lower than adults’.  
 
 
Figure 1. Adults’ (N=12) and children’s (N=31) accuracy (percentage correct) on each condition 
 
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests were used to assess whether a given subject group was reliably 
making the expected distinctions between item types. Results indicated that both adults and 
children are sensitive to the distinction between match and mismatch again items for both 
repetitive again (adults: z=3.04, two-tailed p=.002; children: z=3.92, two-tailed p<.001) and 
restitutive again (adults: z=3.04, two-tailed p=.002; children: z=4.12, two-tailed p<.001). As a 
group, the children (like the adults) accepted restitutive-true items significantly more often than 
they accepted mismatch items. Hence, the main finding of the study is that a sizable proportion 
of the children tested already knew restitutive again was possible with goal-PPs in English. 
A mixed logit model of children’s accuracy on all test sentences was created with sentence 
type (true repetitive, true restitutive, mismatch) as a fixed factor. This model found that the 
overall accuracy on mismatch items are significant lower than those on the true repetitive items 
(β=1.175, z= 9.60, p=.002) and true restitutive items (β= 1.290, z= 17.9, p <.001). Yet there was 
no significant difference between overall accuracy on true repetitive and true restitutive trials 
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(β=0.115, z= 0.077, p=.781). As we will see in Section 5.4.2, children’s accuracy on the 
mismatch items is lower because a number of children seemingly ignored again and accepted all 
the again-sentences. 
Children’s justifications of their answers, with a few listed in (13) and (14), were as expected. 
Although children were only asked how they figured out the answer when they rejected the test 
sentence, occasionally they justified their ‘yes’ answers (15).  
 
(13) Story: same as in (10). 
Puppet: I know what the snail did in the end. The snail crawled under the rock again. 
Child #19 (3;10,9): No, he didn’t crawl under the rock…crawled one time. 
Child #6 (5;0,6): …because he didn’t go… the first time. HE (pointing to the lizard) went 
there. 
Child #28 (5;1,21): No, he just went there one time. 
(14) Story: same as in (8) in Appendix III 
Puppet: I know what the woodpecker did after he napped in the tree. The woodpecker 
flew into the lighthouse again. 
Child #6 (5;0,6): He didn’t go there AGAIN.  
Child #28 (5;1,21): Because the woodcracker[woodpecker] just flew into the tree and 
then went there. The parrot…[s]parrow just flew in and he went again.  
(15) Story: same as in (11) in Appendix III  
Puppet: I know what Woody did after he met the fisherman on the boat. Woody swam to 
the island again. 
Child #19 (3;10,09): Yes, he swims to the fisherman’s boat and then back to the island.   
78 
 
To examine whether the factor of children’s age affect the child participant’s interpretation of 
the sentences, I divided the child participants into a younger group (3;10-4;09, n=15) and an 
older group (4;10-5;06, n=16). A mixed logit model of accuracy on all trial types was created 
with children’s age group (young and old) as a fixed factor. This model found no significant 
effect of age (β=.211, z= 2.64, p=.105). When a fixed factor of sentence type (true repetitive, true 
restitutive, mismatch) was added to the same model, there was still no significant main effect of 
age (β=.236, z=2.36, p=.125). 
 
5.4.2. Individual subject analysis 
Below I examine the performance of each individual child participant in terms of the response 
patterns summarized in Table 3-5. 
Table 3-5. Possible response patterns 
Sentence type 
Possible response patterns 
Adult-like Again dropper Rep-only knower 
True repetitive item (N=2) Yes Yes Yes 
True restitutive item (N=4) Yes Yes No 
Mismatch item (N=4) No Yes No 
 
First, if a child was adult-like (categorized as ‘adult-like’ in Table 3-5), s/he accepted (said 
‘yes’ to) the true repetitive and restitutive items, but rejected (said ‘no’ to) the mismatch items, 
which failed to meet the presupposition of again. Second, if a child seemingly ignored again 
(and is therefore categorized as an ‘again dropper’ in Table 3-5), s/he accepted all the again 
79 
 
items, since in all test items, the asserted portion is true in the context given. Third, if a child 
only knew repetitive again (categorized as a ‘rep-only knower’ in Table 3-5), s/he accepted the 
true repetitive items, yet rejected the true restitutive items and mismatch items. Children who did 
not fall under any of the response patterns above are simply categorized as ‘others’.  
The following criteria were used when classifying the children: (i) ‘Adult-like’ children had 
to get at least three out of four true restitutive items correct and three out of four mismatch items 
correct. In addition they had to get at least nine out of ten again items correct. In other words, 
they were allowed to make at most one mistake on a true repetitive item, and this only if they 
made no mistakes on other again items. (ii) An ‘again dropper’, who was expected to say ‘yes’ 
across the board, had to say ‘yes’ on at least nine out of ten again-items. (iii) A rep-only knower 
had to say ‘no’ on at least three out of four true restitutive items and on at least three out of four 
mismatch items. Meanwhile s/he had to say ‘yes’ to at least one of two true repetitive items.12 
Analysis of individual subject data indicates that 9 out of 31 children (29.0%) were fully 
adult-like, while another 9 out of 31 children (29.0%) systematically responded as if they were 
ignoring again, by accepting all the again-sentences regardless of whether the presupposition 
was met. This is what led to the children’s low overall accuracy on the presupposition-failure 
items (Figure 1). Of the remaining 13 children, only 2 had difficulties specifically with restitutive 
again. One of them got all the mismtach items corret, yet got one out of two true repetitive itmes 
and three out of four true restitutive items wrong; the other got all true repetitive and mismatch 
items correct yet got three out of four true restitutive items wrong. 
13
  
                                                          
12
 It is difficult to set the standard for the true repetitive condition, because there were only two items in this 
category. For rep-only knowers, I tried to stack the cards against myself by deciding that the child knows repetitive 
again if s/he gets at least one out of two true repetitive items correct. I think that this should not be too problematic, 
since the mismatch items also help to distinguish rep-only knowers and again droppers.    
13
 For the remaining eleven child participants categorized as ‘others’, their patterns were hard to identify because of 
the following reasons: first, there were only two true restitutive items, which makes it hard to conclude whether 
child know the repetitive reading if s/he gets one item wrong. Second, the task involved judgment on pragmatic 
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As we have shown in the individual subject analysis, some children simply ignored again, 
and responded according to the truth/falsity of the assertion. The data of these children do not 
reveal their knowledge of again. Therefore, I exclude these children and show in Figure 2 the 
accuracy of the remaining 22 children, which is similar across conditions.  
 
 
Figure 2. Adults’ (N=12) and children’s (N=22) accuracy on each condition 
 
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests indicate that these children’s sensitivity to the distinction 
between true and false again items was statistically reliable for both repetitive again (z=3.61, 
two-tailed p<.001) and restitutive again (z=3.81, two-tailed p<.001).  
A mixed logit model of these 22 children’s accuracy on all test sentences was created with 
sentence type (true repetitive, true restitutive, mismatch) as a fixed factor. This model found no 
significant effect of sentence type (z=0.236, p=0.889).   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
felicity (whether the presupposition was met), which was subtle and complex, and thus contained some noisy data. 
Third, some standards of categorization may be too strict, given the complexity of the task. For instance, the 
standard that a child needed to get at least nine out of ten again-items correct to be counted as adult-like excluded 
three children who got eight out of ten items correct and could be potentially adult-like.   
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5.4.3. An alternative way of categorizing the test trials 
The next goal is to examine whether signal detection is modulated by story type (repetitive vs. 
restitutive). To do this, we analyze the data through an alternative way of categorizing the test 
trials. Test trials were divided into repetitive versus restitutive again based on the story types 
they occur in (repetitive story vs. restitutive story). Although the mismatch restitutive again 
items would also have been rejected under a repetitive reading, it is likely that participants 
rejected them with the restitutive reading in mind, because the character in the test sentence was 
contrasted with another character who met the presupposition of restitutive again, and neither of 
the characters met the presupposition of repetitive again.  
Under this way of categorizing the data, children’ and adults’ accuracy of match and 
mismatch items for each story type (repetitive, restitutive) is summarized in Figure 3 and Figure 
4. In Figure 4, data from the nine children who consistently ignore again (i.e. those classified as 
again-droppers in Section 5.4.2) was excluded. 
 
 




Figure 4. Adults’ (N=31) and children’s (N=22) accuracy on each context 
To examine whether signal detection is modulated by context (in other words, whether 
children’s sensitivity to the un/availability of a restitutive interpretation was comparable to their 
sensitivity to the un/availability of a repetitive interpretation), I calculated the d’ score for each 
participant under each of the two story types (repetitive vs. restitutive), and then compared d’ 
scores across them using mixed logit models. This model found no significant main effect of 
story type for children (β=-0.2913, z=1.150, p=.284) or adults (β=-0.5718, z= 0.881, p=.348).  
Under this approach to the data, we can also check for effects of specific verb-preposition 
combinations. This analysis is facilitated by the fact that the stimuli were counterbalanced in 
such a way that across subjects, every verb-preposition combination occurred in every 
experimental treatment (i.e. in both Match and Mismatch items, in all three of the repetitive, 
restitutive, and goal-PP stories). Table 3-6 and Table 3-7 summarize adult’s and children’s 
accuracy on each combination of manner of motion verb plus preposition. Comparatively, 
children’s accuracy on walk to under each condition seemed a bit lower compared with other 
verb-preposition combinations.  
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Table 3-6. Adults’ accuracy (percentage correct) on each verb-preposition combination 
 crawl under fly into swim to  walk to 
goal-PPs (no again) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
repetitive again 100.0% 100.0% 91.7% 100.0% 
restitutive again 100.0% 100.0% 91.7% 83.3% 
 
 
Table 3-7. Children’s accuracy (percentage correct) on each verb-preposition combination 
(N=31) 
 crawl under fly into swim to  walk to run into jump into 
goal-PPs (no again) 93.5% 87.1% 96.8% 64.5% N/A N/A 
repetitive again 77.4% 80.6% 77.4% 54.8% N/A N/A 
restitutive again 74.2% 74.2% 61.3% 58.1% 93.5% 83.9% 
Totals 81.7% 80.6% 78.5% 59.1% 93.5% 83.9% 
 
The accuracy on run into and jump into, for which only true restitutive items were presented, 
were much higher compared with other combinations of motion verb and preposition. This is 
because a number of children seemingly ignored again, and accepted all the again-sentences, 
leading to a high accuracy on run into and jump into. Excluding these two verb-preposition 
combinations and the goal-PP trials, I created a mixed logit model of children’s accuracy on each 
verb-PP combination, with verb-PP combination and story type (repetitive, restitutive) as fixed 
factors. This model found no significant difference between overall accuracy by story type (β=-
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0.149, z=1.077, p=0.299), but there was a significant difference between children’s accuracy on 
walk to compared to crawl under (β=-0.884, z=5.080, p=0.024) and fly into (β=-0.982, z=6.045, 
p=0.014). The differences between other verb-PP combinations are not significant (crawl under 
vs. fly into: β= 0.098, z= 0.052, p=0.819; crawl under vs. swim to: β=-0.298, z=0.528, p=0.467; 
fly into vs. swim to: β=-0.396, z= 0.901, p= 0.343; swim to vs. walk to:  β=-0.586, z=2.356, 
p=0.125).  
I see two potential sources for children’s specific difficulty with walk to. For one thing, it 
could stem from an experimental artifact. In most of the stories for again, the movement 
trajectory of the characters was marked through footprints, paw prints, etc., even in the cases of 
swimming and flying, so as to alleviate the memory/processing demand. However, in the two 
again stories with walk to, the movement of the characters happened not to be marked. Note that 
adults’ accuracy on walk to with restitutive again was also lower compared with other verb-
preposition combinations (cf. Table 3-6).  
Another possibility is that children have difficulty with walk to, as suggested by the low 
accuracy on the goal-PP trial. It is not transparent from the preposition to that the goal-PP entails 
a result state in which the subject is at the destination. As a result, some children may not have 
an adult-like understanding of to and may thus interpret it as towards. This idea is in line with a 
previous finding that English-learning children between four and seven years old tend not to treat 
the end-state component of some lexical accomplishment verbs such as fill as a necessary 
meaning component (Gentner 1978; Gropen, Pinker, Hollander & Goldberg 1991). The pre-test 
sentence with ‘walk to’ did not match the given story context, in which the character walked 
only halfway to the store. Children who entertained a ‘walk toward’ interpretation would judge 
the sentence as true, leading to a low average. But why do they seem to be adult-like with swim 
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to? This is because the pre-test sentence with swim to was a match item. Since ‘swim to’ entails 
‘swim toward’, children with a non-adult-like interpretation would still accept the test sentence. I 
leave this hypothesis as a direction for future research. 
 
6. Discussion 
6.1. A proposal 
Overall, the results of the experiment indicated that three- to five-year-olds achieved a surprising 
degree of facility with both repetitive and restitutive again modifying goal-PP constructions. 
Participants were sensitive to the distinction between true and false items for both repetitive 
again and restitutive again. In addition, they showed very similar performance in the true 
repetitive and the true restitutive conditions.  
To account for the children’s considerable success, I propose that they are benefiting from 
more general evidence about the syntax/semantics of English goal-PPs. To lay out the details, let 
us first see how the ambiguity of again is derived and how the cross-linguistic variation of again 
with goal-PPs is accounted for. 
Many researchers (von Stechow 1995, 1996, and Beck & Johnson 2004, among others) argue 
that the ambiguity of ‘again’ (in German and English) is structural: a single again, denoting 
repetition, can adjoin to different syntactic projections within a complex VP. The semantics of 
again is presented in (16), according to which again adjoins to a proposition and triggers a 
presupposition that an eventuality with the same properties has occurred previously.
14
 The 
presupposition of again is determined by its sister. Thus different readings of again come from 
where it adjoins in syntax. Take (17a) as an example: walk to the village denotes a complex 
                                                          
14




event with walking as its development and being at the village as its culmination. When again 
modifies the whole complex event (17b), the repetitive reading is derived. When it modifies the 
resultative state (17c), the restitutive reading is derived (17c), under the assumption that to can 




(16) Let P be a property of eventualities and let e be an eventuality. 
[[again]](P)(e) is defined only if e’[P(e’)=1&e’<e]. 
Where defined, [[again]](P)(e)=1 iff P(e)=1.    (adapted from von Stechow 1996) 
(17) a. John walked to the village again.  
b.  [ [ John 1[ t1 [ walked [ PRO1 to the village]]]] again]    Repetitive 
c.  [ John 1[ t1 [ walked [ [ PRO1 to the village] again]  ]]]    Restitutive 
d. [[PRO1 to the village]]
g=λe.ate(the_village)(g(1)) 
16
  (see Beck 2005) 
 
However, we have seen that the restitutive reading for goal-PPs is not permitted in all 
languages. To account for this cross-linguistic variation, Beck and Snyder (2001) and Beck 
(2005) propose that the syntax of goal-PPs varies across languages. A proposition denoting just 
the result, as needed for the restitutive reading of again, is present only if the language provides 
a special semantic composition rule. This semantic composition rule can interpret the 
combination of a manner-of-motion verb (e.g. walk) and a prepositional phrase indicating 
location or path (e.g. to the store) as an accomplishment predicate. The content of the special 
                                                          
15
 Without the assumption that to can be interpreted as ‘at’ in English, the restitutive reading of again for (17a) 
would require that there was a path of going to the village or direction toward the village that was repeated, which is 
incompatible with the classical context for the restitutive reading in which John was born at the village and has 
never left (cf. Section 1). Sufficient for our purpose in this study, (17d) is a simplification of Cresswell’s (1978) 
semantics of to, which involves the notion of a path derived from progress through time (see Beck 2005 for more 
details). 
16
 In (17d), g is an assignment function (see Heim & Krazter 1998) which interpretes variables, in this case PRO1. 
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semantic composition rule has evolved over the years. Here, I illustrate the idea with Snyder’s 
most recent proposal (2012) about the semantic composition rule, which he calls Generalized 
Modification (18).  
 
(18) Generalized Modification (GM)  
“If α and β are syntactic sisters under the node γ, where α is the head of γ, and if α denotes a 
kind, then interpret γ semantically as a subtype of α's kind that stands in a pragmatically suitable 
relation to the denotation of β.”  
 
Furthermore, Snyder (2012) proposes that whether GM is available is a point of cross-
linguistic variation, which he calls the Compounding parameter (TCP) (19).  
 
(19) The Compounding Parameter (TCP):   
The language (does / does not) permit Generalized Modification. 
 
Let us first examine how a goal-PP construction is interpreted in [+TCP] languages (e.g. 
English), where GM is available. Take floated under the bridge as an example. In the assumed 
structure in (20a), PP is a small clause with a PRO subject. Extending Chierchia’s (1998) 
concept of ‘kind’, Snyder (2012) proposes that for a property of events, there corresponds an 
eventuality-kind. The motion verb float denotes a kind of activity, i.e. the floating-kind, and the 
locative phrase “under the bridge” denotes a kind of state. GM can combine the two constituents 
and give rise to the interpretation in (20b). Snyder (2012) assumes that the “pragmatically 
suitable relation” between eventuality kinds is limited and that the main relation between an 
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activity kind and a state kind is as follows: the former serves as development of an 
accomplishment event and the latter serves as its culmination.
17
 Thus (20b) can be translated into 
(20c). Similarly, for walk to the store in (21a), GM gives rise to the interpretation in (21c), under 
the assumption that to be interpreted as ‘at’ ((21b), see Beck 2005).  
 
(20) a. [The bottle 1 [t1 [floated [PP PRO1 under the bridge]]]]. 
b. a subtype of the “floating” event-kind, which stands in a pragmatically suitable relation to 
the state of “the bottle being under the bridge.” 
c. a kind of accomplishment event, with the bottle floating as its development and the bottle 
being under the bridge as its culmination. 
(21) a. [John 1 [t1 [walked [PP PRO to the village]]]] 
b. [[PRO1 to the village]]
g=λe.ate(the_village)(g(1))  (see Beck 2005) 
c. an accomplishment event-kind with “John walking” as its development and “John being at 
the village” as its culmination. 
  
In contrast to [+TCP] languages, GM is not available in [-TCP] languages such as Spanish 
and French. The lack of this special semantic composition rule makes certain types of goal-PP 
constructions harder to construct. This explains why (7), the Spanish counterpart to float under 
the bridge, does not have a goal-PP reading. But even in [-TCP] languages, the apparent 
                                                          
17
 Snyder (2012) assumes that “standing in a pragmatically suitable relation to…” has to be interpreted by the 
conceptual system, outside of linguistic semantics. He proposes that the human conceptual system provides only a 
tiny repertoire of possible relations between eventualities (and eventuality-kinds). The one that is relevant here is the 
relationship between the development (activity) and culmination (state) of a larger accomplishment event. 
Crucially, GM does not give rise to a “locative” interpretation that the floating event occurs under the bridge. 
Interpretation of the locative type is done differently, for instance, via the standard Davidsonian account of adverbs 
as predicates of eventualities, which treats Spanish bajo el puente ‘under the bridge’ as specifying that the “floating” 
eventuality took place under the bridge. And the structure corresponding to the “locative” interpretation is different 
from (20a) in that it does not contain an empty category.    
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counterparts to some English goal-PP constructions are perfectly grammatical, as in the French 
and Spanish examples in (22) and (23). 
  
(22) Jean a marché au sommet. 
Jean has walked  to-the summit 
John walked to the summit. 
(23) Suresh anduvo hasta la aldea. 
Suresh walked  until the village 
 Suresh walked to the village. 
 
Beck (2005) proposes tentatively that the “goal” PP in a sentence like (23) may actually be 
serving as an event modifier (i.e. an adjunct without a PRO), which renders such sentences 
grammatical. An alternative account for grammatical goal-PP constructions in a [-TCP] language 
is that the manner of motion verb has become semantically “bleached” to the extent that it is no 
longer a true manner-of-motion verb, but rather has become a change-of-location verb, and can 
select a goal as its argument (William Snyder, pc). For instance, the PP “to the summit” in (22) 
may simply be serving as a regular type e argument of the motion verb “walk” in French.18 
Despite the variation in different proposals, PPs in such examples are not propositions, hence not 
an appropriate adjunction site for the adverb again, which takes a proposition as its argument. 
An important note about TCP, as Snyder has proposed in a series of works (1995, 2001, and 
2012, among others), is that the parameter connects a number of constructions, including 
                                                          
18
 On this view, au sommet ‘to the summit’ is not associated with a proposition. 
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endocentric root compounds (e.g. banana box), verb particle constructions (e.g. lift the book up), 
adjectival resultatives (e.g hammer the metal flat), and goal-PP constructions.
19
 
Based on this background, what an English-speaking child really needs to learn about 
restitutive again modifying goal-PPs includes two components: a) the syntax of English goal-PP 
constructions, and b) the meaning of again in its simple, repetitive use. To acquire the former, 
children need to figure out that English is [+TCP] and therefore permits the special composition 
rule of GM, and thus that a manner of motion verb and a small clause with PP can be combined 
together to form an accomplishment event. Exposure to structures that require the composition 
rule GM (e.g. verb-particle combinations, endocentric root compound, or adjectival resultatives) 
will guide children to set the value to +TCP. The question is whether there is enough cues in the 
input for English learners to set TCP and how early children set the parameter. Checking the 
frequency of verb particle constructions in maternal speech, William Snyder (pc) reported that in 
the first transcript from each of the Brown (1973) corpora on CHILDES, when the child Adam 
was age 2;03,04, Eve was 1;06,15, and Sarah was 2;03,05, the frequency (per 1,000 utterances) 
of V-DP-Particle sequences in the mother's speech was 17.9 for Adam, 5.05 per thousand 
utterances for Eve, and 10.2 per thousand utterances for Sarah. These results indicate that there 
are a considerable amount of uses of verb particle constructions, for which TCP is a prerequisite 
of, which can help children set the parameter. As a result, the setting of TCP is achieved pretty 
early (before age 3), as shown in many previous studies, since other consequences of the TCP, 
aside from goal-PPs, can be observed in young children. For instance, Snyder & Stromswold 
                                                          
19
 The connection between some of these constructions has been made before and debated in the literature (for 
example, Aske 1989; Goldberg 1995; Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995 and references therein). More recently, Son 
and Svenonius (2008) argues against the idea that a single parameter like TCP captures the availability of both 
adjectival resultatives and goal-PP constructions. In the face of these challenges, Snyder (2012) points out that one 
needs to be cautious about the possibility that an expected surface form tied to the [+TCP] setting is nonetheless 
disallowed in particular languages due to independent properties of the language (see Snyder 2012 for more details). 
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(1997) examined 12 children, and found that their verb-particle combinations occurred between 
1;09 to 2;07 years (for similar results, see Snyder 2001:332 and Snyder 2007). Like verb-particle 
combinations, novel endocentric, bare-stem compounds in English also shows up in children’s 
spontaneous speech between 1.9 to 2.6 years (see Snyder 2001: 332; Snyder 2007: 92). 
Another component the child needs to learn is the basic meaning of again. I speculate that 
children can learn the lexical meaning of this adverb from its parental uses in child-directed 
speech. These uses include the combination of again with a variety of predicates, whether or not 
their combination gives rise to a repetitive versus restitutive ambiguity. Checking the child-
directed speech to the four English-speaking children, whose information was summarized in 
Table 3-1, I searched for all utterances containing again with the CLAN program Combo. The 
results, presented in Table 3-8, indicate that there were a considerable number of again uses in 





                                                          
20
 There is a complex learnability question involved here, which goes beyond the scope of this paper: How can 
learners tease apart the presupposed content from the asserted content of a presupposition trigger like again? This 
question is especially interesting given that a positive sentence containing again (iia) seems to have a similar 
meaning as a positive sentence containing twice (iiia).  
A possible answer is that children may be sensitive to the parental uses of a presupposition trigger like again in 
constructions where presupposition projects. For example, presupposition projects under negation, which 
distinguishes it from simple logical entailment. Take again as an example: if negation takes wider scope than again, 
(iib) presupposes that John had been late before. In contrast, (iiib) does not entail that John had been late before. For 
instance, it is compatible with a context in which John was not late last time but was late this time. However, (iib) is 
not compatible with such a context (even with negation taking narrow scope than again).  
 
(ii) a. John was late again. 
b. John wasn’t late again. 
(iii) a. John was late twice.  
b. John wasn’t late twice. (In fact, he was never late./In fact, he was late only once.) 
 
If children (somehow) have the knowledge of this property and also pay attention to such indirect negative 
evidence that sentences like (iib) never occur in a context where John was not late last time but was late this time, 
they may be able to distinguish again and twice and deduce the presupposition component of again.   
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Table 3-8. Again in child-directed speech 
 Uses of again Total adult utterances Frequency of  again per 1000 utterances 
Naima 270 61794 4.3694 
Lily 199 67238 2.9596 
Violet 126 25999 4.8463 
Mat 141 20170 6.9906 
 
Checking the spontaneous speech of the same four English children (see Table 3-1), I 
extracted all child utterances containing again with the CLAN program Combo. Results were 
checked against the original transcripts to exclude imitations, repetitions, and formulaic routines. 
Fragments (e.g. again?) were also excluded. The results are summarized in Table 3-9.  To 
estimate the time in which children acquire again, I adopted the measure of FRU, which stands 
for “first clear use soon followed by repeated use” (see Stromswold 1996 and Snyder & 
Stromswold 1997, among others). Therefore, to measure the emergence of a certain construction, 
not only do we look for the child’s first clear use of the construction in her longitudinal corpus, 
but also check whether there is additional uses with different lexical items in the portion of the 
corpus immediately following the first clear use of the construction. If there is no repeated use 
soon after a potential first use of the construction, we need to exclude it. Table 3-9 summarizes 
children’s FRU of again. In particular, the FRU reported were pragmatically felicitous in the 
sense that the eventualities represented by the predicates had occurred in the preceding context, 
hence the presupposition was satisfied. The results suggest that children’s productive and 
felicitous use of again was also in place fairly early, before two and a half years.   
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Table 3-9. Children’s FRU of again 
Child Age of FRU File number FRU 
Naima 1;05.26 nai17, line 695 *CHI: yyy moose xxx read the book again Mommy. 
Lily 1;11.28 lil24, line 1227 *CHI: yyy wet again. 
Violet 1;10.29 vio18, line 869 *CHI: xxx read it again.  
Mat 2;05.10 mat08, line 114 *CHI: I saw another two honkers again. 
 
I propose that a child will permit restitutive readings as soon as s/he has acquired the syntax 
of English goal-PPs and the basic meaning of again. In other words, while the child does not 
reliably get direct evidence for restitutive again with goal-PP constructions, s/he could deduce 
this possibility from evidence concerning the basic meaning of again, and from evidence that 
other structures (e.g. verb-particle combinations) requiring the composition rule GM are well-
attested in English.  
Given that both prerequisites for restitutive again are in place before age three, this proposal 
makes the prediction that children as young as four years old should be able to interpret 
restitutive again with English goal-PPs. If many or all children are using this type of strategy, 
instead of the simply relying on direct evidence in the child-directed speech, it is entirely 
expected that most four- and five-year-olds will be successful. 
At the end of this subsection, I would like to explain why in this study I focus on ‘again’ 
modifying goal-PPs, although this is not the only construction that gives rise to ambiguous 
readings when modified by again. As shown in Section 2, the ambiguity can also be observed in 
sentences with other accomplishment predicates, such as lexical accomplishment verbs (e.g. 
open) and adjectival resultatives (e.g. hammer the metal flat). However, the restitutive reading is 
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not always related to TCP. For example, open the door again in English gives rise to the 
restitutive reading, because the lexical accomplishment verb open is decomposed in syntax into 
into the adjectival root open, plus other material contributing a causal and a development 
component like CAUSE and BECOME (see von Stechow 1995, 1996, Beck & Johnson 2004). In 
other words, whether a lexical accomplishment verb can give rise to a restitutive reading when 
modified by ‘again’ depends on the decomposition property of the verb itself instead of TCP. 
This explains the findings reported in Beck and Snyder (2001) and Beck (2005) that cross-
linguistically there is no connection between the availability of the restitutive reading for ‘open 
the door again’ and the availability of resultative constructions, whereas the restitutive reading 
for goal-PP constructions is only available in languages that permit adjectival resultative 
constructions (e.g. hammer the metal flat): Both goal-PPs and resultatives are related to TCP 
whereas lexical accomplishment verbs are not. This shows that whether goal-PP modified by 
‘again’ has a restitutive reading is not predictable from other instances of restitutive readings. In 
other words, knowing her language allows ‘again’ with an accomplishment predicate to have a 
restitutive reading does not inform the child that ‘again’ with a goal-PP will also allow this 
reading. Therefore, the learnability problem with goal-PPs plus ‘again’ lies precisely in the 
structural combination, which is why there is a learnability problem and why I studied this 
structure in particular.   
 
6.2. Children’s evaluation of presupposed content 
Another issue that is involved in our study is whether and how children evaluate presupposed 
content as opposed to asserted content. Some studies reveal that children also have some 
difficulty with certain presupposition triggers: for example, Karmiloff-Smith (1979) and 
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Schaeffer and Matthewson (2009) observed that children use the definite determiner the in a non- 
adult-like way. In addition, some comprehension studies demonstrate that preschool children 
often ignore discourse particles such as ‘too’ (see Bergsma 2006 on Dutch ook, Matsuoka et al. 
2006 on Japanese mo and reference therein), thus concluding that young children have difficulty 
with the presupposition. However, more recent studies (e.g. Höhle et al. 2009, Berger & Höhle 
2012, Berger & Pouscoulous 2013) indicate that the reported difficulty is likely to be task-related 
and that three- to four-year-olds (and even younger children) are able to take into account the 
presuppositions triggered by particles like auch (‘too’). Our study, whose results indicated that 
children have considerable success interpreting again, lends further support to this view.
21
  
Despite the success of many children, we also observed an apparent lack of sensitivity to the 
presupposition of again on the part of quite a few children. In addition, children’s overall 
accuracy on again items was much lower than adults’. There are three possible accounts for this 
lack of sensitivity. One possibility is that these children do not understand the basic meaning of 
again. However, this seems less plausible, because the results of the corpus study indicated that 
children’s felicitous uses of again occur pretty early, before two and a half years old. As an 
anonymous reviewer pointed out, there is an alternative processing explanation for why children 
might ignore ‘again’: since again always comes at the end of the sentences used in this 
experiment, the child might have already committed to an interpretation before hearing “again”. 
This could be tested by changing the placing of again in the sentence or by putting other 
modifiers at the end and see if children ignore it (e.g. testing how children interpret The turtle 
kissed the rabbit twice under the scenario where there is only one kiss; or testing how children 
                                                          
21
 The acquisition of presuppositions is an issue that goes beyond the scope of this paper. As discussed in footnote 
18, it is not clear what kind of evidence exactly is needed for children to acquire presuppositions. Besides, 
presupposition triggers of different kinds (for instance, hard versus soft presupposition triggers (Abusch 2002, 
among others) may have distinct learning processes and mechanisms (also see Yatsushiro’s (2007, 2008) discussion 
on children’s acquisition of lexical and implicated presuppositions of ‘every’). 
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interpret The turtle kissed the rabbit only once if turtle kissed the rabbit many times).
22
 A third 
possibility is in line with Berger and Höhle’s (2012) account for children’s insensitivity to the 
presupposition of ‘also’. Ignoring ‘also’ need not indicate a non-adult-like representation of the 
adverb. Instead, children may simply downgrade the relevance of its presupposition when 
completing the experimental task. Interestingly, this idea was indicated explicitly by one adult-
like child when he responded to the first mismatch again item he heard. The child initially 
seemed to think the presupposition of again was irrelevant, but then asked the experimenter 
directly:  
 
(24) Story: same as in (10). 
Puppet: I know what the snail did in the end. The snail crawled under the rock again. 
(MM due to presupposition failure) 
Experimenter:  Did Parrot get it right? 
Child #17 (5;0,25): Yes, but he didn’t crawl under the rock before. So did he [the puppet] 
get it right? 
Experimenter: What do you think? 
Child #17: No.  
 
Comparatively, children’s acquisition of presupposition is less widely studied compared with 
their acquisition of scalar implicature (Barner et al. 2011; Guasti et al. 2005; Katsos & Bishop 
2011; Noveck 2001; Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou 2004; Pouscoulous 
et al. 2007; among others). Overall, these studies on scalar implicature indicate that children 
                                                          
22
 Thank the anonymous reviewer for the first suggestion and Jonathan Bobaljik for the second suggestion.  
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interpret scalar implicatures more logically than adults. However, they can be more pragmatic 
under appropriate experimental manipulation. As another phenomenon on the semantic-
pragmatic interface, how do children evaluate presupposed content? How is it similar to or 
different from children’s evaluation of scalar implicature? The answers to these questions go 
beyond the scope of this chapter. But it seems that like scalar implicature, children’s sensitivity 
to some presupposition can be improved if its importance is highlighted in the experiment.  
 
6.3. Future avenues of research 
As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, the reasoning for English children’s success in 
comprehending restitutive again with goal-PPs points to a question about children learning –TCP 
languages: these children should not permit the restitutive meaning, not only because it will not 
be in the input, but mainly because their language does not have the other properties associated 
with +TCP. I leave this prediction as a direction for future research. 
Although the experiment demonstrated that many children have considerable success in 
interpreting restitutive again at a fairly young age, the experiment per se did not tell us much 
about the specific acquisition process. Ideally, it would be more convincing to run the 
experiment on younger children and show that repetitive again is consistently acquired either 
concurrently with, or earlier than, restitutive again with goal-PP constructions. However, it is 
foreseeable that the current methodology will not be applicable to children as young as two or 
even the early threes, given the complexity of the task.  
Another possibility would be to conduct a training study, testing the following two 
predictions: first, we can provide training on the basic meaning of again for children who have 
acquired the goal-PP structure, but who do not know how to interpret again modifying goal-PP 
98 
 
construction. We expect that children who succeed in acquiring the basic meaning of again will 
immediately have access to a restitutive reading of again in a goal-PP sentence. Second, children 
who have acquired the basic meaning of again, but have not yet acquired goal-PP constructions, 
let alone those modified by restitutive again, will get the restitutive reading for free if we 
succeed in training them to use goal-PP constructions.  
In the current study, a contrastive character which does not meet the presupposition of again 
was introduced to highlight the relevance of presupposition. Another avenue for future research 
is to examine more precisely how children interpret presupposition failure, as suggested by an 
anonymous reviewer. For instance, we can measure participants’ response (either accuracy or 
reaction time) in complying with the direction “put x in the box again” where x either was or was 
not in the box before. If participants understand the basic meaning of again, they will see that 
there is a presupposition failure in the second condition but not the first, and may either not 
comply or take longer to comply in that condition.   
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Chapter 4  
Almost ambiguous: An intervention effect 
 
 
1. Introduction: the ambiguity of almost 
When almost modifies a predicate like close as in (1), the sentence is ambiguous (see Rapp & 
von Stechow 1999; Sevi 1998; Amaral & del Prete 2010). First, it has a “counterfactual” reading, 
in which the subject is on the verge of performing the action represented by the predicate but 
does not start it (1)a. A second reading, called the “scalar” reading, indicates closeness of 
completing the event: the subject has initiated the action but the result state is not achieved (1)b. 
Intuitively, the two readings are different in the following way: under the scalar reading, the 
event denoted by the predicate gets started and comes close to completion; whereas under the 
counterfactual reading, the described event represented by the predicate does not even start. 
Whether these are truly independent readings will be discussed in this chapter. I begin here by 
presenting them from a purely descriptive perspective.  
 
(1) John almost closed the door. 
a. counterfactual: John was about to close the door but he did not start the action.  
b. scalar: John started closing the door and come close to complete the action. 
 
The ambiguity of ‘almost’ is not unique to English, but can be found in other languages. 
Some languages behave like English in that ‘almost’ gives rise to ambiguity, as exemplified in 
(2).   
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(2) a. Mandarin Chinese 
Zhangsan chadian ba men guan-shang. 
Zhangsan almost  BA door close-up.  
Zhangsan almost closed the door.                                (counterfactual, scalar) 
      b. Slovenian 
John je skoraj zaprl vrata. 
          John is almost close door.   
John almost closed the door.      (counterfactual, scalar) 
[Adrian Stegovec, p.c.] 
       c. Polish 
Jan  prawie zamknął drzwi 
John-NOM almost closed  door-ACC 
John almost closed the door.      (counterfactual, scalar) 
[Marcin Dadan, p.c.] 
       d. Dutch 
?John had de deur bijna dichtgedaan. 
John had the door  almost close-done 
John almost closed the door.      (counterfactual, scalar) 
[Beata Moskal, p.c.] 
 
In some other languages, ‘almost’ can be potentially ambiguous; however, different readings 
of ‘almost’ goes with different morphology. For instance, the counterfactual reading of German 
fast ‘almost’ requires subjunctive. Rapp and von Stechow (1999) report that the subjunctive 
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examples only have the counterfactual reading but not the scalar reading, regardless of the 
position of fast ‘almost’ (3)a-(3)b. On the other hand, indicatives in general cannot be used to 
convey a counterfactual reading (3)c-(3)d. It seems to be restricted to the scalar reading if fast 




(3)     a.   weil  David fast seinen Hasen erwürgt hätte  
because David almost his rabbit strangled had (Subjunctive II) 
 (counterfactual, *scalar) 
b. weil  David seinen Hasen fast erwürgt hätte 
because David his rabbit almost strangled had (SubjunctiveII ) 
(counterfactual, *scalar) 
c??weil David fast seinen Hasen erwürgte 
because David almost his rabbit strangled  (preterite, indicative) 
(*counterfactual, *scalar) 
 
                                                          
1
 Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) points out that under the scalar reading, (3)c improves if weil ‘because’ is replaced 
with als ‘when’, as shown below.  
 
(i) ?  Als David fast seinen Hasen erwürgte 
when David almost his rabbit strangled  (preterite, indicative) 
(*counterfactual, scalar) 
 
I am going to leave open the question why (3)c cannot give rise to the scalar reading. Neither will I explain the 
contrast between (3)c and (i). 
 
2
 Rapp & von Stechow (1999) acknowledge that there may exist idiolectal and dialectal variations about the data in 
(3).  Also, not all forms of indicatives disallow a counterfactual reading. A present perfect indicative (ii) marginally 
allows a counterfactual reading (for similar examples, see Rapp & von Stechow 1999: 163, (23c)). 
 
(ii) John hat fast die Tür geschlossen.    
John has almost the door closed.    (present perfect, indicative) 




d. weil  David seinen Hasen fast erwürgte 
because David his rabbit almost strangled  (preterite, indicative) 
a-d: because David almost strangled his rabbit.   (*counterfactual, scalar) 
 [Rapp & von Stechow 1999: 157-158, (10)] 
 
Meanwhile, there also exist languages in which certain variants of ‘almost’ only give rise to a 
single reading. For example, Serbo-Croatian has two ‘almost’s: skoro and zamalo, which give 
rise to distinct interpretations.
3
 Skoro only gives rise to a scalar reading, as suggested by (4); 
whereas zamalo favors a counterfactual reading, as suggested by (5).  
 
(4) Ivan je skoro  zatvorio vrata.  
Ivan.nom  is almost  closed  door. 
Ivan almost closed the door.   (#counterfactual, scalar) 
(5) Ivan je zamalo  zatvorio vrata. 
Ivan.nom is almost  closed  door 
Ivan almost closed the door.    (counterfactual, ?scalar) 
[Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
 
Like Serbo-Croatian, Korean also has different means to express different interpretations of 
‘almost’:  keuy indicates that the event represented by the clause gets close to completion. For 
instance, (6)a indicates that the fish became very sick, almost to the point of death. In contrast, 
(u)l ppen ha, which is referred to as ‘action narrowly averted’ (ANA) by Kim (2002), indicates 
                                                          
3
 In some dialects of Serbo-Croatian, there exists another variant of ‘almost’ umalo, which can be used 
interchangeably with zamalo. 
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that the event represented by the sentence was on the verge of happening (but did not happen).
4
 
For example, (6)b can be used in the following context: I forgot that I had fed the fish today and 
was on the verge of feeding them again. Fortunately I remembered in the end. Had I fed the fish 




(6) a. koki-ka keuy cwuk-ess-ta 
fish-NOM almost die-PAST-DECL 
The fish almost died.                [Kim 2007, (11a)] 
       b.  koki-ka cwuk-ul ppen hay-ss-ta 
fish-NOM die-MOD ANA-PAST-DECL 
The fish almost died.               [Kim 2007, (12a)] 
 
The fact that in some languages the counterfactual and scalar interpretations of ‘almost’ are 
distinguished morphologically is in favor of the idea that the two readings are independent from 
each other, although the English case may be more complex, and the two readings are not 
independent from each other.  
The goal of this paper is not to settle how the ambiguity is derived. Instead I examine in this 
chapter an intervention effect, which as far as I am aware of, has never been reported before: an 
                                                          
4
 (u)l ppen ha is morphologically complex. According to Kim (2002), (u)l  functions as irrealis, referring to an 
unrealized event; ppen- is the dependent nominal, which indicates the closeness or nearness to the occurrence of an 
event; -ha is a verb functioning as a tense carrier.   
5
 At first glimpse, it seems that ppen ha-ta behaves like English almost except that it only gives rise to the 
counterfactual reading. However, it has some quirks which may require some special analysis. For instance, it is 
possible to combine keuy and ppen ha-ta, as demonstrated below. This example gives rise to a counterfactual 
interpretation (cf. Kim 2002, Kim 2007). 
 
(iii) koki-ka  keuy cwuk-ul  ppen hay-ss-ta 
fish-NOM almost die-MOD  ANA-PAST-DECL 
The fish almost died.         [Kim 2007, (14a)] 
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intervening manner adverb blocks the scalar reading of almost. For example, (7) does not have 
the reading that John was in the process of closing the door in a slow manner, but he did not 
close the door fully and only gets close to it.
6
 As we will see, this intervention effect does not 
follow directly from some previous analyses of the ambiguity of almost. 
 
(7) John almost slowly closed the door. 
 
As we have seen, in Serbo-Croatian and Korean there is a lexical item for scalar ‘almost’. 
When a manner adverb intervenes between scalar ‘almost’ and the predicate, the sentence is 
ungrammatical, as shown in the examples below. These examples suggest that there is a true 
intervention effect with respect to scalar ‘almost’. 
 
(8) Serbo-Croatian 
*Ivan  je skoro  brzo  zatvorio vrata.  
       Ivan.NOM is almost  quickly closed  door 
       Ivan almost closed the door in a quick manner.               [Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
                                                          
6
 Here I illustrate the intervention effect with a manner adverb of speed, such as slowly, instead of an adverb like 
carefully or cleverly. As Jackendoff (1972) observed, adverbs like carefully and cleverly can be ambiguous between 
a manner reading and subject-oriented reading when immediately preceding the verb. The two readings are 
paraphrased in (iv). For different accounts for the alternation between these readings, see Ernst 2002, McConnell-
Ginet 1982, and Pin͂ón 2010. 
 
(iv) Bill carefully closed the door. 
a. manner reading: Bill closed the door in a careful manner. 
b. subject-oriented reading: It was careful of Bill to close the door. 
 
In this chapter, I focus on the manner reading and leave the subject-oriented interpretation aside for future 
research, although some speakers reported that the intervention effect with almost is observed with both the manner 
and the subject-oriented readings for the adverb. For instance, (v) does not have the reading that John pushed the 
door almost closed in a careful manner. Neither does it have the reading that it was careful of John to push the door 
almost closed.  
 




??John-i  mwun-ul  keuy   ppalli  tat-ass-ta  
        John-NOM  door-ACC  almost  quickly close-PERF-DECL  
        John almost quickly closed the door.        [Jungmin Kang, p.c.] 
 
On the other hand, the analysis of this intervention effect bears on the semantics of almost 
and an understanding about where its ambiguity comes from. Both issues have received a fair 
amount of discussion in the literature (for the semantics of almost, see e.g. Sadock 1981; Sevi 
1998; Morzycki 2001; Penka 2006; Amaral & Del Prete 2010; for the ambiguity, see e.g. Amaral 
& Del Prete 2010; Eckardt 2007; Hitzeman 1992; Rapp & von Stechow 1999; Sevi 1998), but 
are still not well understood. Some interesting and leading ideas include that almost associates 
with scalar alternatives (see e.g Penka 2006; Amaral & Del Prete 2010) and the ambiguity is 
derived when it takes different scalar items as its argument (Eckardt 2007). I will follow some of 
these ideas for my analysis of the intervention effect. To be more specific, the semantics of 
almost that I adopt is inspired and based on a scalar analysis, which argues that almost associates 
with scalar alternatives (e.g. Hitzeman 1992; Penka 2006; Amaral & Del Prete 2010). I also 
follow Eckardt (2007) in that almost is a polymorphic operator which can combine with 
properties of various semantic types. I derive the intervention effect by examining the 
consequences when almost associates with one or two scalar items in its scope, which leads to 
ill-formedness. My analysis relies on (a) a posited minimality constraint such that almost cannot 
skip potential targets; and (b) an assumption that the scale associated with almost needs to have a 
fixed limit point.  
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In addition, I will also examine the intervention effect in some languages which has two 
variants of ‘almost’, including Serbo-Croatian and Korean. These languages will provide 
converging evidence for my analysis.   
I begin by reviewing previous analyses of the semantics of almost (Section 2), and how the 
counterfactual and scalar readings are derived (Section 3). I then discuss the intervention effect 
and the challenge that it presents for some previous analyses (Section 4). In the next section 
(Section 5), I propose an analysis of the intervention effect, followed by some converging 
evidence from Serbo-Croatian and Korean (Section 6).      
 
2. Semantics of almost  
I start with the semantics of almost, focusing on sentences in which almost modifies simple 
predicates, such as (10). Our intuition tells us that (10) has at least two layers of meaning: (a) 
Gore came close to winning; (b) Gore did not win. These two aspects of meaning have been 
referred to by Horn (2002) as the “proximal component” and the “polar component”, 
respectively. In the literature, the semantics of almost has often been analyzed as a conjunction 
of these two components, as we will see when we get to the detail of different analyses.    
 
(10) Gore almost won the election.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the status of the two components is not identical. A number of 
researchers have observed that the negative polar component is somehow placed in the 
background, and the proximal component is more at core (Nouwen 2006, a.o). Consider (11) and 
(12), although almost and not quite all at first glance seem to convey similar meanings, what we 
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can infer from (11) and (12) varies: (11) suggests that the speaker is pleased that most of his/her 
friends attended his/her wedding despite that some failed to show up. In contrast, (12) suggests 
that the speaker is pleased that some of his friends did not come. In (11) the evaluative adverb 
fortunately seems to ignore the negative aspect of the meaning that not all the friends came and 
simply assesses the proximal component, whereas in (12) fortunately evaluates the negative 
aspect of the meaning.  
 
(11) Fortunately, almost all my friends attended my wedding. 
(12) Fortunately, not quite all my friends attended my wedding. 
 
The exact status of the polar component remains controversial (see Horn 2002, Nouwen 2006 
for an overview). In the literature, it has been analyzed as an implicature (Sadock 1981; Ziegeler 
2000), as a presupposition (Ducrot 1973; Anscombre & Ducrot 1983), as an entailment (Eckardt 
2007), or as part of the assertion but being “assertorically inert” (Horn 2002).  
As for the proximal component, there exist two main approaches for the analysis of its 
semantics (both terms below adopted from Nouwen 2006): One is referred to as the intensional 
approach, which analyzes almost as a modal operator: almost p is true only if p is true in a world 
close to the actual world (see e.g., Sadock 1981). An alternative approach, called the scalar 
alternative approach, is to resort to alternatives on a scale that is lexically motivated, induced via 
focus or determined by context: almost p is true only if there exists a scalar alternative p’, which 
is close to p on the scale, and p’ is true (see e.g., Hitzeman 1992, Penka 2006, Amaral & Del 
Prete 2010).  In this section, I go through some previous analyses of almost and discuss in detail 
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how the semantics of the proximal component is implemented. The analysis of the polar 
component will also be mentioned in passing when necessary.  
 
2.1. The intensional approach 
Sadock (1981) proposes that almost is a function which relates possible worlds w and 
propositions p. Its meaning, shown in (13), is the conjunction of two statements: p is not true in 
the actual world (the polar component) and there is a world which is not very different from the 
actual world in which p is true (the proximal component). This analysis, which alludes to close 
possible worlds, has been criticized for stashing away critical details in the meta-language 
(Eckardt 2007, Sevi 1998). Ultimately one would want an explicit account for what relevant 
close worlds are (see in particular the proposals by Eckardt 2007, Nouwen 2006, Sevi 1998).    
 
(13) [[almost]] (w) (p) = 1 iff  
(i) p(w)=0 
(ii) there is a world w’ which is not very different from w and p (w’)=1 
 
Sadock (1981) analyzes the polar component (p being false) as a conversational implicature, 
which is derived via Grice’s Maxim of quantity: p is a stronger statement than almost p. If the 
speaker utters almost p instead of p, the hearer can infer that the speaker does not believe that p 
is true.  
However, as noted by many researchers, including Sadock himself, this implicature is hard to 
cancel (14)a, in contrast to other implicatures (14)b. This is a general concern of all analyses that 




(14) a. ?Not only did Bill almost swim the English Channel, he did swim it. 
b. Not only did Bill eat some of the cake, he ate all of it. 
[Penka 2006: (6)] 
 
Leaving the analysis of the polar component aside, there are other concerns for Sadock’s 
(1981) proposal. First of all, it has been pointed out that such an analysis makes the wrong 
predictions that (15) and (16) should be false, because there is no world in the logical space 
where 961 is a prime number or 0.333 equals one third.  
 
(15) 961 is almost a prime number.                                        [Sevi 1998: 78, (24)] 
(16) 0.333 almost equals one third.                                        [Sevi 1998: 78, (26)] 
 
However, these sentences may not constitute a strong argument against a modal analysis like 
(13) if we allow “imaginary” worlds (in Sadock’s term) in which mathematical rules are not 
obeyed or logical contradictions are allowed, as Sadock (1981: 259) defends himself:  
[(15)] might be adjusted true because the only blot on 961’s record as a prime number is 
the sad fact that it is the square of 31. If this one little fact were not true, then 961 would 
be a prime number. The imaginary world in which 961 is a prime number is not very 
different from the real world in the nontechinical sense that only one proposition has to 
be changed to gain access to it, but of course it is very different from our world in the 
technical sense that it is an inconsistent world and lacks mathematics.  
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Along this line of reasoning, Sevi (1981) further points out that (17)-(19) should be 
contradictory, which is contrary to fact. Intuitively, (17) simply indicates that .333 is close to 1/3 
instead of invoking an imaginary situation where 0.333 equals one third. Similarly, the most 
natural way to interpret (18) is not to talk about a hypothetical situation where I am able to run. 
Instead, it simply claims that despite my limit of my physical ability, I can perform an action 
which is close to running. Similarly, (19) simply claims that the World Trade Center is a bit 
taller than the Empire State Building instead of invoking a hypothetical situation which is 
incompatible with the architects’ plan. However, like (15) and (16), these examples are not 
strong counterarguments either, because we can still maintain a Sadock-style analysis for almost 
and (17)-(19) simply involve a change of modal bases.  
 
(17) It is not possible that 0.333 equals one third, but it almost does.    [Sevi 1998:18, (27)] 
(18) Although I can’t run, I can almost run.                                        [Sevi 1998: 20, (33)] 
(19) The Empire State Building is almost as tall as the World Trade Center, but it couldn’t 
have been taller (because the World Trade Center was built to be taller). [Sevi 1998: 20, (34)] 
 
A more serious challenge for Sadock’s analysis is suggested by Morzycki (2001), who shows 
that such an analysis cannot be extended to DP-modifying almost. Under the Sadock-style 
semantics as in (13) in which almost is a sentential operator, (20)a is predicted to have the same 
interpretation as (20)b, because the prejacent of almost in the two examples are identical. 





(20) a. Almost every plant is dry. 
Paraphrase: Most of the plants are dry.    
b. Every plant is almost dry.  
Paraphrase: Every plant is minimally moist.       [Morzycki 2001: 316, (33)] 
 
Extending this argument, I observe a similar problem if we compare sentence pairs as in 
(21)-(24), which suggest that the position of almost helps to disambiguate. When almost 
precedes the VP, as in the (a) examples, the sentence is ambiguous between a counterfactual 
reading and a scalar reading, with different readings illustrated below. However, when almost 
directly modifies a subconstituent of VP (e.g. DP or PP), only the scalar reading is available.
7
 
                                                          
7
 Jonathan Bobaljik (p.c.) points out that there seems to be a difference in meaning between the scalar reading of the 
(a) examples and the (b) examples in (21)-(24): the scalar reading of the (a) examples requires some goal or 
continuation of events whereas the scalar reading of (b) examples does not. For example, for the scalar reading of 
(23)a, there must have been some goal (e.g. a reading competition) or continuation of events (she was reading so 
quickly, and would have read a tenth one if she was not distracted), which would have led to her reading 10 books. 
Such requirement is not necessary for the scalar reading of (23)b, which simply indicates that the number of books 
that Mary read was close to (but below) 10. If Mary set out to read nine books and did so, then stopped reading, as 
planned, then (23)b is felicitous but (23)a is not. This contrast is also shown below.  
 
(vi) a. To get to Cambridge from Storrs, you drive almost to Boston, then take exit 18.  
b. #To get to Cambridge from Storrs, you almost drive to Boston, then take exit 18. [Jonathan Bobaljik, p.c.] 
 
However, such a contrast for the scalar reading between the (a) and (b) examples seem to disappear if the sentence 
with almost also involves a scalar item such as whole or all, at least for some speakers (Jon Gajewski, p.c.). Under 
the context provided in (vii), both example (a) and (b) are felicitous. 
 
(vii) Context: The requirement of an English literature class is to read the first 130 chapters of Moby Dick (which 
has 135 chapters in total plus an epilogue).  
a. %We almost read the whole book. 
b. We read almost the whole book.                 [Jon Gajewski, p.c.] 
 
Also, for examples like (vi), once we replace drive to with drive all the way to, the contrast between the two 
examples for their scalar readings disappears for some speakers, as shown below (Jon Gajewski, p.c..  
 
(viii) a. %To get to Cambridge from Storrs, you almost drive all the way to Boston, then take exit 18.  
b. To get to Cambridge from Storrs, you drive almost all the way to Boston, then take exit 18. 
 
I speculate that speakers who report a contrast for the scalar reading between (a) and (b) in (21)-(24) may in fact 
entertain a counterfactual reading for the (a) example, which usually involve some goal or continuation of events. 
However, the scalar items such as whole or all make the scalar reading more salient, hence the disappearance of the 
reported contrast.  
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These sentence pairs raise the following question for an analysis like (13): How do we account 
for the difference between the (a) and (b) examples in each pair, if the prejacents are the same?   
 
(21) a. John almost arrived at 3pm.    (counterfactual, scalar) 
counterfactual: John missed the train and arrived at 8pm. If he had caught the train, he 
would have arrived at 3pm. 
scalar: John arrived at 2:55pm. 
b. John arrived almost at 3pm.    (#counterfactual, scalar)  
(22) a. Bill almost invited all of his friends to the party.   (counterfactual, scalar) 
counterfactual: Bill planned to invite all of his friends to the party. However, he didn’t 
invite any of them in the end, because he had to cancel the party due to inclement weather.  
scalar: Bill invite all of his friends to the party, except John.  
b. He invited almost all of his friends to the party.  (#counterfactual, scalar) 
(23) a. Mary almost read ten books.    (counterfactual, scalar) 
counterfactual: Mary needed to read ten books to win a reading contest; however, she 
read none of them, because the contest was cancelled the last minute. 
Scalar: Mary read nine books. 
b. Mary read almost ten books.     (#counterfactual, scalar) 
(24) a. Sue almost walked to the park.    (counterfactual, scalar) 
counterfactual: Sue planned to walk to the park. However, she didn’t even start because it 
started raining outside.    
scalar: Sue started walking and got close to reaching the park. 
b. Sue walked almost to the park.    (#counterfactual, scalar) 
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One may think that the reason why the (a) and (b) examples in (20)-(24) have different truth 
conditions is simply because almost takes different scopes. Once we tweak the semantics of 
almost so that it can directly apply to the constituent that it intuitively associates with, the truth 
conditional differences between the (a) and (b) examples in (20)-(24) will fall out automatically. 
However, simply fixing the type of almost and making it a cross-categorical modifier does 
not work. This is shown in Morzycki (2001), who type-shifts the proposition-modifying almost 
as in (13) to a quantifier-modifying almost as in (25). According to (25), (20)a (repeated in (26)a) 
receives an interpretation in (26)b. Based on this truth condition, (26)a is true in a context where 
most of the plants are dry, as we expected. However, the truth condition also renders (26)a true 
in a context where every plant is minimally moist but none of the plants is dry. For the same 
reason, simply type-shifting almost so that it can apply to DPs and PPs is not sufficient to explain 
the contrast in (21)-(24), because the type-shifted almost is based on the propositional almost. To 
maintain a modal analysis of almost which appeals to close possible worlds, one needs to further 
restrict the possible worlds in which the prejacent is true relevant to the constituent that almost 
intuitively associate with.      
 
(25) [[almostDP]]=λw. λQ<<e,st>, st> . λP<e, st>. almost(w)(Q(P)(w))      [Morzycki 2001: 312, (24)] 
(26) a. Almost every plant is dry.  
b. [[almostDP]](w)([[every plant]])([[is  dry]])=  
    almost(w)( [[every plant]]([[is  dry]])(w) )=  




Morzycki (2001) attempts to fix the problem with ‘almost every plant’ and provides distinct 
denotations of almost modifying a number of categories.
8
 We will concentrate on his analysis of 
DP-modifying almost, for which he imposes a special requirement that worlds of comparison do 
not vary with respect to the extension of the VP (27). 
 
(27) DP-modifying almost 
[[almostDP]] = λQ<<e,st>,st>.λP<e,st>.λw.¬Q(P)(w) & ∃w’[Q(P)(w’)&CLOSE(w)(w’)& 
λx.[P(x)(w)] = λx.[P(x)(w’)] & ∀w’’[[w’’≤w w’&Q(P)(w’’)] w’’=w’]] 
[Morzycki 2001: 316, (36)] 
 
Penka (2006) illustrates how adding such a restriction to the denotation of almost solves the 
‘almost every plant’ problem. To be more specific, let us go back to example (26)a and consider 
a toy model which consists of the evaluation world w and one close world w’. Imagine that there 
are only four individuals in w: a, b, c and d, among which a, b, and c are all the plants, and a, b, d 
are all the dry things, as schematized in (28). Morzycki’s amended semantics of DP-modifying 
almost requires dry things being identical between w and w’. As a result, the sentence can never 
yield the reading that every plant is minimally moist. The only way to make “every plant is dry 
in w’ true is to assume that c is not a plant in w’. This is how the undesired reading is ruled out 
and the desired reading is obtained. 
 
                                                          
8
 Meanwhile Morzycki (2001) explores the issue of whether a uniform analysis can be provided for almost and other 
modifiers like nearly, virtually, not quite, etc. These modifiers share many essential properties of almost, including 
occupying the same positions, yielding the same range of readings, and imposing similar restrictions on the 
expressions that they modify. To achieve this purpose, at the end of the paper he suggests a division of labor 
between the semantics of these modifiers and a syntactic feature in functional structure that licenses them. The 
syntactic feature in the functional structure takes care of most of the meaning of almost and its kins. What the 




 Plants dry  Individuals 
w a b c a b d a b c d 
w’ a b a b d a b    d 
 [Penka 2006, (9)] 
 
Morzycki argues that the amended analysis in (27) explains why almost is not compatible 
with existential quantifiers (29). This is illustrated by Penka (2006) in the toy model in (30), 
which consists of two possible worlds (w, and w’) and four individuals (a, b, c and d) in total. As 
required by almostDP, the dry things have to be the same in w and w’. To make ‘some/a plant is 
dry’ true in w’, something dry but is not a plant in w needs to be a plant in w’. However, 
according to Morzycki (2001) this is odd, because it is pragmatically strange to change essential 






(29) #Almost a/some plant is dry.                                             [Penka 2006, (10)] 
(30)  
 Plants dry  individuals 
w a b  c d a b c d 
w’ a b c c d a b c d 
[Penka 2006, (11)] 
 
                                                          
9
 However, remember that even for the good example (26)a, under the assumption that in the toy model there are 
only plants and dry individuals, it is required that the individual c is not an individual in w but an individual in w’ 
(p.c. Jon Gajewski). This raises the following question: Does this also count as “changing the essential properties of 
an individual across worlds” and therefore should be ruled out due to pragmatic oddity?   
10
 Magdalena Kaufmann (p.c.) suggests that Morzycki’s analysis ruling out almost some makes a further prediction: 
If the noun in the quantifier phrase denotes a non-essential property that can be changed across world (for instance, 
student), a sentence like (ix) is predicted to be good, which is contrary to the fact. 
 
(ix) #Almost some/a student is late.  
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However, this analysis makes the wrong prediction that almost cannot modify negative 
quantifiers such as no (31). For (31) to be true, something that is in the extension of NP in the 
actual world w would not be in the extension of NP in w’ (32), which is also expected to render 
(31) pragmatically odd.  
 
(31) Almost no plant is dry.                                                                            [Penka 2006, (12)] 
(32)  
 Plants dry  individuals 
w a b c c d a b c d 
w’ a b  c d a b c d 
                                          [Penka 2006, (13)] 
 
We now move on to Sevi’s (1998) analysis of almost, which is partially formulated within a 
model-theoretic framework. Different from previous intensional analysis in which an almost-
sentence is evaluated relevant to possible worlds, he proposes that almost operates on aspects of 
circumstances of evaluation, and formally represents them as indices from a discrete set with a 
strict partial order. The set I is assumed to be underspecified and contextually determined: it can 
be a set of possible worlds, a set of standards of precision for resolving vagueness (see Lewis 
1970), or a set of time intervals. The formal analysis is presented in (33) (Sevi 1998: 65), which 
can be paraphrased as follows: almost A is true in i* iff A is false in i* and there is a maximally 
close index i such that A is true in i.
11
   
 
                                                          
11
 Like other analysis, the contribution of almost is analyzed in terms of the conjunction of two statements, although 
Sevi notes that the asserted polar component is backgrounded. 
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(33) Let A be a formula, let I be a discrete set, and let < be a three-place relation such that for 
every I*  I, <i* is a strict partial order on I (i1 < i* i2 is read as i1 is closer to i* than i2).  
[[almost A]]
i*
 =1 iff [[A]]
i*=0 and there is an i’, s.t. for any i’’that is not identical to i’, i' < i* 
i’’, and [[A]]i’=112        [modified from Sevi 1998: 65, (8)] 
 
To illustrate Sevi’s semantics, let us consider the sentence Danny is almost bald as an 
example. According to Sevi, this sentence is evaluated relevant to a set of standards of precision. 
A standard of precision is a contextual factor that determines the boundary between positive and 
negative extensions of a vague predicate, such as a gradable adjective. Sevi (1998) assumes that 
the set of precision standards consists of members that can be linearly ordered with respect to a 
relation of strictness informally defined in (34). Under this assumption, the interpretation of 
Danny is almost bald involves a comparison between the current standard of precision and a 
more relaxed standard of precision. Given the semantics of almost in (33), Danny is almost bald 
is true iff ‘Danny is bald’ is false relevant to the current standard of precision s* and true relative 
to the closest (contextually relevant) standard s.   
 
 
(34) s’>s’’ (the standard of precision s’ is stricter than s’’) iff s’ requires that a sentence be 
true relative to more precisifications than s’’ requires.  
If s’ is not more strict than s’’ then it is more relaxed. 
[Sevi 1998: 69, (12)] 
 
                                                          
12
 One may wonder whether the minimality requirement in (33) is too strong: Does almost really requires a 
minimally close possible world, standard of precision, or time interval? Sevi (1998) emphasized that the minimality 
involved is contextually determined (see his Section 3.4 for more discussion).    
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On this account almost relaxes the standard of evaluation: individuals which do not belong to 
the extension of the predicate “bald” under the current standard of precision s* fall within the 
extension of the predicate under the closest standard s. Amaral (2007) notes that this is 
problematic, since we would expect that almost behaves on a par with other relaxers of standards, 
such as approximately, not exactly or loosely speaking. However, this prediction is not borne out, 





(35) Loosely speaking, Danny is bald. But more accurately, he has a reasonable amount of 
hair.                                                                                                       [Amaral 2007: 32, (46)] 
(36) #Danny is almost bald. But more accurately, he has a reasonable amount of hair. 
                                                         [Amaral 2007: 32, (47)] 
 
2.2. The scalar alternative approach 
Instead of treating almost as a modal operator, some researchers propose that almost associates 
with scalar alternatives. The idea goes back to Hitzeman (1992), who proposes that almost maps 
one category of a scale to a close and preceding category on the same scale, with “category” 
defined as a continuous subset of a scale whose members share a property or a set of properties. 
For example, the predicate human in (37) has as part of its semantic interpretation a category 
                                                          
13
 Some speakers report that (36) is as odd as (35). However, if we replace more accurately with actually, as 
indicated below, there is a contrast between loosely speaking and almost (Jon Gajewski, pc).  
 
(x) Loosely speaking, Danny is bald. But actually, he has a reasonable amount of hair.  




called “human”. Almost human denotes a category (which is a subcategory of non-human) 
represented by the shadowed portion that is close to and precedes the category “human”.   
 
(37) Frankenstein’s monster was almost human.                                       [Hitzeman 1992, (11)] 
 
      
 
 
Penka (2006) proposes a similar idea, focusing on the case in which almost modifies a 
quantificational DP. She argues that almost requires an alternative set which consists of 
propositions in which the modified constituent is replaced by objects of the same semantic type.  
She also assumes that the elements in the alternative set are ordered on a scale based on 
entailment relation, namely a Horn scale. In her analysis, almost takes propositional scope and its 
associated alternatives are provided lexically by the modified constituent. The formal 
implementation is given in (38), in which the alternatives are propositions instead of sub-
prositional constituents (e.g. VP or DP). ≈ relates two relatively close propositional alternatives 
ordered on the relevant scale. Based on (38), almost p is true iff p is false in the evaluation world 
w, and there exists a relatively close alternative q that is true in w.  
 
(38) [[almost≈]] = λw.λp<s,t>. ¬p(w) & ∃q [ q ≈ p & q(w)]                              [Penka 2006, (16)] 
 
With the semantics of almost introduced in (38), Penka (2006) explains some selectional 







more than half (which she calls vague quantifiers) are not compatible with almost (39). This is 
because these quantifiers do not correspond to precise values on the quantifier scale (< all, most, 
many, several, some >, see Horn (1972)). This is also argued by Hitzemann (1992). As a result it 
is unclear what part of the scale counts as “close by”, as required by the semantics of almost. 
 
(39) *Almost several / many / most / more than half students passed the exam. 
  [Penka 2006, (22a)] 
 
Penka also explains why almost is incompatible with existential quantifiers like a and some (40): 
This is due to the fact that existential quantifiers occupy the bottom of the quantifier scale. 
Therefore, there does not exist a lower value which is a scalar alternative to the prejacent and 
true, which is required by the semantics of almost.   
 
(40) *Almost a / some student passed the exam.                    [Penka 2006, (23)] 
 
With the attempt to provide a unified analysis of almost as a cross-categorial modifier, 
however, Penka (2006) focuses on cases in which almost modifies a DP. Amaral and Del Prete 
(2010) extend Penka’s analysis to other categories, bringing in a broader notion of scale on 
which the alternatives can be ordered in various ways other than entailment relation (Hirshberg 
1985). For example, (41) involves a scale on which alternatives are ordered temporally. The 
involved scale can also be ‘rank orders’ (Horn 1972, 2002), like <full professor, associate 
professor, assistant professor>, which provides the relevant scale for the interpretation of (42).
14
 
                                                          
14
 Intuitively, (42) does not mean that John is an associate professor. Rather, it is much narrower in the sense that he 
got really close to becoming a full professor, which raises the question whether the rank scale <full professor, 
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(41) It is almost 3pm. 
(42) John is almost a full professor.  
   
Amaral and Del Prete’s (2010) analysis of ‘almost’ is close to Hitzeman’s (1992) and 
Penka’s (2006) in that the interpretability of almost requires an ordered set of alternatives. They 
assume that the alternatives are generated through focus on the expression that is intuitively 
modified by ‘almost’, and that the ordering of the alternatives is constrained by the semantics of 
the modified expression and by the context of utterance. The specific semantics of Italian quasi 
‘almost’ is given in (43), where  is a variable over semantic types. ˂P< ,t>, S> is an ordered pair 
with two coordinates: The first coordinate is the ordinary semantic value of the constituent 
modified by almost. The second coordinate S is a set of alternatives to P, which is of the same 
semantic type as P. Applying to a scalar item and its argument, quasi ‘almost’ yields a 
conjunction of two elements: The modified constituent P is not true of its argument, but a close 
alternative Q, which is lower than P and close to P is true. 
 
(43) [[quasi]]=λ ˂P< ,t>, S>. x.  P (x) Q <,t>  S [Q <S P ˄ closeS (Q, P) ˄ Q (x)] 
[Amaral & Del Prete 2010: 89, (51)] 
 
In the end, I would like to review Eckardt’s (2007) semantics of almost, which also appeals 
to scales yet is formulated differently. Eckardt argues that almost is a polymorphic functor which 
combines with relations and properites of various types. This is represented in (44)a, where x̅ is a 
vector of lambda bound variables. There are several requirements for almost to apply 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
associate professor, assistant professor> seems right. To capture this intuition, we can say that (42) involves a more 
fined scale.  
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successfully. First of all, the use of almost requires that the speakers can perceive the property 
modifed by almost as a subproperty of a more general superproperty, which is formally 
represented as λx̅.λs.Π(s,x̅) in (44)b. Second, the superproperties in question must be ordered by 
some salient strict partial order, which is transitive and asymmetric (44)c. The third requirement 
concerns the maximum condition on P: the property that is modified by almost must contain all 
the maximal elements according to the strict partial order. This is represented in (44)d. <y̅,s’> < 
<x̅,s> indicates that <y̅,s’> is ranked lower than <x̅,s> on the scale.  
 
(44) a. ALMOST + λx̅.λs.P(s,x̅)                                                                  [Eckardt 2007, (4.1)] 
b. λx̅.λs.P(s,x̅) ⊂ λx̅.λs.Π(s,x̅)                                                              [Eckardt 2007, (4.2)]  
c. <a̅,s> < <b̅,s’> ⋀ <b̅,s’> < <c̅,s’’> <a̅,s> < <c̅,s’’>  
< a̅,s> < < b̅,s’>  < b̅,s’> < < a̅,s>                                                 [Eckardt 2007, (4.3)] 
d. For all x̅, y̅, s, s’ such that x̅≠y̅ ˄ s≠s’: P(s, x̅) ⋀ Π(s’,y̅)  <y̅,s’>  <  <x̅,s>15 
[Eckardt 2007, (4.6)] 
 
To illustrate these requirements, let us consider an example x almost loves y, in which almost 
modifies the predicate love (45)a. We can perceive the predicate LOVE to be a subproperty of a 
more general superproperty: POSITIVE-EMOTION (45)b. The superproperty is ordered by 
some salient strict partial order (45)c, where LOVE is perceived to have the highest degree of 
positive emotion (45)d.  
 
 
                                                          
15
 In fact, (44)b and (44)d is logically inconsistent for the following reason: According to (44)b, tuples that meets P 
also meets Π given the proper subset relation. This, together with (44)d, suggests that any two tuples that meets P 
will be below each other, which is logically inconsistent (Jon Gajewski, p.c.).   
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(45) a. ALMOST + λxλyλwLOVEw(x,y) 
b. superproperty Π: λxλyλwPOSITIVE-EMOTIONw(x,y) 
c. strict partial order: <x,y,s> < <x’,y’,s’> iff x is less attached to y in s than x’ is attached 
to y’ in s’ 
d. maximality of P: for all <x,y,s> which are tied by positive emotion, and <x’,y’,s’> 
such that x’ loves y’ in s’, the degree of attachment that is called ‘love’ is perceived to be 
stronger than the degree of all other kinds of attachment exemplified in Π.    
[Eckardt 2007, (4.7)] 
 
When all these requirements are met, almost maps the property P to another property which is 
close to P regarding the ordering. The specific formulation is given in (46), which states that “x 
has the property of ALMOST-P in worlds s iff <x̅,s> range in the upper part of the ordering on 
the superproperty Π but is not in the maximal domain that is specified by P” (p. 17).  
 
(46) ALMOST(λx̅λsP(s,x̅)):= 
λx̅λs [MOST <y̅,s’> (Π(s’,y̅) <y̅,s’> <  <x̅,s>)  ⋀ ∀<z̅,s’’> (P(<s’’,z̅> <x̅,s> < <s’’,z̅>)] 
[Eckardt 2007, (4.8)] 
For the example x almost loves y, the sentence is true iff x is attached to y to a degree which 
is higher than most degrees of attachment but is not among the highest degrees that can be called 
love).   
We will come back to this analysis in the next section when we discuss how it also captures 
the counterfactual reading. The analysis sounds intuitively correct, however, the usage of MOST 
in the meta-language seems dubious. Quantifying over tuples that meet the superproperty, it 
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makes the wrong prediction that if the domain that satisfies P, the prejacent of almost, occupies 
most of the scale, the sentence should be false even if almost maps P to a property that is close to 
P.   
 
3. Previous accounts of the ambiguity of almost 
3.1. Scope analysis 
The ambiguity of almost has been used by McCawley (1972) as an argument for lexical 
decomposition. An assumption behind such an argument is that almost can take different scopes, 
giving rise to distinct readings. Such an idea has been pursued and discussed in detail in Rapp 
and von Stechow (1999). Appealing to lexical decomposition in syntax (Dowty 1979; von 
Stechow 1995, 1996), they assume that an accomplishment verb such as close has the following 
underlying representation: CAUSE BECOME + result state ‘closed’. In addition, they adopt 
Sadock’s (1981) analysis of almost, which is repeated in (47).16  
 
(47) [[almost]] (w) (p) = 1 iff  
(i) there is a world w’ close to w such that p (w’)=1   
(ii) p(w)=0 
 
Based on the assumptions above, the ambiguity of almost stems from the scope interaction 
between almost and various elements of the decomposed verb: When almost takes scope over 
                                                          
16
 For lexical decomposition, there is some variation with respect to the covert morpheme that a predicate like close 
can decompose into. Some people simply represent the covert morphemes that contribute to a causal and 
developmental component as CAUSE and BECOME. Others use the terms like AGENT and BECOME (e.g. von 
Stechow 1996, Rapp & von Stechow 1999) or collapse these two into a phonologically empty verb (e.g. Beck & 
Johnson 2004). These variations are orthogonal to our purpose here.  
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CAUSE BECOME in (48)a, the counterfactual reading is derived. When almost takes scope 
under CAUSE BECOME in (48)b, the scalar reading is derived.  
(48) a. [John [almost [CAUSE [BECOME [the door closed]]]]] 
            b. [John [CAUSE [BECOME [almost [the door closed]]]]] 
 
Such a scope analysis has been criticized. Sevi (1998) provides the following argument 
against a scope analysis: the ambiguity of almost is not restricted to accomplishments, but can be 
observed for states (49), activities (50), and adjectives (51) as well. Unlike accomplishments, 
these predicates are not subject to lexical decomposition, therefore it is puzzling how the 




(49) I almost knew Johnny Marr.                                                               [Sevi 1998: 11, (10)]  
a. I almost knew Johnny Marr; he moved next to my old apartment a day after I left.  
b. Johnny is a real shy person; after living 3 years next door to him, I got the feeling that I almost 
knew him. 
(50) I almost ran.                                                       [Sevi 1998: 11, (11)] 
a. I almost ran, but then I decided to stay.  
b. I walked so quickly, that I almost ran.  
 
                                                          
17
 One may argue that (49) to (51) are not strong counterexamples for the scope analysis (Magdalena Kaufmann, 
p.c.). For (49), the structure associated with the interpretation in (a) can differ from that associated with (b): (49)a 
seems to be an inchoative reading in the sense that the predicate know is interpreted as get to know, which is non-
stative. One can say something similar about (50): the (a) reading is inchoative. If this is the case, it raises some 
further questions that go beyond the scope of this study: how is the inchoative reading derived? Is it triggered by 
almost or not?  
For (51), one can argue that the two interpretations are both scalar readings. They are derived by almost associating 
with different scales: In (51)a, almost operates on a temporal scale; while in (51)b a scale associated with the 
adjective green.  
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(51) The traffic light is almost green.                                                    [Sevi 1998: 11, (13)] 
a. It is about to turn green.  
b. Its color is a shade of turquoise close to green. 
 
Here I would like to point out another problem for the scope analysis, according to which the 
scalar reading is derived when almost takes lower scope.  Assuming that the predicate ends up in 
v, how could preverbal almost, which seemingly must be adjoined at the vP level or higher, ever 
have an attachment site within the VP? This is especially puzzling if we compare English almost 
with again: As reported in the literature, preverbal again does not give rise to a repetitive vs. 
restitutive ambiguity (52), whereas preverbal almost does give rise to a counterfactual vs. scalar 
ambiguity.  
 
(52) a. Sally painted the shell red again.    (repetitive, restitutive) 
b. Sally again painted the shell red.    (repetitive, *restitutive) 
 
3.2. Pragmatic analyses 
A number of authors (e.g. Sevi 1998, Hitzeman 1992, Amaral & Del Prete 2010) argue that the 
ambiguity of almost is derived pragmatically.  In this section, I review two main analyses along 
this line: one is by Sevi (1998), and the other by Hitzeman (1992) and Amaral and Del Prete 
(2010). 
Sevi’s (1998) analysis of almost is repeated in (53). A crucial aspect of his analysis is that the 
semantics of almost is underspecified. The interpretation of sentences with almost depends on 
elements of a contextually chosen set I, whose members of I are ordered along a strict partial 
order. The set I represents the dimension of circumstances where the sentence is evaluated: it can 
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be a set of possible worlds, a set of standards of precision to resolve vagueness, or a set of 
temporal intervals. Sevi (1998) argues that different interpretations of almost stem from different 
settings of I.  
 
(53) Let A be a formula, let I be a discrete set, and let < be a three-place relation such that for 
every I*  I, <i* is a strict partial order on I (i1 < i* i2 is read as i1 is closer to i* than i2).  
[[almost A]]
i*
 =1 iff [[A]]




To illustrate how it works, let us consider the example John almost closed the door. If the 
sentence is evaluated relative to a set of possible worlds, i.e. I being a set of possible worlds 
gives rise to an interpretation that “John did not close the door in the actual world w, and he 
closed the world in a closest world w’ ”, namely the counterfactual reading. On the other hand, 
the sentence can also be evaluated relative to a set of standards of precision, which is linearly 
ordered from stricter standards to more relaxed standards, as we discussed in the previous section. 
If this is the case, it gives rise to an interpretation that John didn’t close the door under the 
current standard of precision, yet he closed the door under a more relaxed standard of precision. 
This is how the scalar reading is derived.
18
  
An alternative pragmatic analysis for the ambiguity of almost is proposed by Hitzeman (1992) 
and Amaral & Del Prete (2010). Despite the slight differences between the authors, both suggest 
that the disambiguation depends on the choice of a “goal” (in Hitzeman’s term) or a “limit” (in 
Amaral & Del Prete’s term) on the scale. They assume that an accomplishment VP involves a 
complex event structure, which consists of a sequence of successive steps that lead to the 
                                                          
18
 As we have seen in Section 2.1, Amaral (2007) raises some concerns about the idea that almost relaxes the 




completion of the event. In addition, to account for the counterfactual reading, they also assume 
that there is a preparatory period leading to the initiation of the accomplishment event. To 
illustrate the detail of their analysis, we will go through the account proposed in Amaral and Del 
Prete (2010), which is inspired by and shares the spirit of Hitzeman’s (1992) account.  
According to Amaral and Del Prete (2010), almost associates with a scale with a limit point, 
which is specified by the constituent intuitively modified by almost, and its basic meaning is to 
approach the limit on the scale. To discuss how the ambiguity of almost is derived, they use Leo 
almost proved the theorem as an example. First of all, they assume that the accomplishment VP 
involves a complex event structure E, which holds within itself a sequence of successive steps of 
proving. These steps specify a scale, as graphed below. E includes a starting point (beginning 
stage of proving the theorem) and an end point (theorem being proved), both of which can serve 
as a limit on the scale. Both limits can serve as a limit point on the scale for almost: Setting the 
beginning stage of theorem proof as the limit gives rise to the counterfactual reading, whereas 
choosing the complete proof point as the limit yields the scalar reading.  
 
(54)  
       Beginning      stage i        stage j              complete proof (limit point) 
 
                                 Activity (scale) 
 
At first glance, the analysis looks elegant. However, there are several questions and concerns 
about this analysis. First of all, in this analysis the derivation of the counterfactual reading 
crucially relies on a preparatory stage that leads to the starting point of an event, which raises a 
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further question of how we define such a stage. One possibility, hinted in Hitzeman (1992) and 
Amaral and Del Prete (2010), is that we count the planning stage prior to the starting point of the 
event as the preparatory stage. However, Sevi (1998) argues that this does not seem right, 
because the truth of almost p does not necessarily depend on whether p is planned or expected. 
This is exemplified in (55), whose speaker can truthfully say he was almost killed in the situation 
described, simply because there are realistic alternatives to reality where he was killed: he could 
have walked more slowly or faster or the window could have fallen a few seconds earlier or later 




(55) I was almost killed today. A window fell and smashed very close to me when I was 
passing by a construction site.                                                                   [Sevi 1998: 82, (39)] 
 
Second, both Hitzeman (1992) and Amaral and Del Prete (2010) derive the scalar reading by 
assuming that the predicate can be scaled into a series of successive steps towards accomplishing 
the goal. This makes a further prediction that a telic predicate modified by almost should be 
ambiguous, as we can envisage for an event represented by a telic predicate a series of 
successive steps that lead to the culmination. These successive steps form a scale, which 
provides an acceptable environment for almost to give rise to a scalar reading.  However, this 
                                                          
19
 The objection of Sevi (1998) concerns “planning” stage, which has to do with planning or expectation. An 
alternative way to formulate the “preparatory stage” is to get away the notions like “planning” or “expectation” and 
simply define it as ‘a sequence of events’ that culminates in the start of the event represented by the prejacent 
(Jonathan Bobaljik, p.c.). Such a definition is in line with Amaral and Del Prete’s (2010) analysis of the 
counterfactual reading.  However, it is unclear what exactly should be included in this sequence of events and why 
almost cares about such a sequence of events. Also, as exemplified below, almost is felicitous in some contexts 
where the event not only started, but even proceeded halfway through. The context in (xii) corresponds to neither the 
scalar reading nor the counterfactual reading which are described at the beginning of this chapter, and it is not clear 
how Amaral & del Prete’s analysis can account for (xii). 
 
(xii)  Mary almost climbed Mount Washington. She was halfway there when she came across an unexpected 




prediction is not borne out for examples like (56)-(58). In contrast to the sentence with the close, 
the sentence with its antonym open only has a counterfactual reading (56) but not a scalar 
reading that John almost completed the action of opening the door.
20
 (57)a is another example 
where the telic predicate ate the apple describes an event for which we can perceive a series of 
steps (one bite, two bite, etc.) toward an inherent end point of the event: finishing the apple. 
However, the scalar reading does not seem to be available, especially in contrast to (57)b. 
Similarly the lack of a scalar reading of (58)a in contrast to (58)b also does not follow from 
Hitzemann (1992) or Amaral and Del Prete (2010), although the predicate can be perceived to 
scale into a set of successive steps (waking up one child, two children, etc.) towards waking up 
all the children. These examples suggest that a complex event with an inherent end point itself is 




(56) John almost opened the door.    (counterfactual, #scalar) 
(57) a. John almost ate the apple.    (counterfactual, #scalar)  
b. John almost ate the whole apple.  (counterfactual, scalar) 
(58) a. John almost woke up the children.   (counterfactual, #scalar) 
b. John almost woke up all the children.  (counterfactual, scalar)   
[Jon Nissenbaum, p.c.] 
                                                          
20
 By “scalar reading”, I refer to the reading derived when almost approaches the limit that corresponds to the 
inherent end point of event represented by the telic predicate ‘open the door’, following Amaral and Del Prete 
(2010).  Alternatively, one can say that the end point is specified by the predicate ‘open the door’. Since any amount 
of openness suffices to count as ‘open’, we can perceive the scale as consisting of a sequence of successive steps 
that leads to ‘open the door’ (e.g. slid the deadbolt, unlocked the lock, turned the handle, started to pull, etc.). So 
‘John almost opened the door’ is not only compatible in a context where John thought about doing it, but didn’t 
carry out any action; but in a context where he slid the deadbolt, unlocked the lock, turned the handle and even 
started to pull, yet the door wasn’t open because it got stuck (Thanks to Jonathan Bobaljik for this point.) However, 
if we perceive the scale in this way, it is not clear whether there exists another limit point which corresponds to the 
regular counterfactual reading (John thought about doing it, but didn’t carry out any action). If there is, how do we 
define it?  
21
 As we will see later (in Section 5), the contrast between examples (a) and (b) for (57) and (58) is related to some 
property of definite descriptions.  
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In Section 4, I present another concern for the pragmatic approach proposed by Hitzeman 
(1992) and Amaral and Del Prete (2010): An intervening manner adverb blocks the scalar 
reading for almost. As far as I am aware, this intervention effect has not been reported before. As 
we will see, this also poses some challenge for Sevi’s (1998) pragmatic approach. Before we 
jump to the next section, I discuss Eckardt’s (2007) account for the ambiguity of almost. The 
goal is not to argue against Eckardt per se, but rather to highlight some crucial ideas in Eckardt’s 
analysis that we may use later.   
 
3.3. Eckardt’s (2007) analysis of the ambiguity 
As discussed in Section 2.2, Eckardt (2007) offers a scale-based analysis of almost. She argues 
that almost is a polymorphic functor that can modify properties of various sorts (see (44)). It 
presupposes the accessibility of a superdomain Π and a strict partial order < with respect to 
which the property almost modifies is the maximal element (see (45)). If these conditions are met 
by world knowledge or contextual background, almost maps p to an adjacent sub-polar range of 
properties on the scale (see (46)).   
This semantics of almost also covers cases where it modifies a property of possible worlds, 
i.e. a proposition. This is when the counterfactual uses of almost arise. Take (59) for example, 
almost takes the proposition ‘Peter was dead’ as its argument (60). Again several prerequisites 
need to be satisfied for almost to apply. First of all, it presupposes the accessibility of a 
superdomain Π, which is the logical space (61)a. Second, the superproperty in question is 
ordered by some strict partial order <. In this case, the strict partial order is defined in terms of 
counterfactual similarity relative to worlds where the prejacent is true (61)b. Third, all worlds in 
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p are above any worlds outside p in terms of the given order (61)c. If these conditions are met, 
almost p maps p to an adjacent sub-polar range of properties on the scale (62).   
 
(59) Peter was almost dead.  
(60) almost + λs.[ Peter is dead in s ] 
(61) prerequisites: 
a. superproperty Π = λs. [ s = s ] 
b. strict partial order: For any s, s’ such that Π(s) and Π(s’): s < s’ iff for any world w in λs[ Peter 
is dead in s ]: s’ is closer to w than s is. (Note that the strict partial orders here are defined in 
terms of counterfactual similarity.)    
c. maximality of P: All worlds in P are above any worlds outside P in terms of the given order.  
[Eckardt 2007, (4.28)] 
(62) ALMOST(λs. [ Peter is dead in s ]) 
= λs.[ MOST s’( s’ < s ) ∧ ∀s” ( [Peter is dead in s”] → s < s” ]                  [Eckardt 2007, (4.29)] 
 
We have mentioned in Section 2.2 that the use of MOST in the meta-language as in (62) does 
not seem to be accurate. In the account for the counterfactual reading, the strict partial order is 
defined in terms of closeness to the worlds where the prejacent of almost p is true (61)b. It is 
opaque how the formulation can be implemented, given that there are a large number of worlds 
where p holds. A possible world s may be close to some of the p-worlds yet far away from some 
other p-worlds.  Given the existence of multiple reference worlds w, it is unclear how the not p-




3.4. Real ambiguity? 
So far we have looked at different analyses of the counterfactual and scalar reading of almost. 
However, the fact that a sentence has different interpretations does not mean that there exists a 
real ambiguity, because the sentence can be judged true in different situations. In fact, Sevi (1998) 
and Eckardt (2007) point out that under Sadock’s semantics of almost, if the ‘closeness’ relation 
is not further specified, the computed counterfactual reading subsumes the scalar reading. In 
other words, the scalar reading does not have to be independent from the counterfactual reading 
but could be simply a special case of it.  
Ideally we would like to see whether it is possible to come up with contexts where the scalar 
reading is true yet the counterfactual reading is false. (63) is such an attempt, in which the test 
sentence with almost is embedded in a downward-entailing environment, the restrictor of a 
universal quantifier every.  
 
(63) Three astronauts Bill, John and Mary are taking a simulation test about how to launch a 
space shuttle. Each astronaut has to close the door of the space shuttle before leaving. Bill is 
the first one to take the test. He checks the simulator to make sure that it’s running properly 
He is just about to start when his suit breaks. So he cannot take the test at all. Now it’s John’s 
turn. Trying hard and getting close, however, he can’t shut the door fully because he is out of 
strength. Mary is the last person to take the test. She is about to fully close it when the door 
gets jammed. Although John and Mary do not manage to close the door completely, they get 
really close and still scored 50 points. Unfortunately, Bill doesn’t score any point because he 
doesn’t even start the test.  
Every astronaut who almost closed the door scored 50 points.  
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If the scalar reading is truly independent from the counterfactual reading, under a downward-
entailing environment, the entailment relationship between the two readings will be reversed, 
which makes it possible that the scalar reading is true yet the counterfactual reading is false in 
the provided context. Speakers who report that the sentence can be true in the provided context 
parse the sentence under the scalar reading of almost. On the other hand, if there does not exist 
an independent scalar reading and the counterfactual reading is the only available reading, then 
the test sentence in (63) is predicted to be false. It turns out that some speakers judge the 
sentence in (63) as true, which suggests the availability of an independent scalar reading.
22
   
In addition, we can also apply some traditional ambiguity tests to examine whether there is a 
real ambiguity. These tests involve quantifiers, conjunction and ellipsis, as illustrated in (64)-
(66). If there is no true ambiguity but simply a case of underspecification, the following 
examples are expected to be felicitous. On the other hand, if there is a real ambiguity, the 
sentences are supposed to be infelicitous. 
    
(64) Each student almost closed the door. Bill and John had planned to close it, but forgot to 
do it. Mary and Jane didn’t forget to do it, yet they were careless and didn’t close it fully.   
(65) #Both John and Bill almost closed the door. John was just about to do it when he got an 
emergency phone call. Bill was in a process of closing the door. He didn’t close it fully but 
got really close.   
                                                          
22
 Jonathan Bobaljik (p.c.) is concerned that tests like (63) may not be a knock-down argument for the claim that 
there exists an independent scalar reading. The test sentence can still be judged as true under a pragmatic analysis of 
the ambiguity. To be more specific, if we are allowed tweak the closeness relation in the Sadock-style semantics or 
if one evaluate the test sentence along the dimension relative to the degree of the door being closed as in Sevi (1998), 
the test sentence can be true. However, tweaking the closeness relation or evaluating the sentence along a different 




(66) #John almost killed the hostages and so did Manuel. John first severely wounded them 
and then Manuel was on the point of finally killing them when the police burst in and tore the 
gun from him.                   [Sevi 1998, (6)] 
 
Examples (64)-(66) are somewhat awkward and the judgments are delicate, which suggests that 
the scalar reading is independent from the counterfactual reading.  
 
4. The effect of an intervening adverb 
Let us consider the set of examples in (67). For the moment, I simply lay out the full paradigm 
with respect to the available readings for each item following a descriptive definition of 
“counterfactual” and “scalar” reading as described in Section 0, i.e. under the counterfactual 
reading, the agent did not even start to carry out the action represented by the verbal predicate; 
under the scalar reading the agent started and got close to completing the action represented by 
the predicate. 
  
(67) a. John almost slowly closed the door. (counterfactual, adv-associated, *scalar) 
b. John almost closed the door slowly.  (counterfactual, adv-associated, scalar) 
c. John slowly almost closed the door. (*counterfactual, *adv-associated, scalar) 
d. Slowly John almost closed the door. (*counterfactual, *adv-associated, scalar) 
 
Let us start with (67)a. First, it has a counterfactual reading in the sense that John had the 
intention to slowly close the door, but did not even start the action. A second interpretation is 
that John tried to close the door slowly, but slammed it instead (because he lost control of the 
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door). This reading can also be subsumed under the counterfactual reading, because we can 
easily imagine that if John had not lost control of the door, he would have slowly closed it. For 
the moment, I will call this interpretation adv(erb)-associated interpretation, simply to 
distinguish it from the counterfactual reading I mentioned just now. Notice that the term here is 
used descriptively and does not connect with any theoretical analysis. However, (67)a does not 
have the scalar reading that John performed a slow action of closing the door, he got close to 
completing the event but did not close it fully. In other words, an intervening manner adverb like 
slowly blocks the scalar reading. In contrast to (67)a, when the adverb is placed after the 
predicate as in (67)b, the scalar reading is available.
23
 Compared with sentences in which 
adverbs occur before almost, both (67)c and (67)d only has the scalar reading in the sense that 
John performed a slow action of closing the door, but did not close it fully. The counterfactual is 
not available for (67)c or (67)d, because it is pragmatically odd to specify the manner of an 
action which did not happen at all. Neither do these two examples have the adv-associated 
interpretation. This is also expected because the adverb is not within the scope of almost. 
The intervention effect poses a new challenge for a pragmatic analysis: For Sevi (1998) it 
remains a mystery why an intervening adverb can restrict the dimension of circumstance based 
on which the sentence is evaluated. It is also not clear how Sevi would account for the scalar 
reading for (67)b, since both closed and slowly have a standard of precision that can be loosened. 
In order for Sevi’s analysis to work, the proposal need to be supplied with more details about 
whether almost targets the standard of precision for a specific adjective or both (Magdalena 
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 Stress could play a role in the interpretation of (67)a and (67)b, although the pattern is not crystal clear. For (67)a 
some native speakers find it natural to put stress on almost, which gives rise to a counterfactual reading that John 
had the intension to close the door in a slow manner, but did not start the action. When stress is placed on the 
intervening adverb slowly, almost easily associates with slowly and gives rise to the adverb associated reading. For 
(67)b it is most natural to place stress on the sentence final adverb slowly, which gives rise to a variety of 
interpretations, including all those in the bracket that we have described. When almost bears stress, the scalar 




Kaufmann, p.c.). For Hitzeman (1992) and Amaral and Del Prete (2010), the intervention effect 
gives rise to a puzzle why an intervening adverb prevents us from choosing the culmination point 
of the event (in the case of (67), the point where the door got fully closed) as the limit for almost.   
In face of the new challenge from the intervention effect, shall we give up a pragmatic 
analysis and turn to other accounts for the ambiguity of almost? How does the intervention effect 
bear on other previous analyses? First of all, the intervention effect seems to be in favor of a 
scope analysis (see McCawley 1972; Rapp & von Stechow 1999), according to which the scalar 
reading, which is derived by almost being base-generated in a lower position and moving 
covertly to a preverbal position. Based on Relativized Minimality (e.g. Rizzi 1990), an 
intervening adverb should block this movement, leading to the absence of a scalar reading. As 
we have seen in Section 3.1, however, the scope analysis has been criticized due to some serious 
problems that cannot be easily ignored. Can the intervention effect be accounted for under 
Eckardt’s (2007) analysis of the ambiguity? The answer is not clear because Eckardt (2007) is 
not explicit about how the scalar reading is derived for examples like John almost closed the 
door. This does not mean, however, that we should abandon a scalar semantics of almost or an 
Eckardt-style account for the ambiguity. In the next section, I develop such an analysis for the 
intervention effect, pursuing a scalar semantics of almost. The formal implementation of the 
semantics of almost is built on the bits and pieces of proposals from earlier scalar analyses of 
almost (e.g. Penka 2006, Eckardt 2007, Amaral & Del Prete 2010).    
 
5. Analysis 
This section provides an analysis of the intervention effect described in Section 4. It is divided 
into two subsections: Section 5.1 forms the background of the analysis. I start by introducing the 
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scalar semantics of almost that I assume (Section 5.1.1). Under this semantics of almost, I 
account for how the scalar reading of almost is derived for an example like John almost closed 
the door (Section 5.1.2) by assuming lexical decomposition (see von Stechow 1995, 1996) and 
the scalar structure of the gradable adjective closed as proposed in Kennedy and McNally (2005). 
This is why a lengthy discussion on adjective scale structures and how almost interacts with 
gradable adjectives is coming up in the same section. As a matter of fact, the analysis of the 
intervention effect also builds on this discussion. Notice that the semantics of almost that I 
assume at the beginning of Section 5.1.1 is intended at least for the scalar reading of almost. As 
for the counterfactual reading, different analyses have been proposed since the original 
observation of the ambiguity of almost (see e.g. Sadock 1981; Eckardt 2007; Amaral & Del Prete 
2010), and more than one of them is compatible with my analysis of the intervention effect. 
Although I do not intend to give an account for the counterfactual reading, I discuss briefly at the 
end of Section 5.1 (Section 5.1.4), two possible analyses of the counterfactual reading. In Section 
5.2, I propose an analysis of the intervention effect.  
  
5.1. Background for the analysis of the intervention effect 
5.1.1. The semantics of almost that I assume (at least for scalar almost) 
My semantics of almost is given in (68), in which x̅ is a vector of lambda bound variables.  
 





As we can see, the semantics given in (68) is similar to Amaral and Del Prete’s (2010) (cf. (43)). 
It states that almost is a polymorphic operator which can combine with an n-place property p, 
and this property p is scalar. As what Amaral and Del Prete (2010) propose, I assume that the 
scale induced from p can be lexically motivated, focus-induced or derived from context, and the 
predicate that almost modifies intuitively provides the end point (i.e. the “limit” in Amaral and 
Del Prete’s term) on the scale. Almost applies to p and its arguments, and gives rise to a 
conjunction of two elements. The scalar property p does not hold of its arguments. However, an 
alternative property q which is lower than and close to p holds of the arguments.  
 
5.1.2. Scalar almost, scale structures of gradable adjectives and their interaction with 
almost 
Under this semantics of almost, let us examine how the scalar reading is derived for an example 
like John almost closed the door.  First of all, we need to address the following question: What 
scalar alternatives are involved in the scalar reading? Assuming lexical decomposition in syntax 
(cf. von Stechow 1995; 1996), I argue that in this case it is the decomposed element, the gradable 
adjective closed, that provides a scale for almost.  
This is where the semantics of gradable adjectives (e.g. expensive, tall, closed, open, etc.) 
comes into play. I assume the semantics of gradable adjectives proposed by Kennedy and 
McNally (2005). They analyze the semantics of adjectives as a measure function that maps an 
individual in its domain to a degree (which are formalized either as a point or an interval) on a 
scale. The scale consists of three components: a set of degrees, an ordering relation and a 
dimension along which the quantity is measured. For example, the adjective expensive associates 
with a scale consisting of a set of degree d ordered along the cost dimension. It denotes a relation 
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between degree of cost d and objects x such that the cost of x equals d (69)a. The adjective closed 
associates with a scale consisting of a set of degrees d ordered along the dimension of “being 
closed”. It denotes a relation between degree of being closed and objects x such that x is d-
degree closed (69)b.  
 
(69) a. [[expensive]]=λd. λx. expensive (x)=d               [Kennedy & McNally 2005: 349, (12)] 
b. [[closed]]= λd. λx. closed (x)=d 
 
One well-known property of gradable adjectives is that the interpretation of many adjectives 
(e.g. expensive, tall, big) depends on context. For instance, what counts as expensive may vary 
from context to context. One way to account for this context dependency is to model the truth 
conditions of gradable adjectives relative to a contextually defined standard of comparison. 
Following von Stechow (1984), Kennedy and McNally achieve this by assuming that when there 
is no other overt degree morphology (e.g. in English comparatives, degree modifiers and 
measure phrases) modifying the adjective, there exists a covert degree morpheme pos that relates 
the degree argument of the adjective to the standard of comparison.  The specific semantics of 
pos is given in (70). 
  
(70) [[pos]]=λGλx. d[standard(d)(G)(C)  ˄G(d)(x)]        
[Kennedy & McNally 2005: 350, (13)] 
 
In the formula, the standard function holds of a degree d if it meets a standard of comparison for 
an adjective G with respect to a comparison class C. C is a contextually given set of individuals 
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that influence the semantic denotations of adjectives. Once we compose pos with expensive, we 
get the denotation of its positive form as in (71).  
 
(71) [[pos]]([[expensive]])=λx. d [standard(d)([[expensive]])(C) ˄ [[expensive]](d)(x)] 
= λx. d [standard(d)([[expensive]])(C) ˄ expensive(x)=d] 
[Kennedy & McNally 2005: 350, (14)] 
 
Kennedy & McNally further propose that for the case of expensive, the standard relation 
requires that a degree d exceeds a norm or average that is computed based on the comparison 
class C. Since the value of C is determined contextually, whether a particular degree exceeds the 
norm or average is also determined by context, which accounts for the vagueness of an adjective 
like expensive.  
However, the requirements imposed by the standard relation are not the same for all 
adjectives. Instead, they vary depending on the adjectival argument of pos. Kennedy and 
McNally (2005) argue for a distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives: for the 
former (e.g. tall, expensive), the standard of comparison is context dependent, whereas the 
standard of comparison for the latter (e.g. open, closed, wet, dry) is not. Within absolute 
adjectives, there exists a further distinction between maximum-standard and minimal-standard 
absolute adjectives. For instance, closed is a maximum-standard absolute adjective in the sense 
that the standard of comparison associates with the maximum degree of “being closed”, the end 
point on the scale. In other words, (72) does not mean that the door is closed to a certain degree 
which surpasses some standard of comparison. Instead, it means that the door is completely 
closed. So for the case of closed, the standard relation in the pos morpheme requires that d must 
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equal the maximum of the scale associated with the adjective. The positive form (i.e. combining 
pos with closed) gives rise to the interpretation in (73), where SA represents the scale associated 
with the adjectival head, and mA is the measure function introduced by the adjective.  
 
(72) The door is closed.  
(73) [[APmax]]=[[pos]]([[Amax]])= λx.∃d [standard(d)([[Amax]])(C)⋀[[Amax]](d)(x) 
=λx.∃d [d=max (SA)⋀mA(x)=d]  
[combining (34b) & (35b) in Kennedy & McNally 2005: 358)] 
 
In contrast to closed, its antonym open is a minimum-standard absolute adjective in the sense 
that the standard of comparison defaults to the minimal value on the scale. (74) does not mean 
that the door is open to some degree that is beyond some standard of comparison, but rather 
simply requires some minimal positive aperture of the door. For a minimum-standard absolute 
adjective, a degree d satisfies the standard relation if it is greater than the minimum value of the 
scale associated with the adjective, as shown in (75), when we combine pos with a minimum-
standard absolute adjective.  
 
(74) The door is open.  
(75) [[APmin]]=[[pos]]([[Amin]])=λx.∃d[standard(d)([[Amin]])(C)⋀[[Amax]](d)(x)]=λx.∃d 
[d>min (SA)⋀mA(x)=d]  




As many authors have observed (see Cruse 1986, Rotstein & Winter 2004, Kennedy & 
McNally 2005, Burnett 2012, among others), almost always goes well with maximum-standard 
absolute adjectives, independent of context. However, in an out-of-the-blue context, it is often 
less acceptable with minimum-standard absolute adjectives and relative gradable adjectives, as 




(76) a. John is almost *tall/*fat/*handsome. 
b. This watch is almost *expensive/*attractive/*fashionable. 
[Burnett 2012: 160, (17a)-(17b)] 
(77) a. This towel is almost dry/*wet. 
b. The stick is almost straight/*bent. 
c. The table is almost clean/*dirty. 
d. The metal is almost flat/*curved. 
[Burnett 2012: 160, (16a)-(16d)] 
Rotstein and Winter (2004) as well as Winter (2006) point out that when the contexts 
explicitly specify a standard, sentences with almost modifying a minimum-standard absolute 
adjective or a relative gradable adjective can be improved. This is illustrated in the examples 
below.  
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 Rotstein and Winter (2004) notice that for some pairs of absolute adjectives with maximum and minimum 
standards, this contrast is not so sharp in some contexts. In fact, in these context, almost modifying a minimum-
standard absolute adjective is marginally acceptable for some speakers, as illustrated in the example below (for more 
examples, see their example (10)).  
 
(xiii) John is almost hungry: four hours after breakfast, he is no longer satiated from breakfast; he is not yet 
hungry, but he is already starting to think about lunch.                            [Rotstein & Winter 2004: 266, (10a)] 
 
Despite the felicity of (xiii), Rotstein and Winter show that absolute gradable adjectives with maximum standard and 
minimum standard give rise to different inferences when modified by almost. This shows that almost still makes an 
interpretative distinction between the two classes of absolute gradable adjectives.   
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(78) a. We consider a glass dirty and wash it as soon as there are five spots on it. This glass is 
now almost dirty—it has four spots on it.                                                    [Winter 2006, (25)]  
b. The publisher considers a book long if it’s 300 pages or more. This book is almost 
long– It’s 298 pages.                                                                                    [Winter 2006, (26)]  
c. A tall basketball player is someone above 2.00 meters high. John is 1.98 meters, so he 
is almost tall.                                                                      [Rotstein & Winter 2004: 279, (34)] 
 
To account for the patterns in (76) to (78), I assume the following: almost requires a fixed 
limit point on a scale. This is how Penka (2006) rules out sentences with almost modifying 
quantifiers such as several, many, most, more than half (see example (40), repeated in (79)). 
Since these quantifiers do not correspond to precise values on the scale, it is not clear what part 
of the scale counts as ‘close by’. 
 
(79) #Almost several/many /most/more than half students passed the exam.  [Penka 2006, (23)] 
 
According to Kennedy and McNally (2005), the positive form of a maximum-standard 
absolute adjective (e.g. closed) is true of an individual that has the maximum degree on the scale 
associated with the adjective (see (73)). So the set of degrees that qualify as [pos [closed]] is 
{d:d=max(SA)}. The semantics of almost says that the individual’s closeness is not in this set, 
but close to it. This truth condition can be met, because the limit point provided by the 
maximum-standard absolute adjective is fixed on the scale. This explains why maximum-
standard absolute adjectives are always compatible with almost, independent from the context.  
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For a minimum-standard absolute adjective (e.g. wet), the standard of comparison can be 
anywhere on the scale, between the minimum and maximum degree for the adjective to hold. 
Rotstein and Winter (2004) argue that by default the standard of comparison is set to zero degree. 
Following Kennedy and McNally (2005), the positive form of wet is true of an individual that 
has non-zero wetness in an out-of-the-blue context.  This means that the set of degrees that 
qualify as [pos [wet]] is {d: 0 < d}. On the other hand, the semantics of almost says that the 
individual’s wetness is not in this set, but lower than and close to this set. However, since there is 
no lowest degree in the set, the limit point that almost approaches to is not fixed. As result, the 
truth condition of almost cannot be met. In other words, there has to be a minimum amount of 
having the property for almost to be used with a minimum-standard absolute adjective. 
However, the default standard can be overridden by context. In such cases, the context fixes a 
standard and creates a closed interval that is associated with the adjective, as argued by Winter 
(2006). When this happens, the positive from of a minimum-standard gradable adjective like wet 
is true of an individual that has a degree of wetness that is equal to or greater than the fixed 
standard. In other words, the set of degrees that qualify as [pos [wet]] is {d: 
standard(d)([[wet]])(C) ≤ d}. Almost requires that the individual’s wetness is not in this set, but 
lower than and close to this set. Given that there exists a lowest degree in the set, hence a fixed 
limit point, almost becomes compatible with wet.   
We can apply the similar logic to explain why almost generally does not go well with relative 
gradable adjectives (e.g. expensive) in an out-of-the-blue context. A relative adjective lacks a 
default standard. In other words, its standard of comparison can be anywhere on the scale and it 
associates with an open interval. Given the lack of a minimum boundary, hence a fixed limit 
point, almost expensive sounds weird out of the blue. However, when the context provides an 
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explicit standard value, which further yields a closed interval that expensive associates with on 
the scale (see Winter 2006), a relative gradable adjective like expensive can become compatible 
with almost.  
Whether a gradable adjective is compatible with almost correlates very closely with whether 
its corresponding verb allows a scalar reading when modified by almost. A verb whose 
corresponding adjective is a maximum-standard absolute adjective with permits a scalar reading 
(80)a, whereas those that corresponds to a minimum-standard absolute adjective does not (80) in 
an out-of-the-blue context. This connection follows automatically if we assume that almost can 
associate with the corresponding adjective, which is one of the decomposed elements of the 
verbal predicate. 
  
(80) a. John almost closed the door/straighten the stick/flattened the metal.  
 (counterfactual, scalar) 
b. John almost opened the door/bent the stick/curved the metal.  
 (counterfactual, #scalar) 
 
5.1.3. The interaction between almost and a definite plural 
Under this analysis of the scalar reading of almost, we can account for the contrast in (58), 
repeated in (81): Compared with the (b) example, the (a) example lacks the scalar reading.  
 
(81) a. John almost woke up the children. (counterfactual, #scalar)  
b. John almost woke up all the children. (counterfactual, scalar) 
[Jon Nissenbaum, p.c.] 
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To do that, we assume Löbner’s (2000) Presupposition of Indivisibility, a felicity condition on 
predication in natural language. Fodor (1970: 158-168) notes that a plural definite DP (e.g. the 
children) has a different semantics from a universal quantifier (e.g. all), although in a positive 
sentence they seem to have the same truth condition (82). When they are embedded under 
negation:  a plural definite NP (83)a gives rise to a “none” reading (i.e. John woke up none of the 
children), instead of a “not all” reading as (83)b. 
 
(82) a. John woke up the children. 
b. John woke up all the children.  
(83) a. John didn’t wake up the children.  
b. John didn’t wake up all the children.  
 
Löbner (2000) accounts for this all-or-nothing polarity contrast by proposing a felicity 
condition on predication in natural languages, the “Presupposition of Indivisibility”, which is 
defined below: 
  
(84) Presupposition of Indivisibility 
Whenever a predicate is applied to one of its arguments, it is true or false of the argument as 
a whole (p. 239).  
 
Although this principle is intended for all predications in natural language, it is mainly intended 
for a class of predications which Löbner calls summative predications. In summative predication, 
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the truth of a predicate applied to a complex argument depends on the truth of the predicate 
applied to its parts, as defined below.  
 
(85) Definition 
A predication is summative with respect to a certain argument a iff:  
It is true/false of a iff it is true/false of all parts of an admissible partition into proper parts of 
a.             (p.237) 
 
Based on this definition, a predicate wake up applying to a distributive plural the children is a 
case of summative predication. Following the Presupposition of Indivisibility, wake up the 
children presupposes that either each individual child was woken up or none of the children was 
woken up. Once it is embedded under negation, as in (83)a John didn’t woke up the children, the 
presupposition remains intact. Together with the assertion, the sentence gives rise to the ‘none’ 
interpretation. For a negative sentence with the quantifier all as in (83)b John didn’t woke up all 
the children, the quantifier quantifies over the atomic parts of the plural definite object children. 
The predicate woke up applies to the atomic parts of the plural object, thus the Presupposition of 
Indivisibility is satisfied trivially. Not negates the quantifier instead of the predication, which 
allows the sentence to be felicitous in a context where John woke up some of the children.   
We are now in a position to explain the lack of scalar reading of (81)a John almost woke up 
the children. Following the semantics of almost as in (68), the polar component of almost 
indicates that John woke up none of the children. The proximal component of (81)a indicates that 
John woke up most of the children, assuming that the definite plural provides a scale whose 
alternatives are different groups of students ordered based on their cardinality. However, the 
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proximal component conflicts with the polar component. As a result, (81)a cannot give rise to the 
same scalar reading as (81)b John almost woke up all the children.     
 
5.1.4. On counterfactual almost 
We have discussed the scalar reading of almost (for the example John almost closed the door). 
Now let us move on to its counterfactual reading. As we have seen in Section 3.1, different 
analyses has been proposed since the original observation of the ambiguity of almost, and more 
than one of them is compatible with my analysis of the intervention effect. The focus of the 
present study will not be to tease apart competing analyses for the counterfactual reading. Here I 
simply discuss two options concerning the ambiguity of almost (see Ottschofski 2014 for more 
details), both compatible with my analysis of the intervention effect. One option is to propose 
that the ambiguity of English almost is a result of lexical ambiguity/polysemy. In other words, 
there are two almosts in English: one has the semantics as in (68) (repeated in (86)a), according 
to which almost is a polymorphic operator that can combine with an n-place property (n≥1). This 
almost gives rise to a scalar reading. The other variant is a modal-operator and has a Sadock-
style semantics as in (13), which is slightly modified in (86)b. This variant gives rise to a 
counterfactual reading.  
 
(86) a. [[almost1]]=λp<s,…<σ,<τ, t>>>. λws. λx̅. p(w)(x̅) ˄ q  Salt (p) [q <S p ˄ close (q, p) ˄ q 
(w)(x̅)] 




Another option is to propose a unified analysis for both counterfactual and scalar readings. In 
fact, the formulation in (68) is general enough to be extended to cases in which almost modifies a 
proposition, i.e. properties of possible worlds. We can follow Eckardt (2007) in that a 
counterfactual reading arises only when almost modifies a proposition, as shown in (87). (87) 
states that almost combines with a proposition p and a world argument w, and gives rise to a 
conjunction of two elements: p does not hold in w yet an alternative proposition that is ranked 
lower than p and close to p holds in w. The question is what constitutes the alternatives to p and 
how they are ordered. Since the focus of the present study is not to propose an analysis for the 
counterfactual reading, I will leave these questions open for future research. 
 
(87) [[almost]]=λp<s, t>. λws. p(w) ˄ q  Salt (p) [q <S p ˄ close (q, p) ˄ q (w)] 
 
In light of the cross-linguistic data, it seems that both the polysemy analysis and the uniform 
analysis have their merits. On one hand, some languages have variants of ‘almost’ that are 
morphologically distinct and give rise to distinct interpretations. This is compatible with the 
polysemy analysis. On the other hand, there also exist languages which are cognately unrelated 
yet have ambiguous ‘almost’, which suggests that this may not be simple polysemy.    
What these two approaches of the ambiguity share in common is that the counterfactual 
reading can be possible only when almost takes sentential scope. However, this is not necessarily 
the case for the scalar reading. This explains the pattern in (21)-(24), which is repeated in (88)-
(91): When almost directly modifies a non-sentential constituent, only the scalar reading is 
available, as indicated in the (b) examples. In contrast, in the (a) examples where almost 
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modifies VP, it can take sentential scope. Therefore both counterfactual and scalar readings are 
available.  
 
(88) a. John arrived almost at 3pm.  (#counterfactual, scalar)  
b. John almost arrived at 3pm.  (counterfactual, scalar) 
(89) a. He invited almost all of his friends. (#counterfactual, scalar) 
b. He almost invited all of his friends.  (counterfactual, scalar) 
(90) a. He read almost 10 books.   (#counterfactual, scalar) 
 b. He almost read 10 books.   (counterfactual, scalar) 
(91) a. He walked almost to the park.  (#counterfactual, scalar) 
b. He almost walked to the park.  (counterfactual, scalar) 
 
5.2. Accounting for the intervention effect  
In this section I propose an account for the intervention effect presented in Section 4, i.e. an 
intervening adverb blocks the scalar reading of almost. I derive the intervention effect through 
two independent assumptions: The first one is a minimality constraint, which states that as a 
scalar operator, almost cannot skip a closer scalar item and simply associate with a farther one 
(see Chierchia 2013 for a similar assumption to account for NPI intervention). The second 
assumption indicates that the scale associated with almost needs to have a fixed limit point. This 
assumption has been used to rule out cases in which almost modifies quantifiers like many/most 
and sentences where almost modifies a minimum-standard absolute adjectives (e.g. wet) or a 
relative gradable adjectives (e.g. expensive). 
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In a nut-shell, I show that no matter what scalar items almost associates with, the sentence 
with an intervening adverb is ill-formed: If almost associates with the manner adverb, the 
sentence becomes uninterpretable because the scale associated with the manner adverb does not 
provide a fixed limit point and thus does not go well with almost. If almost associates with the 
scale provided by the predicate, the posited minimality constraint is violated. If almost associates 
with both scalar items, the limit point provided by the complex predicate is not fixed either. 
These lead to an intervention effect on the absence of a scalar reading. 
To be specific, I explore a more syntax-driven way in terms of feature checking/agreement to 
capture the association between almost and scalar alternatives that it associates with. I have 
argued that almost targets constituents that introduce scalar alternatives. Here I further assume 
that it enters into some kind of agreement with these targets (see Chierchia 2013). The idea is 
formally implemented in the following way: A scalar item carries a feature σ. Its alternatives 
may be active or inactive. If the alternatives are active, it is signaled by the feature σ getting 
value “+”. On the other hand, if the alternatives are not active, it is signaled by the feature σ 
getting value “-”. Following Chierchia (2013) I assume that almost works in a “multiple agree” 
fashion and can in principle target a series of scalar items with active alternatives (i.e. “+”) in its 
c-commanding domain. 
In addition, I posit a minimality effect under such a syntax-driven account (see a similar 
proposal in Chierchia’s 2013 treatment for NPI intervention effect): In a configuration of the 
form almost […X…Y], with two scalar items X and Y (whose alternatives may be active or 
inactive) such that X is structurally closer to almost than Y, we will be able to expect almost to 
be able to target Y only if it targets X first. In other words, it is not expected to be able to skip 
over potential scalar items.  
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Here is another assumption regarding the scalar alternatives of a manner adverb (e.g. slowly) 
that we need in order to account for the intervention effect. Like its gradable adjective 
counterpart, the adverb slowly is also associated with a scale along the dimension of speed. Its 
truth condition also varies depends on the context. To capture the adverb’s sensitivity to context, 
Rawlins (2013) extends the Kennedy (/McNally) analysis of gradable adjectives (Kennedy & 
McNally 2005) positing a similar covert “positive” degree operator. For details, see Rawlins 
(2013). Following Abrusán (2011), I assume that the domain of manners contains contraries. For 
any manner P, its contrary manner(s) P’ and what she calls “the middle predicate” PM are 
alternatives to it in any context. For instance, the adverb slowly has alternatives including fast 
and with medium speed. And for any member in the set {slowly, with medium speed, fast}, the 
other two members are alternatives to it in any context. This idea explains our intuition that 
normally there is a reason for having manner adverbs: to emphasize that the action represented 
by the predicate is carried out in a certain manner as opposed to its opposing manners. As 
McConnell-Ginet (1982: 152) describes, manner adverbials restricts the range of events referred 
to by the VP. By restricting the range of events, adverbials also have an alternative set of 
possible states of affairs. 
With all these assumptions, we are now in a position to formulate an account for the 
intervention effect. (92)b-(92)e are some logically possible LFs for the example John almost 
slowly closed the door (92)a, which consists of two scalar items: the manner adverb slowly and 
the decomposed adjective closed.  
 
(92) a.   John almost slowly closed the door. 
b. almost slowly[-σ] John CAUSE BECOME door closed[-σ] 
154 
 
c. almost slowly[+σ] John CAUSE BECOME door closed[-σ] 
i. almost slowly[+σ] John CAUSE BECOME door closed[-σ] 
ii. [almost slowly[+σ]] John CAUSE BECOME door closed[-σ] 
d. almost slowly[-σ] John CAUSE BECOME door closed[+σ] 
e. almost slowly[+σ] John CAUSE BECOME door closed[+σ] 
 
In (92)b, the scalar alternatives of neither scalar items are activated. Intuitively this means 
that almost is associated with none of the scalar items. This is against the selectional requirement 
of almost. Thus (92)b is not well-formed.  
In (92)c, almost associates with the scalar alternatives of slowly. The syntactic structure 
associated with this configuration can be either (92)c-i where almost modifies a proposition, or 
(92)c-ii where almost directly modifies slowly. I will argue that this option is not well-formed out 
of the same reason why almost does not go with its corresponding adjective slow in an out-of-
the-blue context: the adverb does not induce a fixed limit point on the scale that almost can 
approach if the standard of comparison is not specified in the context.
25
 To go through the idea in 
                                                          
25
 Jonathan Bobaljik (p.c.) points out that almost can modify manner adverbs in some context, as shown in the 
following example: 
 
(xiv) We slackened pace a little, and when we got into the big court-yard itself, we were walking almost 
slowly (from All the Year Round, Volume 14 by Charles Dickens).  
 
The following example is also considered acceptable: 
 
(xv) John closed the door almost slowly.  
Intended meaning: It was almost as if it was in slow motion. 
 
As discussed in Section 5.1, in some context (for instance, when the contexts explicitly specify a standard of 
comparison), almost can modify a relative gradable adjective, as repeated below.  
 
(xvi) a. The publisher considers a book long if it’s 300 pages or more. This book is almost long – It’s 298 pages.  
[Winter 2006, (26)]  
b. A tall basketball player is someone above 2.00 meters high. John is 1.98 meters, so he is almost tall.  




more detail, let us take a look at the semantics of a gradable adjective like slow and its adverb 
counterpart like slowly. In Kennedy and McNally’s (2005) classification slow is a relative 
adjective, whose standard of comparison is contextually dependent. To capture this sensitivity to 
context, Kennedy and McNally (2005) posit a covert positive morpheme for gradable adjectives, 
whose function is to relate the degree argument of the adjective to an appropriate standard of 
comparison. When the adjective occurs without overt degree morphology (e.g. comparative 
morpheme, degree modifiers and measure phrases), it combines with the positive morpheme and 
yields a predicate that measures its argument along the relevant dimension, and compares that 
measurement to some standard. Like its gradable adjective counterpart slow, the evaluation of 
the corresponding adverb slowly also depends on context. Intuitively by uttering “John walked 
quickly”, we are asserting that the speed for subintervals of the described interval where John 
was walking is greater than some average or standard speed for similar intervals. To capture the 
adverb’s sensitivity to context, Rawlins (2013) extends the Kennedy (/McNally) analysis of 
gradable adjectives, positing a similar covert “positive” degree operator. For details, see Rawlins 
(2013).
26
 We have seen that almost does not go well with a relative adjective, whose positive 
form denotes that the subject falls within a  set of degrees that lacks a minimum boundary. In this 
sense, the limit point provided by the positive form of slow is not fixed on the scale, which 
explains why example (93) with almost modifying slow is odd. Similar account can be provided 
for the oddity of (94)a in which almost modifies slowly (especially in contrast to (94)b). This 
also explains why the configuration in (92)c is ill-formed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Out of the similar reason, for examples like (xv) and (xvi), the speaker may have a standard of comparison in mind, 
which allows these examples to be interpretable.  
Also, there is an independent reason why (91)c is less felicitous, compared with (xvi). This is because the heavy 
adverbial constituent prefers to be extraposed  (Jonathan Bobaljik, p.c.).  
26
 The complexity of the semantics of slowly and the pos morpheme proposed by Rawlins is orthogonal to our 
purpose here.  
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(93) #He is almost slow. 
(94) a. #He closed the door almost slowly.  
b. He closed the door almost completely. 
 
In (92)d, only the alternatives of the adjective closed are active. However, this does not 
conform to the minimality requirement. i.e. In a configuration of the form almost […X…Y], 
where both X and Y are potential target scalar items for almost and X is structurally closer to 
almost than Y, almost cannot target Y without targeting X first. In other words, it is not expected 
to be able to skip over potential targets.  
In (92)e, almost associates with two scalar items in its scope: slowly and closed. The set of 
alternatives that almost assesses is computed via pointwise function application (see Hamblin 
1973, Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002, among others): i.e. for function application, each member of 
the function alternative composes with each member of the argument set (95).  
 
(95) (Hamblin) Pointwise Function Application  (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002) 
If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ, and [[β]]g,c ⊆ Dσ and [[γ]]
g,c
 ⊆ D<στ>, then 
[[α]]g,c ≝ {a ∈ Dτ | ∃b∃c (b ∈ [[β]]
g,c
 ∧c ∈ [[γ]]g,c ∧a = c(b))} 
 
This gives rise to the following alternative set, whose members are ordered along two 
dimensions: the degree that the door was closed and the speed of John’s action: {John quickly 
made the door 100% closed; John quickly made the door 90%-closed, John made the door 100%-
closed with medium speed; John made the door 90% closed with medium speed;…John slowly 
made the door 100%-closed; John slowly made the door 90%-closed}. The limit point provided 
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by the predicate slowly close the door is not fixed on the scale either. Therefore it is not well-
formed.  
Before we move on to predictions of this analysis of the intervention effect, I have a few 
remarks about the counterfactual reading of (92)a. In the previous subsection, I discussed two 
possible approaches to account for the counterfactual reading, without committing to any of them. 
Intuitively, we want the counterfactual reading of (92)a to indicate roughly the following: John 
did not close the door slowly in the world of evaluation, yet he could have done it in some close 
worlds. Such a truth condition renders the sentence true in many different contexts: we can 
imagine the sentence being true in a scenario where John planned to slowly close the door but 
never initiated the action because he got interrupted before he started the action. This is our 
familiar “counterfactual” interpretation. We can also imagine the sentence being true in a context 
where John did not slowly close the door simply because he was not careful enough and 
slammed the door instead. This corresponds to the “adverb-associated” interpretation we 
discussed in Section 4. In other words, the adverb-associated reading can also be subsumed 
under the counterfactual reading. 
The analysis of the intervention effect crucially relies on the assumption that almost requires 
a fixed limit point on the scale. A prediction that fall from this analysis is that once the scale that 
almost accesses has a fixed limit point, the originally missing scalar reading should become 
available. If the intervening adverb goes well with almost per se, then we predict that it should 
not give rise to an intervention effect. This is borne out in for perfectly, which goes well with 
almost (thanks Magdalena Kaufmann for providing the example). Example (96) allows the 
meaning that John was in the process of closing the door in a perfect manner, but that he didn't 
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complete his action and only got close to it (Emma Nguyen, p.c.). This is because the scale has a 
fixed limit point almost associates with the adverb or both scalar items.   
 
(96) John almost perfectly closed the door.     
 
As proposed by Rotstein and Winter (2004) and Winter (2006), when the context explicitly 
specify a standard, almost can modify a relative gradable adjective. We can also provide a 
context which fixes a standard of comparison such that almost slowly becomes felicitous (see 
footnote 21 which provides possible examples like this). Under such a context, we expect that 
the originally absent scalar reading for John almost closed the door can be recovered and we 




(97) Context: [The speaker is talking about how important it is to keep the door completely 
closed.] 
Since the door slams so easily, I consider any closing that does not cause it to slam as 'slowly'. 
I think the most important thing is to keep the door completely shut so that the wind doesn't 
blow it open. Look at what John did just now! Clearly he didn’t slam it, but he didn’t close 
the door completely, there was still a little gap there.  
?John almost slowly closed the door.  
 
                                                          
27
 Some speakers find this test sentence more acceptable under this context. However, some speakers still find it 
unacceptable. I suspect there are two sources for the infelicity of the test sentence in (97): one is that probably these 
speakers do not even accept almost slowly. Another possible source comes from the fact that heavy adverbs prefer to 
be extraposed (Jonathan Bobaljik, p.c., see footnote 21).  
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To sum up this section, I provided an analysis of the intervention effect.  To do that I first 
discussed the semantics of almost that I assume at least for the scalar reading. To be more 
specific, almost is a polymorphic operator that operates on a scale, which can be grammatically 
encoded, focus-induced or contextually provided. The scalar reading for an example like John 
almost closed the door is derived when almost associates with the decomposed gradable 
adjective closed. To account for the intervention effect, I assumed the following: (a) a posited 
minimality constraint such that almost cannot skip potential targets; and (b) an assumption that 
the scale associated with almost needs to have a fixed limit point. I derived the intervention 
effect by examining each logical possible LFs in which almost associates with one or two scalar 
items in its scope. As we have seen, all of them lead to ill-formedness.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
6. Extension: Converging evidence from other languages  
As we have seen in Section 0, in some languages the counterfactual and scalar interrpretation of 
almost correspond to two distinct lexical items. For example, in Serbo-Croatian skoro gives rise 




(98) Context: As the last person who left the classroom, Ivan was supposed to close the door, 
but he didn’t close it fully. There was still a small gap left.  
Ivan je skoro/#zamalo  zatvorio vrata.  
Ivan.nom  is almost   closed  door. 
Ivan almost closed the door.                                             [Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
                                                          
28
 If in a scalar context the counterfactual reading makes sense, zamalo can also be used, as indicated in (xvii) below.  
 
(xvii) Context: Ivan started closing the door. He was about to fully close it when he got a phone call and stopped 
there.  
Ivan  je zamalo /skoro zatvorio  vrata. 
Ivan.nom is almost  closed  door 
Ivan almost closed the door. 
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(99) Context: Ivan thought of closing the door, but he got an emergency phone call before he 
started closing the door and didn’t even touch the door.  
Ivan je zamalo /#skoro zatvorio vrata. 
Ivan.nom is almost   closed  door 
Ivan almost closed the door.                                             [Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
 
I have argued that no matter what analysis of the counterfactual ‘almost’ we adopt, when the 
counterfactual reading is intended, almost must take propositional scope. This explains why 
zamalo is odd in (100)b and (101)b, because it cannot directly modify the scalar item ‘ten 
books’.29 
 
(100) Context: The library has a book reading context in the summer time. Each participant 
needs to read ten books to win a prize.  John goes to the library and picks up ten books. 
Unfortunately his books are so long that by the time the summer ends, he has only finished 
nine of them.  
a. Ivan je skoro/#zamalo  procitao deset knjiga. 
Ivan is almost   read   ten books 
 
                                                          
29
 Although almost all examples I checked with native speakers go along with this generalization, the informants 
provided a counterexample (v). Unexpectedly, skoro is possible in the (b) example below.  
  
(xviii) Context:  Bill signed up for a swimming competition in the summer. To win the prize, he needed to swim 
three laps. He had prepared everything before the game when he was told the last minute that the 
competition was cancelled.  
a. Ivan je zamalo/*skoro preplivao bazen tri puta. 
Ivan  is  almost   swam.across  pool  three  times 
Ivan almost swam three laps. 
b. Ivan  je  preplivao  bazen *zamalo/skoro tri puta. 
Ivan  is  swam.across  pool  almost   three  times 
Ivan swam almost three laps. 
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b. Ivan je procitao skoro/#zamalo  deset knjiga.  
Ivan is read   almost   ten books 
John read almost 10 books.                                         
 [Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
(101) The library has a book reading context in the summer time. Each participant needs to read 
ten books to win a prize. Bill goes to the library and picks up ten books. However, there are a 
lot of book thieves in the country, and he had all his books stolen on the way home.  
a. Ivan je #skoro/zamalo  procitao deset knjiga. 
Ivan is almost   read   ten books 
John almost read 10 books. 
b. Ivan je procitao #zamalo/#skoro deset knjiga. 
Ivan is read   almost   ten books 
John read almost 10 books.                                         
[Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
 
(102) is another example which indicates that skoro can access a non-propositional scalar 
items whereas zamalo can only operate on a proposition. As the copula su ‘are’ needs to occupy 
the second position, ‘almost all my friends’ forms a constituent. This explains why the sentence 







(102) Context: All my friends came to my wedding, except Ena. 
Skoro/#Zamolo svi moji prijatelji su dosli. 
Almost  all my friends  are come 
Almost all my friends came.                                [Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
 
(103) shows that zamalo but not skoro can modify the predicate ‘meet’, for which only the 
counterfactual reading makes sense.  
 
(103) Context: I was supposed to meet Ivan this afternoon, but our meeting got cancelled the 
last minute. 
a.   Zamalo/??Skoro sam upoznao Ivana. 
Almost  am met  Ivan.acc 
I almost met Ivan. 
b.   Danas sam zamalo /??skoro upoznao Ivana. 
Today am almost   met  Ivan.acc 
I almost met Ivan.                                                              
[Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
 
As we have seen in Section 1, Korean is another language where the counterfactual and 
scalar readings are distinguished morphologically. Keuy ‘almost’ in Korean only gives rise to the 
scalar interpretations of ‘almost’, indicating closeness to completion of the event expressed by 




(104) John-i  mwun-ul keuy tat-ass-ta 
John-nom  door-acc almost close-perf-decl 
John almost closed the door.  (scalar, *counterfactual) [Jungmin Kang, p.c.] 
(105) John-i  keuy yel kwen-uy chayk-ul ilk-ess-ta 
John-nom  almost ten  cl-gen   book-acc read-perf-decl 
John almost read ten books.  (scalar, *counterfactual)   [Jungmin Kang, p.c.] 
 
As expected, keuy cannot be used with predicates for which only the counterfactual reading 





(106) Context: Mina almost hit Jinhee (but she changed her mind, and did not). 
a. *mina-nun cinhi-lul keuy ttayli-ess-ta 
                 Mina-TOP Jinhee-ACC almost hit-PAST-DECL 
b. mina-nun cinhi-lul ttayli-l  ppen hay-ss-ta 
    Mina-TOP Jinhee-ACC hit-MOD  ANA-PAST-DECL 
Mina almost hit Jinhee.      [Kim 2007, (13)] 
                                                          
30
 At first glance, ppen ha-ta ‘almost’ seems to corresponds to counterfactual almost. However, some informants 
indicated that ppen ha-ta cannot be used in a counterfactual context as in the example below. 
 
(xix) Context: John planned to close the door but forget to do it the last minute because of an emergency phone 
call. He didn’t even start closing the door. 
 
#John-i  mwun-ul tat-ul ppen ha-yss-ta 
John-nom door-acc  close-l PPEN do-perf-decl  
John almost closed the door.                                                                                             [Jungmin Kang, p.c.] 
 
 
As shown in Section 1, the usage of ppen ha-ta ‘almost’ is complicated and goes beyond the scope of this study (see 
Kim 2002, Kim 2007 for more details).  
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A manner adverb such as ‘slowly’ or ‘quickly’ induces an intervention effect for both Serbo-
Croatian skoro and Korean keuy: When it occurs between ‘almost’ and the complex predicate, 
the sentence is ungrammatical, as shown in (107)a, (108)a and (109)a. Notice that these 
examples are ill-formed not because ‘almost’ in these languages cannot co-occur with a manner 
adverb. For instance, when a manner adverb like ‘quickly’ precedes Serbo-Croatian skoro 
‘almost’ (107)b, the sentence has the same interpretation as its English counterpart, i.e. John 
almost completely closed the door in a quick manner. Similarly Korean keuy can also co-occur 
with a manner adverb, as long as it does not intervene between keuy and the predicate (108)b, 
(109)b. As we have seen in the previous section, all the possible structures that associate an 
English sentence John almost slowly closed the door are ill-formed, except when almost takes 
propositional scope and gives rise to a counterfactual reading. However, this option is not 
available for Serbo-Croatian skoro or Korean keuy. This leads to the ungrammaticality of (107)a, 
(108)a and (109)a. 
 
(107) a. *Ivan je skoro brzo  zatvorio vrata.  
     Ivan.nom is almost quickly closed  door 
     Ivan almost closed the door in a quick manner. 
b.  Ivan je  brzo  skoro  zatvorio vrata.  
     Ivan.nom is quickly almost  closed  door 
     Ivan almost closed the door in a quick manner.    [Aida Talić & Neda Todorović, p.c.] 
(108) a. ??John-i mwun-ul  keuy   ppalli  tat-ass-ta  
         John-nom  door-acc  almost  quickly close-perf-decl  
         John almost quickly closed the door. 
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b. ?John-i mwun-ul  ppalli  keuy tat-ass-ta  
    John-nom  door-acc  quickly almost close-perf-decl  
    John quickly almost closed the door.                                               [Jungmin Kang, p.c.] 
(109) a. *John-i keuy  chenchenhi yel kwen-uy chayk-ul ilk-ess-ta 
          John-nom  almost slowly  ten  cl-gen   book-acc read-perf-decl 
          John almost slowly read ten books. 
b.  John-i chenchenhi keuy yel kwen-uy chayk-ul ilk-ess-ta 
     John-nom  slowly  almost ten  cl-gen   book-acc read-perf-decl 
     John slowly read almost ten books.                                                [Jungmin Kang, p.c.] 
 
7. Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter I examined an intervention effect with almost: when a manner adverb intervenes 
between almost and a complex predicate (e.g. John almost slowly closed the door), the scalar 
reading of almost is unavailable. Building on previous scalar analyses of almost, I derive the 
intervention effect by examining the consequences when almost associates with one or two 
scalar items in its scope, which leads to ill-formedness. My analysis relies on (a) a posited 
minimality constraint such that almost cannot skip potential targets; and (b) an assumption that 
the scale associated with almost needs to have a fixed limit point.  
To be more specific, I assume that almost is a polymorphic operator that operates on a scale, 
which can be grammatically encoded, focus-induced or contextually provided. When an 
additional manner adverb intervenes between almost and the complex predicate, there are two 
scalar items under the scope of almost whose alternatives may be active or not: the manner 
adverb and the scalar item provided by the complex predicate. Associating with one or both of 
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the scalar items lead to ill-formedness: If almost associates with the manner adverb, the sentence 
becomes uninterpretable because the scale associated with the manner adverb does not provide a 
fixed limit point and thus does not go well with almost. If almost associates with the scale 
provided by the predicate, a posited minimality constraint is violated. If almost associates with 
both scalar items, the associated scale does not have a fixed limit point either. These together 







In this dissertation I investigate the adverbs ‘again’ and ‘almost’, which are known as 
decomposition adverbs, as they can “look inside” a predicate and modify just the result state. For 
example, when sentence-final again modifies an accomplishment predicate (e.g. John walked to 
the village again), the sentence is ambiguous between a repetitive and a restitutive reading: the 
former presupposes that the agent has performed the action before (John has walked to the 
village before), while the latter presupposes only that the result has held before (John had been at 
the village before). Like sentence-final again, preverbal almost modifying a complex predicate 
(e.g. John almost closed the door) is ambiguous: First, it has a “counterfactual” reading, where 
the agent had the intention of performing the action represented by the predicate, but did not 
implement it. (John had the intention of closing the door, but did not actually do so.) Another 
interpretation, called the “scalar” reading, indicates that the agent initiated the action but the 
result state was not achieved. (John started closing the door, but did not close it fully.) This 
dissertation revolves around how these readings are derived from a cross-linguistic perspective 
and how children acquire the ambiguity of English again when it modifies a goal-PP 
construction. 
Chapter 2 examines the decomposition adverbs ‘again’ from the perspective of cross-
linguistic variation, with an emphasis on Mandarin Chinese. Many researchers have argued that 
the repetitive vs. restitutive ambiguity is derived structurally, with a single word for ‘again’ that 
can be attached to different structural positions. This account is difficult to maintain in a 
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language like Mandarin, however. The adverb you ‘again’ can only occur preverbally, which 
suggests that it is always adjoined at the vP level or higher, leading to a prediction that only the 
repetitive reading will be available. Mandarin nonetheless allows a restitutive reading. This 
would seem to rule out a syntactic analysis involving multiple attachment sites within the VP, 
but I argue that there is indeed a structural ambiguity even in Mandarin. The evidence comes 
from scope interactions between ‘again' and an indefinite object.   
Interestingly, languages vary in whether their counterpart to English again permits a 
restitutive reading with goal-PPs such as walk to the village (Beck 2005; Beck & Snyder 2001). 
The restitutive reading is usually available only in languages that, like English, permit resultative 
constructions (Beck & Snyder 2001, Beck 2004). This cross-linguistic variation raises a broader 
question: How do children decide whether a restitutive reading is available in their target 
language? What kind of evidence can they rely on? In Chapter 3 I address these questions. I first 
examine the parental input, which indicates that truth-conditional evidence for the availability of 
a restitutive reading of again in English goal-PP constructions is infrequent and (usually) 
ambiguous. However, as I show through my experimental work, many children nonetheless 
achieve a surprising degree of facility with these restitutive readings by a fairly young age. To 
account for this learning conundrum, I propose that children rely on more general evidence about 
the syntax of English, namely the English setting of Snyder’s compounding parameter, in 
combination with knowledge of a basic, repetitive semantics for again. From this information the 
child can deduce that both readings of again are available with English goal-PPs.  
In Chapter 4, I examine another decomposition adverb English almost, whose ambiguity is 
not well-understood. I focus on an intervention effect, which as far as I am aware of, has never 
been reported before: an intervening manner adverb blocks the scalar reading of almost. For 
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example, John almost slowly closed the door cannot mean that John performed a slow action of 
closing the door, but did not close it fully. I develop in this chapter an account of the intervention 
effect, which bears on the semantics of almost and the source of its ambiguity. My semantics of 
almost is inspired and based on a scalar analysis, which argues that almost associates with scalar 
alternatives (e.g. Hitzeman 1992; Penka 2006; Amaral & Del Prete 2010). I also follow Eckardt 
(2007) in that almost is a polymorphic operator which can combine with properties of various 
semantic types. The account of the intervention effect crucially relies on two assumptions: (a) a 
posited minimality constraint such that almost cannot skip potential targets; (b) an assumption 
that the scale associated with almost needs to have a fixed limit point. To be more specific, I 
derive the intervention effect by examining the consequences when almost associates with one or 
both scalar items in its scope. If almost associates with the manner adverb, the sentence becomes 
uninterpretable because the scale associated with the manner adverb does not provide a fixed 
limit point and thus does not go well with almost. If almost associates with the scale provided by 
the predicate, a posited minimality constraint is violated. If almost associates with both scalar 





Appendix I: Can restitutive you be subsumed under additive you in Chinese? 
 
In Mandarin different interpretations seem to cluster in the lexical item you. For example, you 
also has an additive meaning (1) (glossed as ADD), which English again does not have.  
 
(1) Zhangsan xi le yifu,  you zuo  le   fan. 
Zhangsan wash Asp clothes, ADD make Asp  meal. 
Zhangsan did the laundry, and cooked the meal. 
 
In this section, I explore the question whether the restitutive reading of you can be 
subsumed under the additive interpretation by examining the semantics of additive you. I am 
going to show that you triggers a presupposition: The presupposed eventuality cannot follow the 
asserted eventuality and the sum of the two eventualities is more developed than the presupposed 
event. Based on this semantics, I draw a tentative conclusion that it is not obvious how the low 
restitutive reading can be subsumed under the repetitive reading. 
Let me start by examining the distribution and interpretation of additive you. To start with, 
additive you implies some presupposed content. For instance, the second sentence in (2) has the 
presupposition that there exists another occasion where Zhangsan interviewed someone. 
Therefore it can naturally follow the first sentence in (2). (2) is a case where the verbs in the two 
conjuncts are the same, but the objects are different. As a matter of fact, the predicates in the 
assertion and the presupposition can differ, as illustrated in (1). Furthermore, additive you can 
connect two completely different eventualities. For example, in (3) the subjects and predicates in 
the two conjuncts are not identical.  
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(2) Zuotian Zhangsan caifang le  san-ge  xuesheng, 
Yesterday Zhangsan interview Asp  three-CL student, 
jintian ta you caifang le liang-ge laoshi. 
 today  he  ADD  interview  Asp  two-CL teacher 
Yesterday Zhangsan interviewed three students, and today he interviewed two teachers. 
(3) Baba yao qu kai hui,  Mama you yao qu shangban.  
Dad need go have meeting, Mom ADD need go work. 
Shui lai zhaogu  haizi ne? 
Who come take-care-of child SFP? 
Dad needs to be away for a meeting; mom needs to work. Who’s going to take care of the 
child?  
 
Crucially there is a restriction with respect to how different the presupposed and asserted 
events can be. Not any two unrelated events can be added together. It has been observed that the 
eventualities in the presupposition and in the assertion should share some relevant property. To 
be more specific, they should fall under “a common ‘superset’ eventuality” (Greenberg, 2009b, 
p3). In (1), the superset eventuality is doing housework; in (2) interviewing people; in (3) parents 
not at home.  
However, the “superset eventuality” is not sufficient to make the additive you felicitous. For 
instance, in (4) the two events can in principle fall under a common eventuality: people having 
children. However, the sentence sounds awkward. Therefore, we need a more accurate 
generalization of where additive you is felicitous. Greenberg (2009a, 2009b) observe that English 
additive more observe the same constraint (5). She proposed that addtive more leads to a more 
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developed eventuality e3, which is the sum of the asserted event e1 and the presupposed event 
e2.  
 
(4) #Zhangsan you  liang-ge xiaohai, Lisi you you san-ge  xiaohai. 
Zhangsan  have two-CL children, Lisi ADD have three-CL children. 
Zhangsan has two children, and Lisi has three children. 
(5) #John has three children. Mary has more. (under additive reading) 
 
This “more developed” constraint can be extended to Chinese additive you. In (1) for 
instance, adding Zhangsan’s cooking the dinner and doing the laundry leads to a more developed 
event: “he finished more housework than before”. In (2), we can easily come up with a scenario 
in which Zhangsan’s interviewing more students advances an event. In (3), mom’s going to work 
plus dad’s being away strengthens the insecurity to leave the child alone at home. (4) is odd 
because it fails to meet the “more developed” restriction. However, if we create a context where 
the summed eventualities are considered more developed (e.g. the more children we have, the 
easier we can rent a shuttle), the same sentence sounds better (6). 
 
(6) [Scenario: We need some number of children to rent a shuttle.] 
Zhangsan you liang-ge xiaohai, Lisi you you san-ge  xiaohai,  
Zhangsan has two-CL child,   Lisi  ADD  has three-CL child.  
Jiaqilai ganghao zu yi-liang che.  
Add  just   rent  one-CL car. 




How do we formally capture the notion of “development”? Greenberg (2009a, 2009b) 
offered two suggestions. One proposal is to employ Landman’s (1992) notion of “stage-of” in the 
sense that the presupposed eventuality is required to be a stage of e3, the sum of the asserted and 
presupposed eventuality. An alternative solution is to borrow Beck’s (1997) modalized approach 
to conditional comparatives, and characterized “development” in the sense of (7). 
 
(7) An event e is 'more developed' than an event e' ( e >developed e') , iff e leads to or correlates 




Here I adopt the second approach, because Chinese additive you can also connect two 
stative predicates (8)-(9). Since stative predicates do not develop over time and thus do not have 
stages (Rothstein 2004), it is hard to capture (8)-(9) under Landman’s “stage-of” approach. On 
the other hand, the definition in (7) is compatible with sentences like (8) and (9): The sum of two 
events correlates to a higher degree which measures an eventuality on another scale--for 
instance, the degree of being a good employer in (8); and the degree of being the speaker’s Mr. 
Right in (9). 
 
(8) Ta  zuo shi mali  you zixi. 
She do  thing quickly ADD careful. 
She does things quickly and carefully. 
 
                                                             
1 The definition in (7) is slightly different from Greenberg’s (2009b), which includes an additional condition that “In 
w0 e has a higher number of participants than e'”. This is not necessarily the case. For instance, (8)-(9) does not 
involve an increase of the number of participants.  
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(9) Ta  name yingjun, you hen jiantan. 
He so  handsome,  ADD very talkative. 
He is handsome and talkative. 
 
In addition to the development constraint, you also observes a temporal restriction: The 
presupposed event should not occur later than the asserted one. This explains the contrast 
between the two sentences in (10). 
 
(10) a.  Ta zuotian caifang le san-ge  xuesheng,  
He yesterday interview Asp  three-CL student, 
jintian you caifang le  liang-ge. 
today  ADD interview Asp  two-CL. 
Yesterday he interviewed three students, and today he interviewed two more. 
 b.  #Ta  jintian caifang le san-ge  xuesheng,  
  He  today interview Asp  three-CL  student,  
  Zuotian you caifang le liang-ge.  
  yesterday  ADD  interview  Asp  two-CL. 
  Today he interviewed three students, yesterday he interviewed two students. 
 
Notice that the eventuality in the presupposition does not have to occur prior to the 
eventuality in the assertion. They can hold at the same time, as demonstrated in (11). Sentences 




(11) Zhangsan zaoshang zai tushuguan caifang le san-ge    xuesheng,  
Zhangsan morning  in  library  interview  Asp three-CL  student,  
yucitongshi, Lisi  you   zai bangongshi caifang le liang-ge xuesheng. 
Meanwhile  Lisi  ADD  in office   interview Asp  two-CL student.  
This morning Zhangsan interviewed three students in the library. Meanwhile Lisi 
interviewed two students in the office. 
 
To sum up our observation, additive you triggers a presupposition that an event occurs no 
later than the asserted event. It is felicitous when the sum of the presupposed and asserted events 
brings a more developed event.  
Let us go back to the question we asked at the beginning of the section: Can the restitutive 
reading of you, in particular the low restitutive reading, be subsumed under its additive meaning? 
(12) is an example of the low restitutive reading of you ‘again’. 
 
(12) Context: Zhangsan built a wardrobe. He set the door on its hinges and it looked fine. But 
when he closed the door, it was too small. So… 
Zhangsan you da-kai  le  men,  ba  men na le xialai. 
Zhangsan again hit-open  Asp door, BA  door  take Asp off. 
He opened the door again and took it off. 
 
Based on the semantics of additive you, it seems awkward to implement this idea out of the 
following reason: The presupposition of youadd requires that e1+e2 >developed e2 (with e2 being the 
presupposed event and e1 the asserted event). In the case of (12),  e1 is an event of the door 
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being open, and e2 is an event of John cause the door to be open. It is not obvious how the sum 
of two events is more developed than the presupposed event. A possible answer is that the 
summed event increased the duration of the door being open. However, this is not explicitly 
offered in the context. 
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Appendix II: Test for the scope interaction between you and an indefinite object 
 
Set 1: tu-hong ‘paint-red’ 
Test sentences:  
(1) ta  you  tu-hong  le   liang-ge  beike. 
she  again  paint-red  Asp  two-CL shell. 
She painted two shells red again. 
(2) ta you  tu-hong  le   qizhong liang-ge  beike. 
she again  paint-red  Asp  among  two-CL shell. 
She painted two of the shells red again. 
(3) ta you  ba liang-ge  beike tu-hong  le. 
she again  BA two-CL shell  paint-red  Asp  . 
She painted two shells red again. 
(4) ta you  ba qizhong liang-ge  beike tu-hong  le. 
she again  BA among two-CL shell  paint-red  Asp  . 






A. low restitutive reading, again>existential quantifier 
Zhangsan went to the beach and collected a lot of white shells and two red shells. When his 
wife cleaned the house, she accidentally broke the two red shells. Worried that Zhangsan 
would notice the mishap, … 
B. Low restitutive reading, existential quantifier>again 
Lisa had a bunch of red shells. Unfortunately after a while they all got very dusty and the 
redness faded. In need of two red shells to decorate her Christmas tree, … 
C. High restitutive reading, again > existential quantifier 
John and Jane had some white shells. Since they needed two red shells to decorate their 
Christmas tree, John painted two shells red. Unfortunately, Jane accidentally broke the two 
red shells that John just painted. Therefore, … 
D. High restitutive reading, existential quantifier > again 
John and Jane had some white shells. Last month John painted all the white shells red and 
used them to decorate their closet. This month, when Jane was in need of two red shells, she 
found that all of them got dusty and the color faded. Therefore, … 
E. Repetitive reading, again > existential quantifier 
Jane had a bunch of white shells. She first painted two shell reds. A minute later, she 
accidentally dropped the red shell on the floor and the red shell was broken. So… 
F. Repetitive reading, existential quantifier >again 
Jane painted all her white shells red. Unfortunately after a while they all got very dusty and 




Set 2: da-kai ‘hit-open’ 
Test sentences:  
(5) Ta you da-kai  le yi-kuai  huaibiao. 
He again  hit-open Asp one-CL pocket-watch. 
He opened a pocket watches again. 
(6) Ta you da-kai  le qizhong yi-kuai  huaibiao. 
He again  hit-open Asp among  one-CL pocket-watch. 
He opened one of his pocket watches again. 
(7) Ta you ba   yi-kuai  huaibiao da-kai  le. 
He again BA  one-CL pocket-watch  hit-open  Asp. 
He opened a pocket watches again. 
(8) Ta you ba  qizhong yi-kuai  huaibiao  da-kai le. 
He again BA among  one-CL pocket-watch   hit-open Asp. 





A. low restitutive reading, again>existential quantifier 
John ordered many pocket watches. Unfortunately, two of them had always been open due to 
some manufacturing error. Yesterday he got them fixed and they closed for the first time. 
Today… 
B. Low restitutive reading, existential quantifier>again 
John ordered ten pocket watches. Unfortunately, all of them had always been open due to 
some manufacturing error. Yesterday he got all his watches fixed and closed them for the first 
time. Today, … 
C. High restitutive reading, again > existential quantifier 
Jane and John bought five pocket watch together. Jane picked one pocket watch, opened it 
and closed it. Later John needed to check the time. He wanted to open the watch that John 
opened just now, but he couldn’t find it. Therefore,… 
D. High restitutive reading, existential quantifier > again 
Yesterday Jane and John bought five pocket watch together. To check whether there is any 
manufacturing errors, Jane first opened all of then and closed them. This morning John 
needed to check the time. Therefore,… 
E. Repetitive reading, again > existential quantifier 
John ordered ten pocket watches. He decided to check a different watch each day. Yesterday 
He opened one watch and closed it. Today, … 
F. Repetitive reading, existential quantifier >again 
John ordered ten pocket watches. To check whether there is any manufacturing error, he 
opened all of them and then closed them. Today, he needs to check time …  
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Appendix III: Stimuli 
 
A. Goal-PP stories 
(1) Experimenter: This is a story about a girl named Daisy. One day Daisy decides to go 
shopping. She starts walking toward the store. She walks and she walks, but she still can’t 
see the store. She says, “Should I keep walking? No, I’m just too tired. I can’t walk any 
farther.” So she decides to go home instead, and never makes it to the store. 
Puppet: I know what Daisy did in the end: Daisy walked to the store.  
(2) Experimenter: This is a story about a turtle. She's out crawling one day, when it suddenly 
starts raining. Fortunately, she spots a bridge not far away. She thinks, “Maybe if I were 
under that bridge, I could avoid the cold rain.” So she heads toward the bridge. She gets tired 
along the way, but she's a very strong turtle, and she doesn’t give up easily. She keeps on 
crawling, and crawling, and finally she's under the bridge, which blocks the rain perfectly. 
Puppet: I know what the turtle did in the end. The turtle crawled under the bridge. 
(3) Experimenter: This is a story about a bee. One day the bee’s working in his garden. Suddenly 
it starts pouring rain. He thinks, “I’ll go back to the hive to hide from the rain.” So he starts 
flying there. He's halfway to his hive when the rain suddenly stops. The bee thinks, “Hmm... 
Now that the rain has stopped, I should go back to the garden and do some more work.” So 
he turns around and goes back to work in the garden. 
Puppet: I know what the bee did in the end. The bee flew into his hive. 
(4) Experimenter: This is a story about a mermaid named Ariel. She was born in the sea, but she 
isn’t happy there. She wishes she had been born on land, where she would have learned how 
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to walk like a human! She begs her dad to let her go there. At first her dad won’t let her go, 
because he thinks she won't really like it there. But she keeps on begging. “Please!” At last 
her father says O.K. She swims, and swims, and finally she gets to the land. She’s so excited!  
Puppet: I know what Ariel did in the end. Ariel swam to the land. 
B. Repetitive stories 
(5) Experimenter: One day, Elmo and Cookie Monster come to the side of a river. They see a 
boat on the river, not too far away. Elmo says, “Let’s go see what’s in that boat!” 
Unfortunately, Cookie Monster isn't interested. He says, “Who knows what’s in that boat. I'd 
rather stay here at the riverside and eat cookies.” So Elmo swims to the boat, where he finds 
a beautiful cake! Elmo leaves the cake in the boat, and swims back to join Cookie Monster 
for a picnic by the river. But then Elmo starts to wonder if he should visit the boat a second 
time. He'd like to try the cake, but he also wants some company, so he asks Cookie Monster 
to join him. “Hmm, I don’t know,” says Cookie Monster. “I prefer cookies.” But Elmo keeps 
begging, and finally the two of them swim out together. They climb onto the boat and enjoy 
the delicious cake. 
Puppet: I know what Elmo/Cookie Monster did after he had a picnic, Elmo/Cookie Monster 
swam to the boat again.  
(6) Experimenter: This is a story about Aladdin and his friend Abu. One day they’re walking 
around in the desert when they spot a castle not far away. Neither one has ever seen a castle 
before, and they're amazed! Aladdin wants to go inside, and tries to get Abu to come with 
him. But Abu is scared. So Aladdin leaves Abu behind and walks to the castle by himself. 
When he gets inside the castle, he is surprised to find lots of fancy clothes... After Aladdin 
gets back, he has dinner with Abu. But Aladdin keeps wondering if he should go to the castle 
 183 
 
for a second time. He likes it there, but he also wants company, so he tries to persuade Abu to 
join him. At first Abu doesn’t want to, because he’s afraid that there might be guards 
watching the castle. But when he hears about the clothes, he happily follows Aladdin to the 
castle. The two of them have a great time inside!  
Puppet: I know what Aladdin/Abu did after he had dinner, Aladdin/Abu walked to the castle 
again. 
(7) Experimenter: This is a story about a baby dinosaur and a baby crocodile. They're near a 
river, where they've just hatched from their eggs. They stay and play by the river for a while... 
Then they notice that there's a tree not far away. The dinosaur wants to play under the tree, 
and he asks the crocodile to join him. “No,” says the crocodile. “I’m too sleepy to crawl right 
now.” So the dinosaur crawls to the tree by himself, and plays there for a while. Later when 
he crawls back to the river, he starts missing the tree, and he wonders if he should go there 
for a second time. “It's a little bit far, but I think I’ll crawl there anyway. It’s a lot of fun to 
play under the tree!” He decides to ask the crocodile to come with him. The crocodile is still 
sleepy, but he feels bad saying no for a second time. So, the crocodile and the dinosaur both 
crawl under the tree, and they both have a great time there! 
Puppet: I know what the dinosaur/the crocodile did in the end. The dinosaur/the crocodile 
crawled under the tree again.  
(8) Experimenter: This is a story about a woodpecker and a sparrow. One day the two of them 
are out flying, when they spot a lighthouse on an island not far away. Neither one of them has 
ever been to a lighthouse before. They're both curious about what’s inside... The sparrow 
says, “Let’s fly there and take a look." But the woodpecker answers, “No, I think it might be 
scary inside. I'd rather fly to a tree nearby.” So the woodpecker flies to a tree, and the 
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sparrow flies toward the lighthouse on his own. When he gets there he enters the lighthouse 
and discovers that it's warm and cozy inside. Later, when he flies back to the woodpecker, 
the two of them take a nap in the tree. When the sparrow wakes up, he starts to think about 
going to the lighthouse for a second visit. He likes it there, but he also wants some company, 
so he tries to get the woodpecker to join him. At first, the woodpecker doesn’t want to fly 
there, because he still thinks it could be scary. But once the sparrow tells him that it’s warm 
and cozy there, the woodpecker decides to see it for himself. So the two of them fly into the 
lighthouse, and they both enjoy the beautiful view. 
Puppet: I know what the sparrow/woodpecker did after he napped in the tree. The 
sparrow/woodpecker flew into the lighthouse again. 
C. Restitutive stories 
(9) Experimenter: Look, here’s a puppy dog! He was born in a doghouse. He’s never left his 
doghouse, because he’s still too young. But now he's getting bigger, and today is his very 
first day to go outside. He is really excited! He walks out to a tree, where he meets a bunny 
rabbit. The two of them have lots of fun talking to each other. But then the puppy starts to get 
worried, because he knows his family is waiting for him. Still, he doesn’t want to say 
goodbye to his new friend... So, he decides to invite the bunny to go home with him. The 
bunny has never been to a doghouse before. He's very excited. The two of them walk back 
happily, and they have a great dinner with the puppy's family!  
Puppet: I know what the puppy/bunny did after he met the puppy at the tree. The 
puppy/bunny walked to the doghouse again. 
(10) Experimenter: This is a story about a robin and a crow. The robin was born inside a 
birdcage. She loves her cozy home. People always provide plenty of food, so she never, ever 
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leaves her cage. One day, however, she somehow runs out of food. And you know what? Her 
cage door is open. So she flies out of the cage and goes to a tree to find some worms. There 
she meets a crow, who has never been in a birdcage... The robin likes the tree. It’s warm and 
comfortable. But she likes her own place better. She wants to go home. So she flies back to 
her cozy birdcage. The crow, who has never even seen a birdcage before, follows the robin. 
When he arrives, he’s amazed by how fancy it is. He decides to live there too!  
Puppet: I know what the robin/ crow did in the end. The robin/crow flew into the birdcage 
again. 
(11) Experimenter: Look, here’s a helicopter... and do you know who the pilot is? It’s 
Woody!... One day Woody is out flying in his helicopter when suddenly, it stops working. He 
manages to land on an island, but he just can't get the helicopter to work. He's stranded! He 
walks all over the island but he can't find anyone. Then he sees a boat floating in the water. 
He swims to the boat and finds a fisherman there! The fisherman didn’t even know there was 
an island nearby. Woody wants to stay with the fisherman, but he also needs to fix his 
helicopter. So he swims back to the island. The fisherman, who has never been to this island 
before, gets in the water and follows Woody. When he reaches the island he helps Woody fix 
his helicopter. Once it's working, Woody and the fisherman decide to stay on the island for a 
while. 
Puppet: I know what Woody/the fisherman did after he met the fisherman/Woody on the boat. 
Woody/The fisherman swam to the island again. 
(12) Experimenter: This is a story about a baby lizard and a baby snail. Look! They're 
hatching from their eggs! The lizard is hatching under the rock, and the snail is hatching by 
the river... The lizard stays under the rock for a while, enjoying the cool shade and the breezy 
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air. Then he starts to feel thirsty. So he crawls away from the rock to the river, and gets some 
water... there he meets the snail. Soon the sun starts to make the lizard feel hot. The lizard 
thinks, “Should I go back? It’s pretty out here, but I really liked the cool shade under the 
rock." He asks his new friend to join him. “Sure, I think it’s just too hot here,” says the snail. 
The lizard crawls under the rock and the snail goes there too. Both of them like it very much, 
and decide to stay under the rock for a long rest.    
Puppet: I know what the lizard/snail did in the end. The lizard/snail crawled under the rock 
again. 
(13) Experimenter: This is a story about a bear and a zebra. The bear was born in a forest. He 
loves the forest because he has lots of friends there. For many, many years he stays in the 
forest and never leaves. The zebra, on the other hand, was born in a grassland, and she's 
never seen anything else. She's never, ever been to a forest. One day the bear comes out of 
the forest. He arrives at the grassland and introduces himself to the zebra, who is very excited 
that she's finally meeting somebody from the forest. After playing with the zebra for a while, 
the bear starts to miss home. He thinks, “I wonder if I should return to the forest. It’s a lot of 
fun out here, but I miss my family. I’m going back!” So the bear runs back, and when he gets 
there he’s very happy to be home! As it happens, the zebra has always wanted to see a forest 
for herself, so she decides to follow the bear. She runs after him into the forest. And you 
know what? She likes the forest so much that she decides to stay there forever! 
Puppet: I know what the bear did in the end. The bear again ran into the forest.  
(14) Experimenter: Look! There’s a pony! He was born on a farm. He’s never been outside of 
the farm, because the fence has always been too high for him to jump over. But now he's 
growing up. One day he decides to see how strong he really is. So, he gathers up all his 
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strength and... whoosh he jumps over the fence. He is very excited! He's made it out of the 
farm! But then he sees a young boy, and he starts to feel scared. He doesn't want the boy to 
see him, so as fast as he can, he uses all of his might and jumps back into the farm. 
Unfortunately, he isn't fast enough. The boy has already spotted him, and follows him to the 
fence. The boy has never been to a farm before, and he thinks the fence looks pretty tall, but 
he decides to try his best and... he jumps over it! Now he's inside the farm, and he can meet 
the pony!  The two become best friends. 
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